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1994 Papua New Guinea financial crisis

1994 economic and financial crisis

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Through Government debt, Commodity and Australia

The country's national debt and deficit rose throughout the early 1990s, during a time when Australian budgetary support was declining and the formerly very profitable Panguna mine was closed. The increased government expenditures did not translate into improved public services, with health and education declining. These years saw historically high levels of capital flight. At the end of 1993, foreign reserves were reduced to just two weeks of expenditures. While deficits continued to increase, in early 1994 tax revenue decreased, and both the central bank and international financial institutions warned of a pending economic crisis.

The government took a number of measures to cut spending, including changing how government expenditures were approved and delaying non-salary payments. These actions impacted both the public and private sectors, reducing public services and depressing private economic activity. An unrelated change of government at the end of August was followed by the new government implementing further measures, including selling off its stakes in some companies, and devaluing the Papua New Guinean kina. The kina was eventually fully floated.

In 1995 the government entered a multi-year economic reform programme funded by foreign loans. This sought to provide economic stability and increase investment. Government expenditures were restructured, non-tariff barriers to trade were reduced, and public services were devolved to provinces and districts. Overall, the budget deficit decreased and even achieved a small surplus, and the economy began to grow again. Nonetheless, growth remained slow until the early 2000s.

Background

Papua New Guinean government debt sharply rose in the early 1990s, with external debt increasing 50% from 1989 to 1993, while domestic debt almost tripled from 1989 to 1994. The deficit rose from 1.2% of GDP in 1989 to 5.9% in 1993.

Some of this change was a result of decreased revenue. The Panguna mine's closure due to the Bougainville conflict reduced revenue from 1990 onwards, while the same conflict also necessitated increased expenditure for recovery efforts. That single closure reduced government tax revenue by 20%, causing by itself a minor economic crisis, although this was alleviated slightly in 1991, following the opening of the Porgera Gold Mine. Nonetheless, the overall budget had become heavily reliant on oil alone. The recovery of mineral income likely prompted more government spending and borrowing in 1993 and 1994, which sought to diversify the market. This was initially successful, with GDP growing 16% in 1993. The government at this time removed tuition fees, increased public salaries, and reduced taxes. However, commodity prices overall decreased starting in 1990, and oil prices declined in late 1993 and early 1994.

Australia reduced its monetary support during this period, from K311.7 million in 1991 to K184 million in 1993, as part of an overall movement towards removing budgetary support entirely and switching to project aid. The short tenure of most Papua New Guinean governments, often around 18 months, meant that decision-making was often short-term. Government reforms made in 1989 as part of a loan agreement with the World Bank Group were partially reversed in 1992.

Between 1991 and 1994, government expenses exceeded targets multiple times. Much of the government expenditure during this time went towards recurring expenses, leading to a decline in infrastructure investment as well as in health and education services. Public services declined in the late 1980s and early 1990s, despite the increased spending. However, there was also an increasing amount of unplanned expenditure, which was 14.3% of spending in 1992, 18% in 1993, and 23.4% in the first half of 1994. These repeated budget deficits were likely linked to high levels of capital flight from 1990 to 1994, larger than any previous capital outflow. Foreign reserves were just US$40 million at the end of 1993, enough for only two weeks of non-mining imports.

As the economic situation began to deteriorate, an emergency mini-budget was produced in March 1994, increasing taxes and decreasing spending, although this did not halt the growing crisis. In the first half of 1994 the deficit reached 11% of GDP, up from 6% in 1993. This was a result of both increased spending and lower than expected revenue. Some of this deficit was financed through borrowing, exceeding the legal lending limits of the Bank of Papua New Guinea (albeit not for the first time). Government reserves also decreased. A deficit of K277.5 million was greater than the expected deficit for the whole year. At the same time, revenue for the first half of 1994 was 2.6% lower than the same period in 1993. Although in March 1994 the new finance minister who had replaced Julius Chan in January 1994 increased taxes and took actions to reduce expenditures, breaking from Chan's budgets, in June 1994 warnings of a financial crisis were issued by the Bank of Papua New Guinea, as well as the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank.

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