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Financial transaction tax

Tax levied on trades of financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, or derivatives

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A transaction tax is levied on specific transactions designated as taxable rather than on any other attributes of financial institutions. If an institution is never a party to a taxable transaction, then no transaction tax will be levied from it. If an institution carries out one such transaction, then it will be levied the tax for the one transaction. This tax is narrower in scope than a financial activities tax (FAT), and is not directly an industry or sector tax like a Financial stability contribution (FSC), or "bank tax", for example. These distinctions are important in discussions about the utility of financial transaction tax as a tool to selectively discourage excessive speculation without discouraging any other activity (as John Maynard Keynes originally envisioned it in 1936).

There are several types of financial transaction taxes. Each has its own purpose. Some have been implemented, while some are only proposals. Concepts are found in various organizations and regions around the world. Some are domestic and meant to be used within one nation; whereas some are multinational. In 2011 there were 40 countries that made use of FTT, together raising $38 billion (€29bn).

History

The year 1694 saw an early implementation of a financial transaction tax in the form of a stamp duty at the London Stock Exchange. The tax was payable by the buyer of shares for the official stamp on the legal document needed to formalize the purchase. As of 2011, it is the oldest tax still in existence in Great Britain.

In 1893, the Japanese government introduced the exchange tax, which continued until 1999. In 1893, the tax rates were 0.06% for securities and commodities and 0.03% for bonds.

The United States instituted a transfer tax on all sales or transfers of stock in The Revenue Act of 1914 (Act of 22 October 1914 (ch. 331, 38 Stat. 745)). Instead of a fixed tax amount per transaction, the tax was in the amount of 0.2% of the transaction value (20 basis points, bips). This was doubled to 0.4% (40 bips) in 1932, in the context of the Great Depression, then eliminated in 1966.

In 1936, in the wake of the Great Depression, John Maynard Keynes advocated the wider use of financial transaction taxes. He proposed the levying of a small transaction tax on dealings on Wall Street, in the United States, where he argued excessive speculation by uninformed financial traders increased volatility (see Keynes financial transaction tax below).

In 1972 the Bretton Woods system for stabilizing currencies effectively came to an end. In that context, James Tobin, influenced by the work of Keynes, suggested his more specific currency transaction tax for stabilizing currencies on a larger global scale.

In 1989, at the Buenos Aires meetings of the International Institute of Public Finance, University of Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Economics Edgar L. Feige proposed extending the tax reform ideas of John Maynard Keynes, James Tobin and Lawrence Summers, to their logical conclusion, namely to tax all transactions. Feige's Automated Payment Transaction tax (APT tax) proposed taxing the broadest possible tax base at the lowest possible tax rate. Since financial transactions account for the greatest component of the APT tax base, and since all financial transactions are taxed, the proposal eliminates substitution possibilities for evasion and avoidance. The goal of the APT tax is to significantly improve economic efficiency, enhance stability in financial markets, and reduce to a minimum the costs of tax administration (assessment, collection, and compliance costs). The Automated Payment Transaction tax proposal was presented to the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform in 2005.

As the EU, European free trade, and Euro came together, various financial transaction taxes were considered openly. One non-tax regulatory equivalent of Tobin's narrow tax, to require "non-interest bearing deposit requirements on all open foreign exchange positions", was considered in particular but rejected. During the 1980s the Chicago School view became dominant, that speculation served a vital purpose in keeping currencies accurately reflecting the prospects of their economies, and that even very short term transactions in response to news could in fact reflect fundamental analysis.

Economic literature of the period the 1990s–2000s emphasized that derivatives and other variations in the terms of payment in trade-related transactions (so-called "swaps" for instance) provided a ready means of evading any tax other than the Automated Payment Transaction tax since it uniformly taxed all transactions. Other measures and exemptions from such transaction taxes, to avoid punishing hedging (a form of insurance for cashflows) were also proposed. These tended to lead to generally more complex schemes that were not implemented, in part due to lack of standardization of risk reporting under the Basel I framework, which was itself a response to the 1980s financial speculation crises.

However, disclosure had not kept pace with practices. Regulators and policy-makers and theorists by the 1990s had to deal with increasingly complex financial engineering and the "avoidance by a change of product mix... market participants would have an incentive to substitute out of financial instruments subject to the tax and into instruments not subject to it. In this fashion, markets would innovate to avoid the tax" as they were doing with the creation of financial derivatives. "The real issue is how to design a tax that takes account of all the methods and margins of substitution that investors have for changing their patterns of activity to avoid the tax. [as] suggested by Pollin et al. (1999)." – Palley, 2000 The global adoption of a small flat rate Automated Payment Transaction tax whose base included all transactions would eliminate evasion and avoidance possibilities since the tax would apply equally at all substitution margins. Advocates including Pollin, Palley, and Baker (2000) emphasized that transaction taxes "have clearly not prevented the efficient functioning of" financial markets in the 20th century.

Many theorists raised the issue that hedging and speculation were more of a spectrum than a distinct duality of goals. "Academic studies (e.g. Bodnar et al, 1998) show that companies usually incorporate predictions of future price levels (i.e. a 'view') when executing hedges (a fact which will come as no surprise to most risk management practitioners). If hedging is really just about reducing risk, then why should our expectations of future market direction have any bearing on our hedging decisions? If we hedge 50% of our exposure, instead of 80% or 100%, because we feel that the price/rate of the underlying exposure is more likely to move in our favor, does this meet the criteria for speculation?... On one level (at the extremes), there is no doubt that hedging and speculation are very different activities. However, once you move beyond the straightforward elimination of open positions, into more nuanced transactions involving complex hedging strategies or tenuous relationships between hedges and exposures, the distinction between a hedge and a bet becomes increasingly vague."

To avoid this problem, most proposals emphasized taxing clearly speculative high-volume very-short-term (seconds to hours) transactions that could not in general reflect any change of fundamental exposure or cashflow expectation. Some of these emphasized the automated nature of the trade. FTT proposals often emerge in response to specific crises. For example, the December 1994 Mexican peso crisis reduced confidence in its currency. In that context, Paul Bernd Spahn re-examined the Tobin tax, opposed its original form, and instead proposed his own version in 1995.

In the context of the 2008 financial crisis, many economists, governments, and organizations around the world re-examined or were asked to re-examine, the concept of a financial transaction tax, or its various forms. As a result, various new forms of financial transaction taxes were proposed, such as the EU financial transaction tax. The outcry after this crisis had major political, legal, and economic fallout. By the 2010s the Basel II and Basel III frameworks required reporting that would help to differentiate investing from speculation. Economic thought was tending to reject the belief that they could not be differentiated, or (as the "Chicago School" had held) should not be. However, even Basel III did not require detailed enough disclosure of risk to enable a clear differentiation of hedging vs. speculation.

As another example of an FTT proposal as a warning to speculators, or a response to the crisis, in March 2016 China drafted rules to impose a genuine currency transaction tax and this was referred to in the financial press as a Tobin tax . This was widely viewed as a warning to curb shorting of its currency the yuan. It was however expected to keep this tax at 0% initially, calculating potential revenue from different rate schemes and exemptions, and not to impose the actual tax unless speculation increased.

Also in 2016 US Democratic Party presidential nominee Hillary Clinton asserted that speculation had "placed stress on our markets, created instability, and enabled unfair and abusive trading strategies" and that as President she would seek to "impose a tax on harmful high-frequency trading and reform rules to make our stock markets fairer, more open, and transparent.". However, the term "high-frequency" implied that only a few large volume transaction players engaged in arbitrage would likely be affected. In this respect, Clinton was following the general 1990s trend to focus on automated transactions, in particular, those which could not reflect any genuine human-reviewed fundamental risk or hedge analysis.

She also vowed to "Impose a risk fee on the largest financial institutions. Big banks and financial companies would be required to pay a fee based on their size and their risk of contributing to another crisis." How much fees would be assessed, and whether they amounted to a tax, were an active topic of speculation in the financial community, which expected them to follow Basel III definitions with further refinements.

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