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Dodecanese campaign

Campaign of the Mediterranean theatre of World War II

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Through Nazi Germany, World War II and Balkans

The Dodecanese campaign (8 September – 22 November 1943) was the capture and occupation of the Dodecanese islands by German forces during the Second World War. Following the signing of the Armistice of Cassibile on 3 September 1943, Italy joined the Allies. The Germans implemented contingency plans to seize control of the Dodecanese, which were under Italian control. The Allies planned to use the islands as bases to strike against German targets in the Balkans, which the Germans aimed to forestall.

Beginning in early September 1943, German troops defeated the Italian garrison in the Dodecanese and British forces sent to join them, aided by the fact that Allied units were operating without sufficient air cover. Most of the Dodecanese islands fell to German forces within two months, resulting in one of Germany's last victories of the war. The German occupation of the Dodecanese islands continued until the end of the war in 1945, when they surrendered to British forces.

Background

Dodecanese Archipelago

The Aegean Sea is part of the Mediterranean from Greece to the western coast of Turkey. The Sporades are in the north, the Cyclades in the south and the twelve islands of the Dodecanese are in the south-eastern Aegean, most close to the Turkish shore and usually grouped with Rhodes and Kastellorizo. The islands had been under Italian control since the Italo-Turkish War in 1911. During Italian rule, the islands became a focus of Italian colonial ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Rhodes, the largest of the islands, was a military and air base. The island of Leros, with its excellent deep-water port of Portolago (now Lakki) was developed into a fortified air base, "the Corregidor of the Mediterranean" (Benito Mussolini) but these developments were mostly a bluff to deter the Greeks from attacking the archipelago and a latent threat to Greece and Turkey. As Italian colonial ambitions developed in the 1930s, the naval and air bases on the islands became a military threat to the Egyptian coast. The Italians made little use of the islands during the war and their supply became a liability. A British attempt to contest Italian control of the Dodecanese, Operation Abstention (25–28 February 1941) was thwarted, when Italian forces recaptured Kastellorizo from the Royal Marines and No. 50 Commando.

Kos

Kos is an island that is 26.5 mi (42.6 km) long and 1 to 6.3 mi (1.6 to 10.1 km) wide. The south coast of the island is steep and hills run from Cape Foca in the east, westwards to Pili and further on; Mt. Dicheo is the highest hill at 2,776 ft (846 m), the hills declining in height towards the west end of the island. The steep southern slopes are rocky and the northern slopes, less steep, descend to pine forests and farmland. There are many sandy beaches and large salt flats at Lambi and Tingachi (now Tigaki). Kos town and port is at the east end of the island and a road runs from the town to Cefalo (now Kefalos) in the west. In September 1943, the c. 3,500 Italian infantry of the 10th Regiment, 50th Infantry Division Regina had four coastal guns, a few obsolescent anti-aircraft guns and its infantry was spread around the island, with little anti-aircraft protection. No defences had been dug, the sites of the four coastal guns were well chosen but the guns were old, in the open and lacked fire-control.

The Regia Aeronautica had detached the 396° Squadriglia, 154 Gruppo CT, to Kos in 1943; in September the Squadriglia had eight fighters, of which four were serviceable, two C.202s a CR.42 and a G.50, with two pilots between them. The island had plenty of food for the 20,000 Greek civilian inhabitants, the Italian and British troops and water was easily available in the towns and villages but lacking in the hinterland. Kos town had a sheltered harbour but the water was shallow, it lacked equipment and had only one berth. One of the Italian pilots took off in the CR.42 on 10 September and flew to Rhodes. Later that evening the remaining pilot spotted six Heinkel He 111 bombers and claimed one shot down. On 11 September, two German aircraft attacked Antimachia, destroyed two aircraft and damaged one.

Leros

Leros is at the northern end of the Dodecanese, with Kalymnos to the south. The island is about 9 mi (14 km) long and varies from .65 to 4 mi (1.05 to 6.44 km) wide with islets off the coast. The island is rocky with narrow valleys and hills, the highest being Mt Scumbarda at the south end at 1,096 ft (334 m). The coast is indented and has steep cliffs with several sandy beaches in the centre of the island in Grifo, Alinda and Gurna bays. The capital is Leros (now Platanos) is in a narrow valley in the north-central part of the island, with the Appetici promontory (590 ft (180 m) to the north and Meraviglia to the south at 669 ft (204 m). There is a road from Leros town to the main port of Portolago (now Lakki) with side-roads to Italian gun-positions on the high ground. The Italian colonial forces were comfortably housed and the Greek inhabitants farmed terraces on the slopes of the hills, herded goats and fished.

Unternehmen Achse

By May 1943, Adolf Hitler had begun to contemplate the possibility of Italian defection from the Axis. The high command of the German armed forces, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) prepared an assessment of the situation if Italy made a separate peace and planned the reinforcement of German troops in Italy (Unternehmen Alaric) and the Balkans (Unternehmen Constantine) that were combined into Unternehmen Achse (Operation Axis) after the overthrow of Mussolini and the Allied invasion of Sicily, the orders being promulgated from 28 to 30 July. On the announcement of the Armistice of Cassibile (3 September 1943) announced on 8 September, the operation began with a week's notice. Italian troops were to be disarmed and made to choose between disbandment and fighting on with the Germans.

Transport infrastructure such as the passes in the Apennines, railways, ports and the ships of the Regia Marina, merchant ships, aircraft and airfields of the Regia Aeronautica, military bases and equipment were to be taken under German military control. The German army in the Mediterranean was reinforced to 38 divisions and a new Army Group F (Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs) created in the Balkans, with the former commander in chief, Generaloberst Alexander Löhr, taking over the subordinate Army Group E in Greece and the Aegean. The 22nd Air Landing Division was occupying most of Crete and Sturm Division Rhodos (Assault Division Rhodes, Generalleutnant (Lieutenant-General) Ulrich Kleemann) had been built up on the island of Rhodes since January 1943.

Allied strategy

The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had desired to draw Turkey into the war since 1940, because Turkish adherence to the Allies would turn the Axis flank in Greece and the Balkans that would be another drain on German military resources, cut the German Black Sea route into the Eastern Mediterranean, threaten German Balkan allies and open another supply route to the USSR. Airfields on Turkey would be able to contribute to the strategic bombing campaign, particularly the Romanian oil industry. The Russians thought that if Turkey entered the war, the Germans would divert a minimum of ten divisions. Despite British blandishments, the Turkish government was unmoved: defeat would lead to German occupation and victory would benefit the USSR.

The Americans were not enthused at the prospect of being saddled with the responsibility of equipping the 46 divisions of the Turkish army, along with all the other armies being supplied by Lend-Lease. There was no optimism at the Casablanca Conference (14−24 January 1943) and First Quebec Conference (17–24 August 1943) for a forward policy in the Aegean. Despite the American lack of enthusiasm, Churchill thought that the defection of Italy on 8 September and the collapse of the Axis position in the Mediterranean made an Aegean strategy feasible: "This is the time to play high."

Operation Accolade

In the spring of 1943, plans began to be laid for offensive action in the Aegean. The British had wanted to gain control of the Aegean since Italy joined in the war but until autumn 1943 the means for such a policy had been lacking. General Dwight D. Eisenhower had been given first call on resources at the Third Washington Conference (12−25 May 1943) except for seven divisions due to be sent to Britain and two British divisions ready to support Turkey against an Axis attack. Naval forces were distributed around the world and the Mediterranean Air Command had been reinforced for the Allied invasion of Sicily (9 July – 17 August 1943) only. General Henry Maitland Wilson, the Commander in Chief Middle East Land Forces, had no power to divert troops from Sicily or Italy and permanent uncertainty over the forces at his disposal for an Aegean enterprise. A directive issued to Wilson on 12 February 1943 required him to prepare for operations in the eastern Mediterranean and No. 2 Planning Staff (later Force 292) Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson, Air Vice-Marshal Richard Saul and Rear-Admiral Geoffrey Miles began to draft plans.

Rhodes was the principal object of the Planning Staff, along with Scarpanto (now Karpathos) and then islands further north, to open the route to Smyrna (now İzmir). By late July three plans for Accolade were ready: a promenade to Rhodes if the Italians collapsed and the Germans withdrew, a quick exploitation if the Italians gave in but the Germans remained and a methodical invasion should the Italians and Germans be prepared to defend the Island. A planning assumption was that Eisenhower would not use all the forces at his disposal and would lend naval and air forces, possibly troops, but this created permanent uncertainty for the planners, whose plans were difficult to devise due to the distance of the Dodecanese from Egypt and the airfields available to the Luftwaffe at Scarpanto [45 mi (72 km) from Rhodes], Crete [160 mi (260 km)] and southern Greece [270 mi (430 km)]. The distance from Alexandria to Kos via the strait between Rhodes and Karpathos is 370 nmi (690 km; 430 mi) and between Rhodes and the Turkish mainland is 400 nmi (740 km; 460 mi). Kos to Leros is 30 mi (48 km) and Leros to Samos is 40 mi (64 km).

The nearest RAF bases to Rhodes were in Cyprus, about 270 mi (430 km) away and Gambut, about 350 mi (560 km) distant as the war had receded from Egypt after the Second Battle of El Alamein in 1942. The Allied air forces had been concentrated in the central Mediterranean for the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. Allied single-engined fighters had nothing like the range to operate over such distances and it would be necessary to operate them from the Turkish mainland or to develop airfields on Kos sufficient for four fighter squadrons. Twin-engined fighters like the Beaufighter operating from Cyprus or Gambut were no substitute against Messerschmitt Bf 109s and the small number of Lightnings in the Mediterranean offered no prospect of success, despite its superior performance. During planning, it was assumed that only single-engined fighters could protect assault landings and that this ruled out Accolade. In August, Allied operations in Italy allowed the hope that German resources had been withdrawn from the Aegean, that Eisenhower could spare heavy bombers to attack Luftwaffe airfields in Greece and Crete and lend four Lightning squadrons.

On 25 July, Mussolini fell and two days later, Churchill prodded the Chiefs of Staff Committee to keep Accolade in mind and on 1 August, Wilson signalled that the minimum of shipping needed for Accolade was an HQ ship, eight Landing ship, infantry (large) [LSI (l)] or Landing Ship Personnel and eighteen MT ships. There were eight LSI (l) in Egypt but five were due to sail to India and the committee signalled on 2 August that most of the air and sea forces would have to come from the central Mediterranean. Wilson was told to take an opportunistic policy in the Aegean. The ship voyages to India were cancelled and some supplies for Turkey were stopped and the staff was told to beg and borrow from Eisenhower eight ships and landing craft, four Lightning squadrons, a parachute battalion and its aircraft and smaller units of specialists by 14–15 August. The British would have a brigade ready by 18 August and another by 22 August. Eisenhower agreed but later than hoped and less the Lightnings or transport aircraft but on 12 August had second thoughts lest Accolade divert resources from Operation Avalanche, the landings at Salerno, due on 9 September and urged the postponement of Accolade. By the end of August anything more ambitious than an unopposed landing on Rhodes or Crete was impossible using only British resources but by 7 September several small operations had been planned to begin with the announcement of the armistice.

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