Deliberative democracy

Deliberative democracy can be practiced by decision-makers in both representative democracies and direct democracies. Use of the term may vary: while some practitioners and theorists use deliberative democracy to describe elected bodies whose members propose and enact legislation, Hélène Landemore and others use deliberative democracy to refer to decision-making by randomly selected lay citizens each with equal power.

Deliberative democracy has a long history of practice and theory, which can be traced back to ancient times. It received academic attention in the 1990s and implementations since 2010. Joseph M. Bessette has been credited with coining the term in his 1980 work Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government.

Overview

Deliberative democracy holds that, for a democratic decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by authentic deliberation, not merely the aggregation of views expressed by voting. Authentic deliberation is deliberation among decision-makers that is free from distortions of unequal political power, such as power a decision-maker obtains through economic wealth or the support of interest groups.

Deliberative democracy can be practiced by decision-makers in both representative democracies and direct democracies. In elitist deliberative democracy, principles of deliberative democracy apply to elite democratic decision-making bodies, such as legislatures and courts; in populist deliberative democracy, principles of deliberative democracy apply to groups of lay citizens who are directly empowered to make decisions. Populist deliberative democracy can use deliberation among a group of lay citizens to distill an authentic public opinion about societal issues for other decision-makers to consider, such as in a deliberative opinion poll. Populist deliberative democracy may also result directly in binding law. If political decisions are made by deliberation but not by the people themselves or their elected representatives, then there is no democratic element; this deliberative process is called elite deliberation.

The roots of deliberative democracy can be traced back to Aristotle and his notion of politics. The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas' work on communicative rationality and the public sphere is often identified as a major work in this area.

James Fearon and Portia Pedro believe deliberative processes most often generate ideal conditions of impartiality, rationality and knowledge of the relevant facts, resulting in more morally correct outcomes. Former diplomat Carne Ross contends that the processes are more civil, collaborative, and evidence-based than the debates in traditional town hall meetings or in internet forums if citizens know their debates will impact society. Some fear the influence of a skilled orator.

Deliberative democracy proponents typically prioritize decision-making quality over quantity by limiting decision-makers to a small group that is given the time and resources to focus on one issue. John Burnheim critiques traditional representative democracy as requiring citizens to vote for a candidate who represents a large package of policies and preferences bundled together, much of which a voter might not want. He argues that this does not translate voter preferences as carefully as deliberative groups do, if they are given the time and the ability to focus on one issue.

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Characteristics

Fishkin's model of deliberation

James Fishkin, who designed practical implementations of deliberative democracy through deliberative polling in various countries, described five characteristics essential for legitimate deliberation:

Information: The extent to which participants are given access to reasonably accurate information that they believe to be relevant to the issue;
Substantive balance: The extent to which arguments offered by one side or from one perspective are answered by considerations offered by those who hold other perspectives;
Diversity: The extent to which the major positions in the public are represented by participants in the discussion;
Conscientiousness: The extent to which participants sincerely weigh the merits of the arguments; and
Equal consideration: The extent to which arguments offered by all participants are considered on the merits regardless of which participants offer them.

Studies by Fishkin and others have concluded that deliberative democracy tends to produce outcomes which are superior to those in other forms of democracy. Outcomes in their research include less partisanship and more sympathy with opposing views; more respect for evidence-based reasoning rather than opinion; a greater commitment to the decisions taken by those involved; and a greater chance for widely shared consensus to emerge, thus promoting social cohesion between people from different backgrounds. Fishkin cites extensive empirical support for the increase in public spiritedness that is often caused by participation in deliberation, and says theoretical support can be traced back to foundational democratic thinkers such as John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville.

Fiskin along with constitutional scholar Bruce Ackerman have proposed instituting a national Deliberation Day holiday two weeks before Presidential elections where citizens would gather to debate pertinent issues.

Cohen's outline

Joshua Cohen, a student of John Rawls, argued that the five main features of deliberative democracy include:

An ongoing independent association with expected continuation.
The citizens in the democracy structure their institutions such that deliberation is the deciding factor in the creation of the institutions and the institutions allow deliberation to continue.
A commitment to the respect of a pluralism of values and aims within the polity.
The citizens consider deliberative procedure as the source of legitimacy, and prefer the causal history of legitimation for each law to be transparent and easily traceable to the deliberative process.
Each member recognizes and respects other members' deliberative capacity.

Cohen presents deliberative democracy as more than a theory of legitimacy, and forms a body of substantive rights around it based on achieving "ideal deliberation":

It is free in two ways:
1. The participants consider themselves bound solely by the results and preconditions of the deliberation. They are free from any authority of prior norms or requirements.
2. The participants suppose that they can act on the decision made; the deliberative process is a sufficient reason to comply with the decision reached.
Parties to deliberation are required to state reasons for their proposals, and proposals are accepted or rejected based on the reasons given, as the content of the very deliberation taking place.
Participants are equal in two ways:
1. Formal: anyone can put forth proposals, criticize, and support measures. There is no substantive hierarchy.
2. Substantive: The participants are not limited or bound by certain distributions of power, resources, or pre-existing norms. "The participants…do not regard themselves as bound by the existing system of rights, except insofar as that system establishes the framework of free deliberation among equals."
Deliberation aims at a rationally motivated consensus: it aims to find reasons acceptable to all who are committed to such a system of decision-making. When consensus or something near enough is not possible, majoritarian decision making is used.

In Democracy and Liberty, an essay published in 1998, Cohen updated his idea of pluralism to "reasonable pluralism" – the acceptance of different, incompatible worldviews and the importance of good faith deliberative efforts to ensure that as far as possible the holders of these views can live together on terms acceptable to all.

Gutmann and Thompson's model

Amy Gutmann and Dennis F. Thompson's definition captures the elements that are found in most conceptions of deliberative democracy. They define it as "a form of government in which free and equal citizens and their representatives justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching decisions that are binding on all at present but open to challenge in the future".

They state that deliberative democracy has four requirements, which refer to the kind of reasons that citizens and their representatives are expected to give to one another:

Reciprocal. The reasons should be acceptable to free and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation.
Accessible. The reasons must be given in public and the content must be understandable to the relevant audience.
Binding. The reason-giving process leads to a decision or law that is enforced for some period of time. The participants do not deliberate just for the sake of deliberation or for individual enlightenment.
Dynamic or Provisional. The participants must keep open the possibility of changing their minds, and continuing a reason-giving dialogue that can challenge previous decisions and laws.

Standards of good deliberation – from first to second generation (Bächtiger et al., 2018)

For Bächtiger, Dryzek, Mansbridge and Warren, the ideal standards of "good deliberation" which deliberative democracy should strive towards have changed:

History

Early examples

Consensus-based decision making similar to deliberative democracy has been found in different degrees and variations throughout the world going back millennia. The most discussed early example of deliberative democracy arose in Greece as Athenian democracy during the sixth century BC. Athenian democracy was both deliberative and largely direct: some decisions were made by representatives but most were made by "the people" directly. Athenian democracy came to an end in 322 BC. Even some 18th century leaders advocating for representative democracy mention the importance of deliberation among elected representatives.

Recent scholarship

The deliberative element of democracy was not widely studied by academics until the late 20th century. According to Professor Stephen Tierney, perhaps the earliest notable example of academic interest in the deliberative aspects of democracy occurred in John Rawls 1971 work A Theory of Justice. Joseph M. Bessette has been credited with coining the term "deliberative democracy" in his 1980 work Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government, and went on to elaborate and defend the notion in "The Mild Voice of Reason" (1994). In the 1990s, deliberative democracy began to attract substantial attention from political scientists. According to Professor John Dryzek, early work on deliberative democracy was part of efforts to develop a theory of democratic legitimacy. Theorists such as Carne Ross advocate deliberative democracy as a complete alternative to representative democracy. The more common view, held by contributors such as James Fishkin, is that direct deliberative democracy can be complementary to traditional representative democracy. Others contributing to the notion of deliberative democracy include Carlos Nino, Jon Elster, Roberto Gargarella, John Gastil, Jürgen Habermas, David Held, Joshua Cohen, Amy Gutmann, Noëlle McAfee, Rense Bos, Jane Mansbridge, Jose Luis Marti, Dennis Thompson, Benny Hjern, Hal Koch, Seyla Benhabib, Ethan Leib, Charles Sabel, Jeffrey K. Tulis, David Estlund, Mariah Zeisberg, Jeffrey L. McNairn, Iris Marion Young, Robert B. Talisse, and Hélène Landemore.

Although political theorists took the lead in the study of deliberative democracy, political scientists have in recent years begun to investigate its processes. One of the main challenges currently is to discover more about the actual conditions under which the ideals of deliberative democracy are more or less likely to be realized.

Drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt, Shmuel Lederman laments the fact that "deliberation and agonism have become almost two different schools of thought" that are discussed as "mutually exclusive conceptions of politics" as seen in the works of Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau, and William E. Connolly. Giuseppe Ballacci argues that agonism and deliberation are not only compatible but mutually dependent: "a properly understood agonism requires the use of deliberative skills but also that even a strongly deliberative politics could not be completely exempt from some of the consequences of agonism".

Most recently, scholarship has focused on the emergence of a 'systemic approach' to the study of deliberation. This suggests that the deliberative capacity of a democratic system needs to be understood through the interconnection of the variety of sites of deliberation which exist, rather than any single setting. Some studies have conducted experiments to examine how deliberative democracy addresses the problems of sustainability and underrepresentation of future generations. Although not always the case, participation in deliberation has been found to shift participants' opinions in favour of environmental positions.

Platforms and algorithms

Aviv Ovadya also argues for implementing bridging-based algorithms in major platforms by empowering deliberative groups that are representative of the platform's users to control the design and implementation of the algorithm. He argues this would reduce sensationalism, political polarization and democratic backsliding. Jamie Susskind likewise calls for deliberative groups to make these kind of decisions. Meta commissioned a representative deliberative process in 2022 to advise the company on how to deal with climate misinformation on its platforms.

Modern examples

The OECD documented hundreds of examples and finds their use increasing since 2010. For example, a representative sample of 2500 lay citizens used a 'Citizens' congress' to coalesce around a plan on how to rebuild New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.