Historical Clarification Commission

The CEH

Creation

In June 1994 the Guatemalan government and the URNG, under advisory by the UN Secretary General and the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), signed the "Agreement on the establishment of the Commission to clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer," which led to the creation of the CEH. Aside from pressure from the UN Secretary General to work towards truth and reconciliation, the road to the CEH was influenced by the Catholic Church — specifically when it created the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala (ODHA) in the mid 1990s.

Mandate

With a belief that uncovering the truth would make national reconciliation a possibility and authentic democracy a reality, the CEH aimed not to judge but to clarify the past with "objectivity, equity and impartiality." The commission aimed to ask and answer questions such as:

• Why were civilians — particularly Mayans — targeted?
• Why did defenceless children suffer?
• Why were basic rules of humanitarian law ignored or not respected?

Instillation of national harmony, promotion of peace, the creation of a culture of mutual respect regarding human rights and the preservation of the memory of the victims was of paramount importance to the commission. Guatemalans and external actors in favour of the commission's work wanted to record Guatemala's bloody past. There is awareness with regards to the systematic violation of human rights during the civil war, but the acts committed and their consequences have yet to become entrenched in the national consciousness and historical memory of Guatemalans.

Commission logistics

The commission's duration lasted two years, from February 1997 to February 1999. Its three commissioners were:

• German law professor Christian Tomuschat, of Berlin's Humboldt University, named by the UN Secretary-General to chair the CEH
• Otilia Lux de Coti, a Mayan scholar nominated by Tomuschat with the agreement of the parties
• Edgar Alfredo Balsells Tojo, a lawyer also nominated by Tomuschat with the agreement of the parties

The process of the commission was complex and was by no means solely a national effort. Throughout the two year mandate of the commission, multiple countries — including Austria, Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom — provided monetary, political and moral support. The U.S. provided declassified documents crucial to the commission, and the UN Secretary General promoted the project and facilitated the contribution of monetary resources and expert knowledge through various UN bodies.

The commission, as outlined in its charter, was to be composed of the current moderator of the peace negotiations (appointed by the UN Secretary General), one Guatemalan citizen (appointed by the aforementioned moderator and agreed upon by both parties), and one academic (selected by the monitor from a list comprised by Guatemalan university presidents and approved by both parties). At the height of the investigations, the commission had a staff of 269 and 14 field offices. The staff consisted of both national, and international commissioners — who accounted for just under half of employees. By the end of the CEH's duration, 2000 communities had been visited and testimonies were received from approximately 20,000 people.

Restrictions

The restrictions of the Commission were as follows: responsibility could not be attributed to any individual — naming names was not allowed; the findings and conclusions of the CEH could not have judicial repercussions; and the commission would have a six-month mandate — extendable to 18 months. The final restriction was not upheld as the commission duration lasted two years. In addition, the CEH had no subpoena powers.

Presentation

The CEH's report, Memory of Silence (Memoria del Silencio) was presented in February 1999 in a 12 volume report to representatives of the URNG and the Guatemalan government as well as Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General. The report is available online for public access in both English and Spanish.

Report findings

For the CEH it was clear that in order to understand the past and move forward on a trajectory for peace, an in-depth analysis of the causes of the civil war was required. They concluded that the four main causes of the conflict were as follows: Structural injustice, closing of free, public spaces, anti-democracy trajectory, Cold War context and international influence.

The CEH also investigated Guatemala's systemic problems. They concluded that the structure and nature of economic, cultural and social relations in Guatemala are marked by profound exclusion, antagonism and conflict — a reflection of its colonial history. In addition, they found the absence of effective state social policy to have accentuated the historical dynamic of exclusion. In fact, they state, most recent state policy has produced inequality and endemic institutional weakness perpetuates the discrepancies among demographics. Leading up to the conflict, civil and political rights were suppressed and public venues were closed to prevent the spread of anti-government sentiment and other revolutionary thinking. During the armed conflict, the incapacity of the state to deal with political instability led to the creation of an intricate system of repression including an underground, illegal punitive system. Military intelligence was the conflict's driving force. Impunity permeated Guatemala's political system.

Human rights violations: statistics

The principal focus on the CEH was with regards to human rights violations during the civil war. They registered a total of 42,275 casualties by human rights violations and acts of violence, of that 23,671 were victims of arbitrary execution and 6,159 by forced disappearance. Estimates of those killed or disappeared during the conflict reach as high as 200,000. In terms of demographics, the CEH found that 83% of "fully identified" victims were Mayan and 17% Ladino. 93% of the violations were attributed to state forces and related paramilitary groups and 3% to insurgency groups. Among the victims of arbitrary execution, forced disappearance, torture, rape and other violations of fundamental rights were children, priests, indigenous leaders as well as non-combatant women and men with no ties to insurgency groups.

Recommendations

The CEH highlighted seven main recommendations for Guatemala's government as it embarked upon a path of peace and reconciliation. These recommendations were created in accordance with the UN draft "Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Violation of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law" (E/CN.4/Sub2/1996/17).

1. Take measures to preserve the memory of the victims
2. Those responsible for the crimes should assume responsibility
3. Restoration of material possessions and economic compensation
4. Conduct investigations into all known forced disappearances
5. Creation of an immediate exhumation policy of all victims' remains
6. Foster mutual respect and observance of human rights
7. Strengthen the democratic process (judicial and military reform)

Throughout the recommendations the CEH highlights the need for indigenous political participation.

Aftermath

Implementation of recommendations

The Guatemalan army was opposed to many human rights aspects of the 1996 Peace Accords including the creation and work of the CEH. They argued that these tools were to be used by the insurgency groups to garner political support and military strength. However, support for human rights focused accords and commissions were strongly supported by the URNG, the Catholic Church, and various civil society and human rights based groups. Problems the commission faced were primarily based on political and ideological disagreements. In fact, although the CEH finally came to fruition, its progress was stalled when the army stated its clear opposition to the commission and the URNG affirmed its inclusion as non-negotiable.

Since the report was released in 1999, progress has been made with regards to compliance of the aforementioned recommendations. In 2000 Guatemala ratified the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearances, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights regarding social economic and cultural rights, and the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In 2002 it ratified the Optional Protocol of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, regarding the participation of children in armed conflicts and the recognition of the competence of the Committee Against Torture to receive individual complaints in 2003. Although these accords have been signed and ratified, their content has yet to be integrated into current and future domestic plans. In addition, in 2003, 20 years after the majority of human rights violations occurred, a National Reparations Program was established.

In accordance with the CEH's statement that the state was obligated to investigate crimes committed during the conflict, José Efraín Ríos Montt— former military dictator — was tried and convicted for genocide and crimes against humanity. However, for multiple reasons his trial was suspended until January 2015, then further suspended until January 2016. A closed-door trial began in March 2016. Rios Montt died while the trial was still ongoing.

Critiques and controversy

One of the most controversial revelations of the commission was its statement that at no time during the conflict did guerrilla groups have the military potential to pose an immediate threat to the state or its army. The state was well aware that the insurgency did not represent a real threat to Guatemalan political order. It has been argued that they deliberately magnified the military threat of the insurgency to justify the crimes they committed.

In the several years following the release of the CEH's report, scholars have analysed its effectiveness in preventing conflict and creating national harmony as highlighted in the commission's mandate. Jeff Corntassel and Cindy Holder argue that state-facilitated truth mechanisms are fundamentally flawed if they do not address historic and ongoing injustices against indigenous groups — this is particularly relevant in Guatemala considering 83% of the victims in the conflict were indigenous. In addition, Rachel Sieder has investigated judicial reform and violence in postwar Guatemala and states that homicide rates in fact were higher in 2011 than during the height of the armed conflict. The effectiveness of the CEH is highly contested, however it has seen successes — particularly with the opening of spaces like 'La casa de la memoria' which exist to preserve the memory of the conflict's victims.