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2008–2014 Spanish financial crisis

Economic situation in Spain

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Manifestación de Democracia Real Ya en Madrid el 16 de mayo de 2011.
furilo · CC BY-SA 2.0

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Through Balance of trade, Competition (economics) and Eurozone

The main cause of Spain's crisis was the housing bubble and the accompanying unsustainably high GDP growth rate. The ballooning tax revenues from the booming property investment and construction sectors kept the Spanish government's revenue in surplus, despite strong increases in expenditure, until 2007. The Spanish government supported the critical development by relaxing supervision of the financial sector and thereby allowing the banks to violate International Accounting Standards Board standards. The banks in Spain were able to hide losses and earnings volatility, mislead regulators, analysts, and investors, and thereby finance the Spanish real estate bubble. The results of the crisis were devastating for Spain, including a strong economic downturn, a severe increase in unemployment, and bankruptcies of major companies.

Even though some fundamental problems in the Spanish economy were already evident far ahead of the crisis, Spain continued the path of unsustainable property led growth when the ruling party changed in 2004. In these times Spain had already a huge trade deficit, a loss of competitiveness against its main trading partners, an above-average inflation rate, house price increases, and a growing family indebtedness.

Following Spain's entry into the eurozone in 1999, lower interest rates and convergence with European inflation rates contributed to a rapid expansion of credit. Credit to the non-financial private sector grew at an average annual rate of about 17% between 1997 and 2007, substantially faster than nominal GDP, with particularly rapid growth in lending to construction and real-estate activities. Private-sector indebtedness consequently increased sharply during the boom, with credit flows to the private sector averaging around 18 percentage points of GDP annually between 1999 and 2007. During the third quarter of 2008 the national GDP contracted for the first time in 15 years, and, in February 2009, Spain (and other European economies) officially entered recession. The economy contracted 3.7% in 2009 and again in 2010 by 0.1%. It grew by 0.7% in 2011. By the 1st quarter of 2012, Spain was officially in recession once again. The Spanish government forecast a 1.7% drop for 2012.

The provision of up to €100 billion of rescue loans from eurozone funds was agreed by eurozone finance ministers on 9 June 2012. As of October 2012, the so-called Troika (European Commission, ECB and IMF) was in negotiations with Spain to establish an economic recovery program required for providing additional financial loans from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). In addition to applying for a €100 billion bank recapitalization package in June 2012, Spain negotiated financial support from a "Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line" (PCCL) package. If Spain applied and received a PCCL package, irrespective to what extent it subsequently decided to draw on this established credit line, this would at the same time immediately qualify the country to receive "free" additional financial support from the European Central Bank (ECB), in the form of some unlimited yield-lowering bond purchases.

The turning point for the Spanish sovereign debt crisis occurred on 26 July 2012, when ECB President Mario Draghi said that the ECB was "ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro". Announced on 6 September 2012, the ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program of unlimited purchases of short-term sovereign debt put the ECB's balance sheet behind the pledge. Speculative runs against Spanish sovereign debt were discouraged and 10-year bond yields stayed below the 6% level, approaching the 5% level by the end of 2012.

Property bubble

The residential real estate bubble saw real estate prices rise 200% from 1996 to 2007.

€651 billion was the mortgage debt of Spanish families in the second quarter of 2005 (this debt continued to grow at 25% per year – 2001 through 2005, with 97% of mortgages at variable rate interest). In 2004, 509,293 new properties were built in Spain and in 2005 the number of new properties built was 528,754. In a country with 16.5 million families, there were 22–24 million houses and 3–4 million empty houses. From all the houses built over the 2001–2007 period, "no less than 28%" were vacant as of late 2008.

House ownership in Spain is above 80%. The desire to own one's own home was encouraged by governments in the 60s and 70s, and has thus become part of the Spanish psyche. In addition, tax regulation encourages ownership: 15% of mortgage payments are deductible from personal income taxes. Even more, the oldest apartments are controlled by non-inflation-adjusted rent controls and eviction is slow, therefore discouraging renting.

When the speculative bubble popped Spain became one of the worst affected countries. According to Eurostat, between June 2007 and June 2008, Spain has been the European country with the sharpest plunge in construction, with actual sales down an average 25.3%. So far, some regions have been more affected than others (Catalonia was ahead in this regard with a 42.2% sales plunge while sparsely populated regions like Extremadura were down a mere 1.7% over the same period).

Banks offered 40-year mortgages and, more recently, 50-year mortgages. While some observers suggest that a soft landing would occur, others suggest that a crash in prices is probable. Lower home prices would allow low-income families and young people to enter the market; however, there is a strong perception that house prices never go down. As of August 2008, while new constructions have come virtually to a halt, prices have not had significant movements either up or downwards. The national average price as of late 2008 is 2,095 euros/m2.

Housing prices were projected to fall another 25%. Government protections allow banks to avoid marking-to-market to postpone losses. "Spanish housing prices are now falling at the fastest pace on record" dropping 15.2% over the last year. Mortgage holders must continue to pay the debt even after a foreclosure. Banks have begun to accept "deed-in-lieu deals" in which the debt is cancelled if the property is surrendered, allowing the bank to quickly sell and recoup a greater percentage of the loan or turn the property into a rental. The collapse of the property market also produced a large number of mortgage foreclosures and evictions. In March 2013, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that Spanish legislation was contrary to EU consumer-protection law because a court assessing whether a mortgage term was unfair could not suspend the separate mortgage-enforcement proceedings. The ruling highlighted the limited protection available to mortgage borrowers under Spanish law.

Some developments resemble ghost towns. For instance, the town of Valdeluz was constructed for 30,000 people, but had a population of only 700 people in 2011. Ghost airports such as €1.1 billion Ciudad Real Central Airport, Castellón-Costa Azahar Airport and others were built.

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