Central Commission for Discipline Inspection

At its first plenary session after being elected by a CCP National Congress, the CCDI elect its secretary, deputy secretaries, secretary general and other Standing Committee members. The CCDI then reports the election results to the Central Committee, which can either approve or disapprove of the results. The CCDI Standing Committee is responsible for convening and presiding over plenary sessions of the CCDI. When the CCDI is not in session, its powers and responsibilities are delegated to the CCDI Standing Committee, which has to implement the decisions of the CCP Central Committee and the CCDI plenary sessions. It is held accountable to the CCDI plenary sessions. The secretary convenes, presides over the work and sets the agenda of the CCDI Standing Committee meetings. The current secretary is Li Xi, who was elected by the 1st Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and approved by the 20th Central Committee on 23 October 2022.

The modern commission was established at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978. Control systems had existed previously under the name "Central Control Commission" for a brief period in 1927 and again between 1955 and 1968, and under its present name from 1949 to 1955. It was disbanded during the Cultural Revolution in 1969. In 1993, the internal operations of the agency and the government's Ministry of Supervision (MOS) were merged. However, beginning with Hu Jintao's term as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2002, and especially following Xi Jinping's assumption of the party leadership in November 2012, the CCDI has undergone significant reforms to increase its autonomy. Since 2018, the National Supervisory Commission has acted as the state arm of the CCDI.

History

Before the People's Republic

The idea of a control system was inspired by Vladimir Lenin in The State and Revolution. Lenin argued that every communist vanguard party, at all levels, needed a system to supervise party-official elections, dismissals, and performance. His writings led to the establishment of the Soviet Central Control Commission. The control system and the party structure were imported by China. The importance of discipline and supervision was emphasized since the CCP's founding. The 2nd National Congress amended the party constitution, devoting a chapter to party discipline. However, no institution was established to safeguard party norms or supervise cadre behavior. Until the establishment of the Central Control Commission (CCC) at the 5th National Congress in 1927, local party committees were responsible for supervising members.

The 5th National Congress again amended the party constitution, adding a chapter on control commissions and their aims, but devoting little attention to their operations. Partly because of this, the control commissions actively participated in several party rectification campaigns during the late 1920s and early 1930s. At that time, the commissions tended to participate in political struggles, most notably the purges of Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming.

The control system was reorganized as the Central Review Committee (1928–1933), the Central Party Affairs Committee (1933–1945), and the Central Control Commission (1945–1949). Despite these changes, the duties and responsibilities of the control bodies remained vague until the amendments to the party constitution at the 7th National Congress in 1945. Although it may be argued that the 1945 amendments did little to clarify the role of a control body, the party leadership expanded on the theoretical reasons for its existence. It was argued in the party constitution that the control system "was born to serve the needs of a Leninist party for its ideological and organizational consolidation. Such a role was reinforced in the Party's frequent campaigns against its real or perceived enemies in and out of the party organization."

In 1949, the Central Committee established the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). It differed from its predecessors in several respects. It was responsible to the Politburo, and its local organizations were responsible for their corresponding party committees, despite the committees' authority to restrict their behavior. In reality, the CCDI was established to check all party organizations except the central leadership.

Political history

During its early years, the CCDI was not a powerful institution. Although it focused on abuses by party veterans and senior officials, the CCDI rarely appeared on record at that time as investigating (or solving) those problems. The few mentions of CCDI inspectors in the press highlighted their failures. Despite the support of Mao Zedong and the central party leadership, it was often unable to fulfill its mandate in the provinces. According to a People's Daily editorial, party inspectors "gave up the struggle and proved themselves unable to persist in ... upholding the dignity of Party discipline when they encountered great obstacles." Aware of Yan'an Rectification Movement successes and CCDI failures, the party leadership used mass mobilization and ideological campaigns to tackle party corruption during the 1950s. In the wake of the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi affair, the CCDI was replaced by the CCC.

Although the CCC became a powerful political force in the following years, at the 8th National Congress in 1956, its inspectors were warned about abusing their power and becoming independent of their local party committees. Its power waned during the Great Leap Forward, but the CCC, the Secretariat, and the Organization Department became the chief weapons in the aftermath of the Great Leap to combat corruption and reverse verdicts on rightists. The CCC played its new role until the Cultural Revolution, a socio-political movement which lasted from 1966 until 1976, when it was affected by purges (partly due to its close ties to Peng Zhen, one of the first highly ranked officials purged during the Cultural Revolution). At the 9th National Congress in 1969, the CCC was abolished, removed from the party constitution, and replaced by special-case organizations (such as the Central Case Examination Group) formed under Mao and Kang Sheng. Despite its abolition at the congress, little criticism was directed at the CCC during the Cultural Revolution; although CCC Deputy Secretary Min Yifan was criticized by the Red Guards, a revolutionary youth movement independent of the party (but inspired by Mao) during the Cultural Revolution. Most of their disapproval focused on his career on local committees, rather than the CCC. Talk of an internal party-control system would not resurface until the death of Mao and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976.

The CCDI was reestablished at the 11th National Congress in 1977. It had three goals: removing the social influence of the Gang of Four, implementing the leadership's cadre policy, and removing "despotic" local party secretaries, and reversing poor verdicts handed down during the Cultural Revolution. Due to the power struggle between Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng, the control system was not implemented in 1977–1978. The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978 formed a new control system under its 1949–1955 name, with responsibilities identical to those of the CCC before its abolition. After the 3rd Plenary Session, the CCDI convened its 1st Plenary Session and elected Chen Yun as First Secretary, Deng Yingchao as Second Secretary, Hu Yaobang as Third Secretary, and Huang Kecheng as Permanent Secretary. However, the election of these people (and others) was purely symbolic; the new CCDI consisted generally of people who had never been involved in control affairs, and overwhelmingly of members considered too young to be taken seriously. In its 1st Plenary Session, the CCDI stated three overarching goals: to "protect party members' rights", to enforce and safeguard the system of collective leadership "with the division of labor by the individual", and to generally oppose the over-concentration of power in one individual. It would combat corrupt tendencies in the party and handle individual complaints.

Although the press and the CCDI highlighted its fight against corruption, the commission was powerless against many "local despots": leaders who ruled largely by fiat. During the early 1980s, the 11th Central Committee was forced to enact emergency measures to combat corruption. Instead of fighting corrupt officials, the CCDI's local branches focused on the rank and file. It was an organizational weapon against the "leftists" (who advanced during the Cultural Revolution or supported it) and the "rightists" (supporters of bourgeois democracy). After weakening under Zhao Ziyang, CCDI power increased in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 under the tutelage of Deng and Jiang Zemin.

Despite the commission's position as the party's – and China's – leading anti-corruption agency, its leaders have admitted serious deficiencies in its work. CCDI Secretary Wei Jianxing allegedly tendered his resignation "on the eve" of the 5th Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee in 2000 to protest the commission's impotence. His successor Wu Guanzheng found himself in a similar situation, allegedly tendering his resignation in August 2005. Although neither resigned before the end of his term, they were unable to increase CCDI independence from the committees or end the Central Secretariat's interference in its activities.

In late 2013, Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and head of China's security agencies, was placed under investigation by the CCDI for abuse of power and corruption, a decision state media announced in July 2014. Zhou was the first PSC member – and the most senior-ranked official – since the founding of the People's Republic of China to be tried and convicted of corruption-related charges. Following his investigation, Zhou was expelled from the CCP. On 11 June 2015, Zhou was convicted of bribery, abuse of power, and the intentional disclosure of state secrets. Zhou and his family members were said to have taken 129 million yuan (over $20 million) in bribes. He was sentenced to life in prison.

According to scholar Xuezhi Guo, "From 1992 to 2009, China brought disciplinary sanctions against approximately two million personnel". The CCDI cited similar numbers: "[B]etween July 2003 and December 2008, the CCDI had tried and closed 852,000 cases, resulting in 881,000 officials receiving disciplinary sanctions." In 2009, the CCDI imposed disciplinary sanctions on 106,626 party members and officials; 146,517 in 2010; 142,893 in 2011; 160,718 in 2012, and 182,000 in 2013. From 2012 to October 2017, disciplinary action started against 1.4 million communist party members. As of 2014, five of the 31 CDI secretaries were women: Huang Xiaowei, Hong Qiang, Zhang Xiaolan, Ma Yongxia, and Song Airong. Of these Zhang, at age 50, was currently the youngest serving CDI provincial secretary.

Institutional history

Founding, abolition, and reestablishment (1949–1980)

The Chinese control system was inspired by Soviet control institutions, most notably the Party Control Committee (PCC). Although, according to Lenin, the Soviet PCC was established to cure the party's bureaucratic ills, it evolved into a tool wielded by party secretaries. The CCDI system was not empowered to the same extent as its Soviet counterpart, since Mao favored mass mobilization and ideological campaigns over party disciplinary measures to curb bad behavior. Even those who shared the Soviet fascination with organizational self-correction, like Liu Shaoqi and Dong Biwu, did not share their obsession with "scientific administration".

The CCDI was cumbersome; twenty-seven separate procedures had to be completed before an official could be placed under investigation. Other problems were institutional; for example, the commission had no organization below the provincial level. In response to the CCDI's failures, the 8th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party established the CCC. Delegates noted that the CCDI's problems were its lack of independence from party committees and the lack of meaningful collaboration between a control commission at one level and those at higher levels. The institutional balance favoring party committees led some (such as Gao Gang and Rao Shushi) to pack local commissions for discipline inspection (CDI) with loyalists who had no interest in carrying out their responsibilities. The control commissions had the power to appeal committee decisions, and were required to report their work to the higher-level control commission. Unlike the CCDI, the CCC had an organization below the provincial level. It was empowered to "examine, approve, and change decisions by lower control committees", was required to verify the composition of control committees at the provincial level and below, and had the power to investigate unreliable elements at will. Bonds were forged with the Ministry of Supervision (MOS) and the Supreme People's Procuratorate to strengthen the anti-corruption agencies' control of "the rapidly expanding party organization and an increasingly elaborate state bureaucracy".

The main goals of these reforms were to strengthen the autonomy of the control commissions from the local ruling committees and safeguard the powers of the center, which were threatened during the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi affair. However, CCP leadership backtracked; at the 8th National Congress, the autonomy of the CCC and the control commissions was reduced. The congress was held in a conservative atmosphere, with the leadership calling for collective leadership of all institutions; the concept of the CCC and the local control commissions having "special rights" to carry out their duties was antithetical to collegial decision-making. The CCC was abolished at the 9th Congress (during the Cultural Revolution), and was reestablished at the 11th National Congress. The 11th National Congress amended the party constitution to state that the "Central Committee of the Party, local Party committees at the county level and above and Party committees in the army units at the regimental level and above should set up commissions for inspecting discipline". The system was in place by December 1978, and a corresponding control system in the military was established in 1981 as the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission. The CCDI's importance was institutionalized by a party regulation that its head must be a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.

"Dual-leadership" system (1980–2002)

According to Lawrence Sullivan, during the 1980s some cadres saw the CCDI's lack of independence as problematic; they argued that it should be independent from the Central Committee, not involving itself in the committee's power struggles. This was opposed by the CCDI leadership, with Huang saying that loyalty to the Central Committee was "more important" than fighting corruption. The chief problem during the early 1980s was CCDI links to local party committees. The local committees elected the commission for discipline inspection (CDI) at their level, but the higher-level CDI could endorse – or reject – the proposed committee. This made the local CDI responsible to its party committee, rather than to the CCDI. Although the organizers of the system were aware of the danger, they believed that the CDIs (through their connection with the central leadership) would be able to carry out their assigned task despite their election by the committee they were supposed to inspect. This institutional anomaly secured the position of corrupt (or "despotic") committee members.

Because of this institutional structure, it was nearly impossible for the CCDI to carry out its mandate. On the few occasions when it attempted to investigate leading officials, it often experienced retaliation. These problems were widespread, leading the Third Secretary to say that "considerable and, in some cases, shocking obstructions in the [CCDI's] work [occurred often]." The party leadership tried to solve these problems at the 12th National Congress, in 1982, by expanding CCDI jurisdiction and authority. The amended party constitution stated that the CCDI's responsibility was "to safeguard the Party's Constitution and other important rules and regulations, to assist Party committees in rectifying Party style, to inspect implementation of the Party's line, principles, policies, and resolutions." The commission became the defender of party orthodoxy, party organization, rules and regulations, the Central Committee, and democratic centralism (defined as obeying the Central Committee). The amendment allowed local CDIs to "take their case to the next-higher party committee" if they considered the committee decision at their level faulty. The 12th National Congress introduced dual leadership in local CDIs; they were responsible to the party committees at their (and the higher) level and to the higher-level CDI. Although each CDI elects a Standing Committee, the 12th National Congress retained a regulation that the Standing Committee must obtain the endorsement of its party committee. That was why the CCDI, elected by the National Congress (not the Central Committee, as it was previously), remained subordinate to the Central Committee. If a Central Committee member was suspected, the CCDI would have to inform (and obtain a ruling from) the Central Committee to begin an investigation.

Unlike the 12th National Congress, the 13th National Congress in 1987 reduced the CCDI's power. Reformist general secretary Zhao Ziyang wanted to end CCDI meddling in China's legal system and reduce its scope to party-discipline issues. Forty-nine CCDI discipline-inspection groups in central ministries and party organizations were abolished at the congress (75 percent of all inspection groups), and the CCDI's chief lost his seat on the Politburo Standing Committee. In the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, Zhao Ziyang's reforms were rescinded, and the former CCDI inspection groups were reestablished. Commission power was increased, and the CCDI issued the "five forbiddens"; party members could not "(1) operate a business, (2) work in an economic entity, (3) trade in stocks, (4) accept gifts, or (5) use public funds for lavish entertainment." The 14th National Congress, in 1992, strengthened CCDI and local CDI investigative powers. According to the amended party constitution, local CDIs could initiate preliminary investigations against members of the local party committee at the CDI's level before a formal investigation began. If a full investigation was warranted, the local CDI had to obtain approval from its higher-level CDI and the corresponding party committee. In 1995, its powers were increased further, with each CDI given the responsibility to vet officials before their appointment to a post. The shuanggui system (see below) was established in 1994 by order of the CCDI. It was first officially mentioned in Article 28 of the Regulation on Dealing with Cases of Party Discipline Violations, which came into effect on 1 May 1994.

Since the 1990s, the mission of CDI's have been less political and more focused on anticorruption efforts.

Institution-building (2002–present)

The CCDI was further reformed at the 16th National Congress in 2002. The CCDI Secretary was now the chief coordinator of all anti-corruption efforts on the mainland, a position later known as Leader of the Central Leading Group for Inspection Work. This was further codified in 2004 and 2005 with the "Internal Supervision Regulation" (ISR), institutionalizing the inner-party supervision system and the Interim Provisions on DICs' Role in Assisting the party Committees with the Organization and Coordination of Anti-Corruption Work. The terminology used in the battle against corruption was changed at the congress; "fighting corruption" became "fighting and preventing corruption". The Hu Jintao-led leadership, which lasted from the 16th–18th National Congress, saw growth in CCDI power and influence, demonstrated most clearly by the increased attendance of PSC members at CCDI plenary sessions.

Under Secretary Wu Guanzheng, the CCDI established its first central inspection teams in August 2003. These teams, led by retired ministerial-level officials and reporting to the CCDI rather than local party committees, were empowered to initiate investigations, conduct interviews, and review relevant documents. The opinion of a central inspection team was an important factor in determining whether or not an official was disciplined, and the teams played an important role in the expulsion of Shanghai party chief (and Politburo member) Chen Liangyu from the party because of corruption.

The dual-leadership system was reformed during Hu Jintao's term. In the aftermath of the Shanghai pension scandal, the central party leadership appointed the CDI leaders of the four direct-controlled municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing) and suggested a preference for outsiders as CDI leaders in the provinces. Beginning in 2009, localities below the prefecture level began to abolish the practice of a control body in every party-controlled organization. Before the reforms, every organization (civil, party, or government) with an embedded party committee or party group had a corresponding CDI-style department. The reforms consolidated control and supervision resources (including finances and personnel) under the auspices of the prefecture- or county-level CDI, which became an "umbrella supervision organ" of all party-controlled bodies in its area of jurisdiction and those below it. The umbrella organization gave the CDI control of the staffing of party organizations it was tasked with overseeing, allowing more efficient use of CDI resources and reducing potential conflicts of interest arising from CDI staff involvement in the operations of a party committee it was supposed to regulate.

The CCDI underwent another round of reforms under general secretary Xi Jinping, elected in the immediate aftermath of the 18th National Congress in 2012. Xi and CCDI Secretary Wang Qishan further institutionalized CCDI independence from the day-to-day operations of the party, improving its ability to function as a bona fide control body. At the 3rd Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in the fall of 2013, the party declared that it would "strengthen the dual leadership system [over the CCDI] by making it more defined, procedure-oriented, and institutionalised." In practice, this signaled the intention of the leadership that CDIs across the country operate separate from the party apparatus headed by the party committees, with local CDIs responsible to higher-level CDIs in nearly all substantive respects. Beginning in 2014, CDI chiefs across the country began to shed concurrent executive positions which could create conflicts of interest (for example, a CDI chief also serving as a vice-mayor or department head); CDI personnel also began removing themselves from "leading groups" and similar policy-coordination and consultation groups. These changes were intended to free CDI resources to "solely focus on the work of enforcing discipline".

Since the 18th National Congress, the CCDI has established several new organizations, including four new discipline and inspection offices. On 28 March 2013, the Central Committee ordered the establishment of Propaganda and Organization Departments in the CCDI, the first such departments in a central-level institution other than the Central Committee. According to China scholar Willy Lam, the establishment of a CCDI Organization Department means "that the CCDI leadership can recruit cadres outside the established channels of the CCP Organisation Department, which has, since 1949, been responsible for the Party's human resources-related operations."

In 2014, the CCDI established an internal Office for the Supervision of Disciplinary System Officials. The office, an internal check on CCDI officials, ensures that officials charged with enforcing discipline operate within the rules themselves and has jurisdiction over CDI officials at all administrative levels. The CCDI intends "zero tolerance" towards CDI officials breaching discipline themselves, and they will be "exposed by name in the media" if they break the rules. That year, the CCDI set up offices in bodies directly reporting to the central committee (such as the Organization and Publicity Departments) and State Council bodies. These offices, known as "Commissioned Bodies", report directly to the CCDI and are not responsible to the institutions in which they are located. 2018 saw the Shuanggui system being replaced by the Liuzhi. In 2024, the CCDI disciplined 94,000 officials for "irresponsibility", "inaction," and "pretending to work".