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Kant's antinomies

Philosophical contradictions of Immanuel Kant

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Through Experience, Empirical evidence and Atom

Kant thought that some certain antinomies of his (God and Freedom) could be resolved as "Postulates of Practical Reason". He used them to describe the equally rational-but-contradictory results of applying the universe of pure thought to the categories or criteria, i.e. applying reason proper to the universe of sensible perception or experience (phenomena). Empirical reason cannot here play the role of establishing rational truths because it goes beyond possible experience and is applied to the sphere of that which transcends it.

The scholar Lewis White Beck suggests that Kant's development of the antinomies may have been influenced by the antinomic mode of argument employed by the ancient Greek philosopher Zeno. In Beck's view, by adopting such a "skeptical method", Kant could avoid the pitfalls of attempting to resolve a conflict between opposing philosophical arguments by asserting instead that the legitimacy of the argument itself may be called into question. Through the use of such a skeptical methodology, Kant could establish the foundation for his claim that "the world we experience is not and does not contain a thing in itself but is only phenomenal." In addition, Beck also argued that Kant's resolution of the "mathematical" antinomy of space and time illustrates his utilization of a philosophical "strategy" which incorporates Ramsey's Maxim.

Overview

Kant's antinomies are four: two "mathematical" and two "dynamical". They are connected with (1) the limitation of the universe in respect of space and time, (2) the theory that the whole consists of indivisible atoms (whereas, in fact, none such exist), (3) the problem of free will in relation to universal causality, and (4) the existence of a necessary being.

The first two antinomies are dubbed "mathematical" antinomies, presumably because in each case we are concerned with the relation between what are alleged to be sensible objects (either the world itself, or objects in it) and space and time. The second two are dubbed "dynamical" antinomies, presumably because the proponents of the thesis are not committing themselves solely to claims about spatio-temporal objects.

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