Cisplatine War

Internal situation

United Provinces

Having recently gained their independence, the provinces that once constituted the former Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata were undergoing a process of internal organization in the early 1820s. Following the Battle of Cepeda in 1820, the Directory of the United Provinces collapsed and Buenos Aires ceased to exercise control over the other interior provinces, leaving the country without a centralized authority.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, General Juan Gregorio de Las Heras—having succeeded Martín Rodríguez as governor of Buenos Aires in 1824—convened the General Constituent Congress with representatives from all the provinces, whose initial objective was for them to delegate the conduct of foreign relations to the province of Buenos Aires. The provinces, for their part, sought the formation of a national government. As its first measure, the assembled Congress approved, on 23 January 1825, the "Fundamental Law" granting the provinces the right to accept or reject the constitution that would eventually be approved, while also delegating the conduct of foreign relations to Buenos Aires. Once work on drafting the national constitution began, the options outlined for the country's organization were divided between a federal model and a unitary one. Proponents of the unitary model argued that the central state should consolidate all state powers, leaving the provinces without autonomy and restricted to local administration. Conversely, the federalists advocated for sovereignty to be shared between the provinces and the central state, with the latter's powers delegated by the provincial states, which would retain the right to enact their own laws and constitutions. A consultation with the provinces was then held; despite the diverse opinions expressed regarding the form of government to be adopted, the deputies ultimately decided in favor of a unitary system.

With the outbreak of war and faced with the pressing need to establish a permanent national executive authority to manage the conflict, the Presidency Law was approved on 6 February 1826. Through this law, Congress appointed Bernardino Rivadavia, a liberal and prominent unitario, as the first president of the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, whose duties included serving as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Opposing forces

Argentine

Republican Army

By January 1826 the Observation Army numbered 2,000 men, but its ranks gradually grew as troops from other Argentine provinces arrived. It was made up of pre-existing units, such as part of the Río de la Plata Regiment, which consisted mostly of Afro-Argentines who had fought in José de San Martín's campaign in Peru, troops from the Auxiliary Army of Peru and a light infantry battalion created in Salta to fight against the royalists. According to the plan, each province was to provide 1.33% of their population, but recruitment proved difficult. The inhabitants of distant provinces had little interest in the war, and so troops from these provinces came at a slow pace. Desertion rates were high, and units sent to join the army arrived at the camp already depleted. Another issue was the lack of materiel. The commander Martín Rodríguez noted that the army did not have "funds [...] for the much-needed purchase of horses, and even to pay the salary of the soldier who comes from remote provinces with the expectation of receiving it monthly".

By the end of March the army numbered 2,800 men, well below the number anticipated by the government. According to Gabriel Di Meglio, the practice of capturing slaves for the army, which had been an important tool during the country's war of independence, "seems to have been somewhat more limited this time", as there was no slave trade in the country since 1812, and also due to the Free Womb law of 1813. Thus, new soldiers were mostly forced conscripts, who came from those deemed "vagrants" by the authorities. Harsh punishments were applied to deserters, such as floggings and even executions by firing squad. Lacking other effective means, the Argentine government intensified forced recruitment, especially in the province of Buenos Aires, where it had greater effective control.

Dissent among the Orientals and Argentines was also an issue, as Lavalleja refused to incorporate his forces into the Argentine Army or to submit to the orders of Martín Rodríguez. When the situation seemed to be heading toward an armed conflict, Lavalleja agreed to incorporate his forces into the National Army, at the same time that the Buenos Aires government replaced Martín Rodríguez with Carlos María de Alvear as the commander-in-chief of the republican forces. The army finally began to organize and, under Alvear's command, the troops spent three months in training and preparation. Likewise, the necessary equipment was gradually received and distributed among the soldiers. Thus, when they began marching again in September 1826, the republican forces numbered around 12,000 men, including the Oriental troops, most of which consisted of cavalry. The Argentine Congress changed the country's name from United Provinces to Argentine Republic, in line with the Unitarian project, and the army adopted the name "Republican Army".

Republican Navy

In Jorge Toscano's words, when compared to Brazil's maritime power, the Argentine Navy was "insignificant and consisted of little more than a handful of small ships left aside since the independence campaign", also remarking that the sight of admiral Lobo's fleet anchored in front of Buenos Aires was a constant reminder of the country's vulnerability. As a result, measures began to be taken in mid-1825: the new Argentine navy minister, Marcos Balcarce, created the navy's structure and appointed commanders José Zapiola and Benito de Goyena; these, in turn, established the payments, rations and uniforms, and also published privateering rules. Balcarce also sought to increase the fleet's size. According to Angel Carranza, at the beginning of 1826 the Argentine fleet numbered 16 ships: a corvette, two brigs, a ketch, and 12 gunboats.

According to L. A. Boiteux, upon creating their navy, "the Argentines did so not only in accordance with their financial resources, but also with the hydrographic conditions of the theater of operations: robust medium-draft ships, sailboats, well equipped, easily manoeuvrable". In Carranza's view, the Argentine fleet consisted of "some materially weak vessels, but that became respectable and effective by the strong spirit of their crews".

Brazilian

Imperial Army

The Imperial Brazilian Army was officially created on 1 December 1824, when a decree established its regular organization, numbering and standardizing the various units that had fought under the Brazilian flag since the independence campaign in 1822. The force was divided into first- and second-line troops, consisting of paid soldiers and unpaid militias, respectively. The first line nominally numbered 30,000 men, divided into 3 grenadier battalions, 28 caçadores (light infantry) battalions, 7 cavalry regiments, 5 horse artillery corps, and 12 field artillery corps, spread across the country. Two grenadier and two caçadores battalions were made up of foreign mercenaries, mostly Germans and Irishmen. In turn, the second line numbered 40,000 men, but this figure did not translate into real military strength, given the lack of training among second-line troops, as well as their politically motivated recruitment, aimed at avoiding enlistment in the first line.

The first line units based in Rio Grande do Sul consisted of the 9th Battalion of Caçadores, and the 4th and 5th Cavalry Regiments, based in the cities of Porto Alegre, Jaguarão and Rio Pardo, respectively. The second line ones consisted of the 46th Battalion of Caçadores, spread across the province, and the 20th (Porto Alegre), 21st (Rio Grande), 22nd (Rio Pardo), 23rd (Alegrete), 24th and 25th (São Borja) Cavalry Regiments. The 25th Cavalry Regiment consisted only of Guarani indians. Recruitment was one of the main issues faced by the army. As early as 1823, members of the Constituent Assembly complained about the 'predatory' nature of recruitment, which amounted to a true "manhunt", threatening the country's economy and society. When the Brazilian Parliament met for the first time in 1826, it was a consensus among its members that recruitment needed to be reformed, but no concrete measures were taken, and so forced recruitment continued.

Imperial Navy

According to Brian Vale and Jorge Luis Toscano, Brazil was the largest naval power in the Americas at the time. Toscano estimated the Brazilian fleet at no less than 65 large warships for a total of 690 guns in 1825, also counting 31 small armed packet boats and transport vessels, noting that it had doubled in size in the three years after the country's independence war by the purchase or incorporation of ships that had been captured by lord Thomas Cochrane from Portugal during the conflict. Apart from purchasing ships, the imperial government also ordered the construction of new ones in local shipyards: two frigates, two corvettes and several gunboats and yachts.

In Hélio Leôncio Martins' estimate, the Imperial Brazilian Navy was the strongest force Brazil could rely on, numbering a total of 121 ships including two ships of the line, Pedro I and Príncipe Real, 8 frigates, 7 corvettes, 1 lugger, 17 brigs, 24 schooners, 33 gunboats, and other vessels. Apart from these vessels, the Brazilian fleet also included merchant ones that had been armed and converted into warships. Its quality varied, however; the frigates were no older than eight years, but the corvettes and brigs included ships from the Napoleonic Wars, such as Itaparica, Liberal and Cacique, to new ones built in North America, such as Maria da Gloria and Maceió. The ships of the line, Pedro I and Príncipe Real, built in 1763 and 1771, respectively, were old and in poor condition, with the latter serving only as a prison ship while the former, despite still being in active service during the war, was in serious need of repairs.

Brazil's naval policy became the subject of criticism for the government's opposition, which were repeated by foreign observers. The former, wanting to harm the emperor's ministers, described the navy as a "naval police", saying that, instead of the large and heavy frigates bought by the government, it would have been better to acquire low draft schooners, better suited for navigation in the shallow waters of the River Plate. For John Armitage, the desire of "ostentation" and to show off an "exalted idea" of its naval power to foreign nations had led Brazil to purchase and build heavy vessels, unsuited for war in the River Plate. Armitage also opined that "swift-sailing vessels would not only have been more easily equipped, but also more appropriate to the actual exigencies of the country". This was also Gustavo Barroso's opinion, for whom the Brazilian fleet was "abundant, but inadequate", as its ships "were not suited to our people, our service and the war against [our] neighbours inside their home". In turn, Toscano argued that these criticisms were unjustified, remarking that, for a country like Brazil, with a large coast and sea trade routes to defend, having a balanced navy with both large and small vessels would be ideal; Toscano also pointed out that John Armitage's remarks were "accepted without criticism in its nominal value by many historians".

When the war broke out in December 1825, the Brazilian naval forces in the River Plate consisted of the frigate Tétis, the corvette Liberal, 2 brigs, a barque, 12 schooners, and 8 gunboats; the same fleet that, under the command of Pedro Nunes, had fought against the Portuguese during Brazil's independence war and also against Artigas in 1820. This squadron was promptly reinforced by two frigates, Imperatriz and Dona Paula, two corvettes, Itaparica and Maceió, one brig and other smaller vessels.

Course of war

On land

1826

Once the war had begun, the Orientals surprised the Brazilian garrison at the fortress of Santa Teresa, capturing it on 31 December 1825 and subsequently invading Brazilian territory up to the city of Santa Vitória do Palmar, whose defenders, few in number, fled in the face of the invaders. The next year, on 28 January 1826, the Argentine Army crossed the Uruguay River and established its headquarters in the town of Salto. Lavalleja's forces were concentrated in the town of Durazno, where they observed any Brazilian movements. The Brazilians, in turn, were gathering troops near Santana do Livramento. The commander of these troops, brigadier Massena Rosado, an inexperienced officer, ordered Bento Manuel and his men, who were in Quaraí, to join him. Thus, Brazil had two stationary armies, one in Santana do Livramento and the other in Montevideo.

The Argentines decided to launch a combined land and naval attack against Colonia del Sacramento. Numerous failed attempts took place from February to March 1826, with the attackers suffering considerable losses. Several skirmishes also followed throughout 1826, without major consequences for the outcome of the war, while the larger operations took place at sea. General Martín Rodríguez had left his camp on the banks of the Uruguay River and established himself in Durazno. Infighting between Rivera and Lavalleja led the former to rebel and the latter to hand over the government of the Banda Oriental to Joaquín Suárez. In order to avoid further problems, the Argentine government appointed general Carlos María de Alvear as the commander of the republican army on 14 August 1826. Alvear arrived at Durazno on 1 September, replacing Martín Rodríguez.

In the Brazilian side, Rosado's passive conduct prompted criticism and complaints, which led emperor Pedro I to decide to go personally to the theater of operations and replace him. The emperor appointed the 54-year old general Felisberto Caldeira Brant, the Marquess of Barbacena, as the new commander-in-chief of the imperial forces. Pedro I left Rio de Janeiro on 24 November 1826 aboard the ship Pedro I, taking with him 800 infantry soldiers, including troops from the 27th Battalion of Caçadores, consisting of German soldiers. He arrived in Porto Alegre on 6 December, bringing with him the German general Gustav Heinrich von Braun. Before meeting with the troops, however, the emperor decided to return to Rio de Janeiro. On 11 December empress Leopoldina died at the court, but the news of her death had not yet reached the emperor when he had already decided to return to Rio de Janeiro.

1827

Once in command, Barbacena visited the frontier towns, arriving at the Brazilian army camp in Santana do Livramento on 1 January 1827. The poor condition of the troops left a bad impression on the general. There was a lack of equipment, and the soldiers were sick and undisciplined, which had led to numerous desertions. Under general Massena Rosado's command, nearly 2,000 men had already deserted. The marquess then began reorganizing the troops. He had already requested the dispatch of 15,000 men, ammunition, and funds from the imperial government in order to march against the Argentines. The government, in turn, did not meet his demands. At the same time, general Braun, in the town of Rio Grande, was making efforts to recruit more men, having with him fractions of the 18th and 27th Battalions of Caçadores and the 4th, 5th, and 6th Cavalry Regiments, for a total of about 1,800 soldiers. The two commanders decided to join forces near the Palmas stream, with Barbacena starting his march on 13 January 1827.

In turn, general Carlos María de Alvear was marching with the republican forces toward Bagé in order to prevent the junction of the two Brazilian commanders and defeat them separately, believing that the Brazilian forces would only grow over time. The Argentine commander issued a proclamation rallying his troops to fight, stating that "millions of Brazilians" were "reaching out to them". He believed the local population to be republican, but the inhabitants resisted the invasion. Alvear and Barbacena were seeking each other in order to engage in a decisive battle, methodically marching in search of a favorable battleground. The Argentines preferred the plains due to their superiority in cavalry, while the Brazilians favored the hills, given their superior infantry.

On 23 January, an Argentine cavalry vanguard brought the news that the Brazilians had begun their march toward the Argentines, which caused euphoria in the republican army. Barbacena was unaware of the whereabouts of the republicans and decided to dispatch a cavalry vanguard under the command of Sebastião Barreto to track the Argentine movements and provide cover for his own march. On 5 February, after weeks of marching, Barbacena and Braun managed to join forces on the banks of the Lexiguana River, frustrating Alvear's plans. The Argentine commander had arrived in Bagé on 26 January and left the city on the 30th after sacking it. Alvear then decided to march toward São Gabriel, being followed by Barbacena. Minor encounters between the vanguards of the two armies heightened the tension. On 13 February, colonel Bento Manuel’s forward detachment clashed with colonel Juan Lavalle's forces near Vacacai. Two days later, another clash took place between the forward detachments of Lucio Norberto Mansilla, chief of the Argentine General Staff, and Bento Manuel, in the vicinity of Umbu. The Brazilians already knew the Argentine position since 14 February and were eager to attack.

On 19 February, immediately after arriving at Passo do Rosário, Alvear ordered his forces to cross the nearby Santa Maria River. Barbacena hoped to attack the republicans while they were still crossing the river. The dangerous Argentine position caused widespread discontent among the troops, and Alvear was nearly removed from command. A council of republican commanders was gathered and decided to march back and occupy the nearby hills, where they would prepare for battle. At dawn on 20 February Barbacena sighted the republican forces near Passo do Rosário. He was determined to attack them, despite being outnumbered, believing he was facing only the enemy rearguard. 6,300 Brazilians were about to clash with 7,700 Argentines and Orientals. The confrontation, known as battle of Passo do Rosário, in Brazil, or Ituzaingó, in Argentina, began at 06:00, with both armies exchanging artillery fire, while repeated Argentine cavalry charges were repelled by the Brazilian infantry, who formed squares. Still, the Argentines managed to isolate the Brazilians from their baggage carts, cutting off ammunition supply and setting the grassfields on fire. Localized imperial counterattacks recovered other threatened positions, but the numerical superiority and tactical flexibility of the republican cavalry eventually forced Barbacena to order a retreat after six hours of battle and the desertion of 1,500 troops. Although some Brazilian accounts framed the battle as indecisive, Carneiro emphasized that the outcome constituted a tactical defeat for the Empire, as control of the battlefield remained with the republican forces, enabling them to claim victory, while the imperials withdrew toward Passo do Cacequi.

The Argentine forces did not interfere with Barbacena's withdrawal after the battle, with Alvear oredring his troops to countermarch to Passo do Rosário, where they had left their baggage before the engagement. Only Lavalleja, with roughly 2,000 cavalry, followed the Brazilian army at a distance, shadowing its movements until about 18:30. The Argentines entered São Gabriel on 26 February, resting there for three days before resuming their movement toward Corrales, while the Brazilians headed toward São Lourenço. In Carneiro's words, Itazaingó marked "the last gasp of the United Provinces' army, which was henceforth to remain exhausted and without the possibility of receiving new supplies". After the battle, both armies abandoned the idea of ​​another decisive pitched battle, preferring to attack the enemy from advantageous positions.

The Imperial forces began to reorganize, sending out troops to capture fleeing soldiers and horses. The Republicans reoccupied Bagé on 18 April, followed by further fighting between the advance forces of the two armies on 23 April (Camacuã), 24 (São Diogo) and 25 May (Pedras Altas/Yerbal), and 2 June (Sego). On 20 June, Barbacena handed over command of the Brazilian army to Braun, who set out for Porto Alegre, returning on 9 July with plans to put the Imperial troops on an offensive footing and attack the Argentines camped at Cerro Largo. The German general decided to relocate the Brazilian camp from São Lourenço—a site considered unhealthy—to a location near the Mirim Lagoon, on the banks of the Jaguarão River. By early 1828, Braun had 9,000 troops stationed in Jaguarão, also counting with another 6,000 scattered across the strongholds of the Río de la Plata region. The Argentines, for their part, had 6,000 men—a force that, in Carneiro's assessment, was dwindling.

1828

On 20 April 1828, Fructuoso Rivera—following an agreement with Estanislao López, the governor of Santa Fe province, and commanding a force separate from the republican army—launched a new invasion of Brazilian territory with the aim of plundering the Misiones region.

At sea

The two navies which confronted each other in the Río de la Plata and the South Atlantic were in many ways opposites. The Empire of Brazil was a major naval power consisting of 96 warships, large and small, an extensive coastal trade and a large international trade carried on mostly in British, French and American ships. The United Provinces had similar international trading links but had few naval pretensions. Its navy consisted of only half a dozen warships and a few gunboats for port defence. Both navies were short of indigenous sailors and relied heavily on British—and, to a lesser extent—American and French officers and sailors, the most notable of which were the Irish born admiral William Brown, and the commander of the Brazilian inshore squadron, the English commodore James Norton.

The strategy of the two nations reflected their respective positions. The Brazilians immediately imposed a blockade on the Río de la Plata and the trade of Buenos Aires on 31 December 1825, while the Argentines attempted to defy the blockade using Brown's squadron while unleashing a swarm of privateers to attack Brazilian seaborne commerce in the South Atlantic from their bases at Ensenada and more distant Carmen de Patagones. The Argentines gained some notable successes—most notably by defeating the Brazilian flotilla on the Uruguay River at the Battle of Juncal and by beating off a Brazilian attack on Carmen de Patagones. But by 1828, the superior numbers of Brazil's blockading squadrons had effectively destroyed Brown's naval force at the Monte Santiago and was successfully strangling the trade of Buenos Aires and the government revenue it generated.

Brazilian blockade

According to Brian Vale, "it was inevitable that Brazil's principal weapon in the struggle would be a naval blockade", given the country's naval power. Moreover, ever since the United Provinces' independence from Spain, Buenos Aires had become a centre of trade, which, being carried out mostly by British, American, and French ships, totalled a yearly sum of 2 million pounds in 1825. It was, therefore, an obvious target. Following Brazil's declaration of war on 10 December 1825, admiral Rodrigo Lobo, commander of the Brazilian fleet in the River Plate, declared the blockade on 21 December, giving neutral vessels fourteen days to leave. News of the blockade only reached Buenos Aires ten days after its declaration, however, and a wave of panic ensued. Woodbine Parish, the British consul in the city, protested that it would be impossible for neutral vessels to leave in time, and so admiral Lobo agreed to postpone the beginning of the blockade to 31 January 1826.

Rodrigo Lobo's initial declaration stated that "all of the ports of the republic" were in a state of blockade. It caused different reactions from foreign powers. The United States view on blockades had been expressed before the war had begun, when Condy Raguet, the U.S. consul in Rio de Janeiro, wrote an extensive note to the Brazilian court detailing his government's position after being notified of the blockade on 6 December. Likewise, the American consul in Buenos Aires, colonel John Forbes, protested and accused Brazil of conducting a "paper" blockade for breaking the requirements of presence and continuity, since Lobo's fleet had made frequent returns to Montevideo for long periods.

The Americans held the view that a blockading force should not only be near the ports, but also in sight. They also argued that Brazil could not legitimally claim to be blockading Patagonia's southern coast when a single corvette was present there. In May, admiral Lobo conceded and agreed to limit the blockade to the River Plate's estuary. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, accepted the Brazilian position. As a naval power itself, it was not in Britain's interests for blockades to be hampered by excessive rules. The British government ordered its diplomatic posts to observe the blockade and refused requests for intervention made by its nationals to the Foreign Office.

In May 1826, Rodrigo Lobo was replaced by admiral Pinto Guedes, who reinvigorated the blockade, causing an enormous increase in the number of vessels seized, which motivated protests from Britain, France and the United States. In November Raguet announced that the United States refused to accept the legality of the blockade; the French ambassador was also instructed not to recognize it, unless Brazil released all French prizes and paid an indemnity. Only Britain continued to recognize it. With foreign patience waning, the Brazilian government backed down: on 26 November 1826, Guedes was ordered only to seize neutral vessels that were attempting to run the blockade after individually warning each one of them. The changes to the blockade's rules made the risk worth taking, and so the number of vessels reaching Buenos Aires, most of which were American, increased. Disappointed with his government's decision, Guedes declared: "I feel not the least repugnance to act fairly to the subjects of His Britannic Majesty, but no-one is ignorant of the mischief which citizens of the United States have done by taking advantage of the obstructions placed in the way of this squadron".

Economic impacts

The economy of Buenos Aires, which was based on the export of cattle, was dependent on the city's port due to the customs revenues it generated. In Roberto Schmit's words, with the blockade, a negative economic cycle began, and production and trade plummeted. When admiral Pinto Guedes replaced Rodrigo Lobo, the Imperial Navy slowly began to strangle the trade from Buenos Aires. According to Vale, only two vessels managed to enter the city's port in the second half of 1826, ruining the country's finances. That year, customs revenues fell to 81,900 pounds from 429,300 in the previous year, and the price of imported commodities more than doubled. Tulio Halperín estimates that only during the first year of the war, the Argentine state spent 3.17 GBP per capita. To sustain this fiscal burden, the government resorted to tariffs and loans. Bonds issued for public and private investments lost their value and inflation quickly went up, as the government used its metal reserves to finance the war, leaving fiat money unbacked. The population's purchasing power decreased and several businessmen were ruined.

Privateering

The United Provinces issued a decree on 2 February 1826 authorizing privateers to attack Brazilian sea trade.

Preliminary Peace Convention

The stalemate in the Cisplatine War was caused by the inability of the Argentine and Uruguayan land forces to capture major cities in Uruguay and Brazil, the severe economic consequences imposed by the Brazilian blockade of Buenos Aires, and the lack of manpower for a full-scale Brazilian land offensive against Argentine forces. There was also increasing public pressure in Brazil to end the war. All of this motivated the interest on both sides for a peaceful solution.

Given the high cost of the war for both sides and the threat it posed to trade between the United Provinces and the United Kingdom, the latter pressed the two belligerent parties to engage in peace negotiations in Rio de Janeiro. Under British mediation, the United Provinces and the Empire of Brazil signed the 1828 Treaty of Montevideo, which acknowledged the independence of Cisplatina under the name Eastern Republic of Uruguay.

The treaty also granted Brazil sovereignty over the eastern section of the former Eastern Jesuit Missions and, most importantly, guaranteed free navigation of the Río de la Plata, a central national security issue for the Brazilians.

Aftermath

In Brazil, the loss of Cisplatina added to growing discontent with Emperor Pedro I. The liberals became stronger in parliament and managed to downsize a seditious army and strengthen their local militias. Although it was far from the main reason, it was a factor that led to a rebellion which took place in Rio de Janeiro on 13 March 1831. These tensions led to the abdication of the Emperor.

In Argentina, the war led to Rivadavia’s resign. The national authorities were dissolved and Argentina de facto defaulted on its debt to Baring Brothers. After the loss of the Banda Oriental, peripheral elites had the momentum, and Juan Manuel de Rosas, the new leader of the federales, soon retook the governorship of Buenos Aires, starting a three-decades-long intermittent civil war between unitarios and federales.

Legacy

Although the war was not a war of independence, as none of the belligerents fought to establish an independent nation, the Independence in Uruguay was a direct consequence of it, and it has a similar recognition within Uruguay. The Thirty-Three Orientals are acknowledged as national heroes, who freed Uruguay from Brazilian rule. The landing of the Thirty-Three Orientals is also known as the "Liberation crusade".

The war has a similar reception within Argentina, considered as a brave fight against an enemy of superior forces. The Argentine Navy has named many ships after people, events and ships involved in the war. William Brown (known as "Guillermo Brown" in Argentina) is considered the father of the Argentine navy, and is treated akin to an epic hero for his actions in the war. He is also known as the "Nelson of the Río de la Plata".

Brazil has had little interest in the war beyond naval warfare buffs. Few Brazilian historians have examined it in detail. The national heroes of Brazil are instead from Brazilian independence, the conflicts with Rosas (Platine War) or the Paraguayan War.

Despite the role of Britain in the war, and the presence of British naval officials on both sides of the conflict, the war is largely unknown in the English-speaking world.