Central Treaty Organization

U.S. pressure and promises of military and economic aid were key in the negotiations leading to the agreement, but the United States could not initially participate. John Foster Dulles, who was involved in the negotiations as United States Secretary of State under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, claimed that was due to "the pro-Israel lobby and the difficulty of obtaining Congressional Approval." Others said that the reason was "for purely technical reasons of budgeting procedures."

In 1958, the U.S. joined the military committee of the alliance. It is generally viewed as one of the least successful of the Cold War alliances.

The organization's headquarters was in Baghdad, Iraq from 1955 to 1958 and thereafter in Ankara, Turkey from 1958 to 1979. Cyprus was also an important location for CENTO due to the British military bases in Akrotiri and Dhekelia along with the island’s location in the Middle East.

History

Modeled after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), METO committed the nations to mutual cooperation and protection, as well as non-intervention in each other's affairs. Its goal was to contain the Soviet Union (USSR) by having a line of strong states along the Soviet Union's southwestern frontier. Similarly, it was known as the 'Northern Tier' to prevent Soviet expansion into the Middle East. Unlike NATO, METO did not have a unified military command structure, nor were many American or British military bases established in member countries, although the United States had communications and electronic intelligence facilities in Iran, and operated U-2 intelligence flights over the Soviet Union from bases in Pakistan. The United Kingdom had access to facilities in Pakistan and Iraq at various times while the treaty was in effect.

On 14 July 1958, the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in a military coup. The new government was led by military officer Abd al-Karim Qasim who withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, opened diplomatic relations with Soviet Union and adopted a non-aligned stance. The organization dropped the name 'Baghdad Pact' in favor of 'CENTO' at that time.

The Middle East and South Asia became extremely volatile areas during the 1960s with the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict and the Indo-Pakistani wars. CENTO was unwilling to get deeply involved in either dispute. In 1965 and 1971, Pakistan unsuccessfully tried to get assistance in its wars with India through CENTO, but this was rejected under the idea that CENTO was aimed at containing the Soviet Union, not India. Before the Civil War in Pakistan and war with India in 1971 & 1965, Pakistan's President Ayub Khan said that his nation was losing faith in the military pact due to its inability to assist its allies in 1962.

CENTO did little to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence to non-member states in the area. Whatever containment value the pact might have had was lost when the Soviets 'leap-frogged' the member states, establishing close military and political relationships with governments in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. By 1970, the Soviet Union had deployed over 20,000 troops to Egypt, and had established naval bases in Syria, Somalia, and South Yemen.

The alliance's stance and perceived indifference toward Pakistan losing territory with Indian participation upon Bangladesh's independence in 1971 permanently damaged the alliance's reputation in Pakistan in particular and harmed its standing in general, as the lack of a collective response to a member's territorial integrity being challenged cast doubt on its efficacy and utility and generated skepticism that the alliance was mutually beneficial rather than a tool of Anglo-American and Western hegemony. Whereas other alliance members stayed out of the Indo-Pakistani wars on the grounds that the alliance didn't need to defend Pakistan since it was intended to contain the Soviet Union not India, Eastern Bloc members readily assisted less Western-friendly Arab governments' 1973 attack on Israel. Anti-Western interests engaged in a more activist foreign policy regionally by participating overtly in Middle Eastern conflicts in one form or another and one of the original arguments in favor of the increasingly passive alliance, that it'd serve as a valuable counterweight to the influence of Nasser's Soviet-friendly Arab nationalism, was discredited and weakened.

The Iranian Revolution spelled the end of the organization in 1979, but in reality, it essentially had been finished since 1974, when Turkey invaded Cyprus. This led the United Kingdom to withdraw forces that had been earmarked to the alliance – Nos 9 and 35 Squadrons flying Avro Vulcan bombers, and the United States Congress halted military aid to Turkey despite two presidential vetoes. With the fall of the Iranian monarchy, whatever remaining rationale for the organization was lost. Future U.S. and British defence agreements with regional countries – such as Pakistan, Egypt, and the Arab-Gulf states – were conducted bilaterally.

With the withdrawal of Iran, the Secretary-General of CENTO, Turkish diplomat Kamuran Gürun, announced on March 16, 1979, that he would call a meeting of the pact's council in order to formally dissolve the organization.