Libya and weapons of mass destruction

In 1968, Libya under King Idris signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), ratified it under Gaddafi in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1980. Despite being the signatory state of NPT, Libya under Gaddafi pursued nuclear weapons from different venues including employing of foreign experts and using the proliferation network to locally advance its efforts. After the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, followed by the Iraq War in 2003, Libya engaged in rolling back its efforts in an exchange of improving the relations with the United States and the Western world. The United States and the United Kingdom assisted Libya in removing equipment and rolling back its program, with independent verification by the IAEA.

In 1972, Libya signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and ratified it in 1982.

In 1970, Libya secretly acquired chemical weapons capability from the Soviet Union and was one of the non-signatory states of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), only acceded to become a member of the CWC on 6 January 2004. Libya declared 24.7 metric tonnes of mustard gas, 1,390 metric tonnes of chemical precursors for making sarin, as well as 3,563 unloaded chemical weapon munitions (aerial bombs). Destruction of the Libyan chemical weapons was agreed upon when the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) set January 2014 as the deadline for the full destruction of Libya's chemical weapons. Libya began destroying its chemical stockpiles and munitions later in 2004, but it missed deadlines for converting one chemical weapons production facility to peaceful use and for destroying its stockpile of mustard agent.

In October 2014, Libya asked for foreign assistance to transport its 850 tonne stockpile of precursor chemicals for making nerve gas out of Libya for destruction. In February 2015, Libyan military sources told media that unidentified armed men had captured large amounts of Libya’s chemical weapons, including mustard gas and sarin. Destruction of Libya's chemical weapon precursors was completed in November 2017.

Libya signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 20 September 2017, but has not ratified it.

Nuclear program

In 1968, Libya under Idris became a signatory state of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and was ratified by Muammar Gaddafi in 1975. This was followed by the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1980 that allowed the cooperation on peaceful applications of nuclear power with the Soviet Union.

Despite being a signatory state of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its international obligations, Libya under Gaddafi since 1969 had actively pursued its ambitions of acquiring nuclear weapons by employing large number of foreign experts and used proliferation network to allegedly to counter the covert Israeli nuclear capability.

Eventually, the Libyan efforts were later exposed by Friedrich Tinner (one of their leading foreign experts) in an exchange for immunity in 2003. Earlier in July 1995, the IAEA had reported that Libya had made a "strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities, including gas centrifuge uranium enrichment," which can enrich uranium for use in nuclear reactors as well as for nuclear weapons.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, followed by the Iraq War in 2003, Libya under Gaddafi engaged in nuclear disarmament with the assistance from the United States and the IAEA in an exchange for improving relations with the Western world.

At the time its nuclear program was rolled back, the Libya's nuclear program remained in and early developmental stage.

Foreign assistance

Gaddafi's most famous buying foray for nuclear weapons was in 1970, when Libyan leaders paid a state visit to China. Gaddafi and his Prime Minister Abdessalam Jalloud made an unsuccessful attempt to convince China to sell tactical nuclear weapons to Libya. Gaddafi's justification for seeking nuclear weapons was his concern over the Israeli nuclear capability, and publicly expressed his desire to obtain nuclear weapons.

In 1974, Gaddafi paid a state visit to Pakistan to attend the second summit of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in Lahore and found a secret opportunity to research on the nuclear weapons in Pakistan. With the takeover of the Bhutto administration by the Pakistani military in 1977, Libya was restricted and any attempts for its requests were rebuffed by the upcoming Zia administration due to President Zia himself distrusted and disliked the Libyans.

With relations severed with Pakistan, Gaddafi normalized relations with India in 1978, and eventually reaching a mutual understanding for civil nuclear cooperation with India. An effort was made to gain access to the raw uranium ore in a view of enriching towards industrial-grade uranium but this approach proved difficult and failed due to lack of scientific capability. In 1980, Libya decided to acquire plutonium and secretly imported 1,200 kilograms (2,600 lb) of uranium ore from Niger without notifying it to the IAEA as required by its safeguards' agreement. In 1982, Libya made an unsuccessful negotiation attempt with Belgium to procure a small industrial plant for manufacturing UF⁴ solid compound.

In 1984, Gaddafi facilitated the visit of the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to Libya and was successful in reaching a pact with India on nuclear technology. India, citing the lack of manpower and infrastructure, later downplayed any cooperation with Libya. During the same year, Libya had reached out to Japan for procuring a small uranium conversion plant and a Japanese company supplied Libya with the technology; the sale was apparently arranged directly with the Japanese instead of through middlemen.

In 1985 and onward, Libya under Gaddafi used a smuggling network which UN weapons investigators found had connections to China.

The Libyan program had employed Friedrich Tinner, a Swiss engineer who guided on most of the Libyan efforts on scaling the uranium towards military-grade using the gas centrifuges methods but was unable to produce an operating centrifuge without the outside technical experts. In 1995, Gaddafi renewed calls for nuclear weapons and pursued new avenues for nuclear technology procurement, while publicly affirming its NPT commitments. With the enforcement of the economic sanctions on Libya and Iran by the Clinton administration in 1996, Gaddafi sought to persuade U.S. President Bill Clinton to lift UN sanctions in exchange for giving up its WMD programs.

In 1997, Libya received technical information on gas centrifuges from its smuggling network and was able to restart the project under Tinner, after it received 20 pre-assembled centrifuges and components for an additional 200 centrifuges and related parts from foreign suppliers.

In October 2000, the Libyan efforts oversaw by Tinner were successful in installing a complete single centrifuge, using a pre-assembled rotors, at its Al Hashan site. However, further experiments relating to the efficiency, performance, and efficacy of the centrifuges failed as the technical guides and documents were too difficult to interpret and bring into operation. Ultimately, Libya notified the IAEA and told its investigators that it had no national personnel competent to evaluate these designs at that time, and due to its extreme difficulty, Libya would have had to ask the supplier for help if it had decided to pursue a nuclear weapon.

Soviet Union

In 1979, Libya fostered close strategic ties with the Soviet Union including cooperation on peaceful use of nuclear technology under IAEA safeguards. In 1981, the Soviet Union agreed to build a 10 megawatts (0.010 GW) research reactor at Tajoura, known as the "Tajura Nuclear Research Facility (TNRF)". There were reports of unsanctioned experiments being performed by the Russian experts on the uranium at the behest of the Libyan government. An unnamed nuclear weapon state, whose name has been kept secret by the IAEA, allegedly assisted Libya in these experiments. American nuclear weapons expert, David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, said the Soviet Union and China were the most likely suspects.

In 1984, Libya began to negotiate with the Soviet Union for purchasing a commercial nuclear power plant but talks failed due to technical difficulties encountered in understanding and running Russian RBMK reactors.

In 1991, Libya tried to exploit the chaos generated by the collapse of the Soviet Union to gain access to nuclear technology, expertise, personnel, and materials. In 1992, it was reported by an official of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow claimed that Libya had unsuccessfully tried to recruit two of his colleagues to work at the "Tajoura Nuclear Research Center" in Libya. Other reports also suggested that Russian scientists had been hired to work on a covert Libyan nuclear efforts.

In March 1998, Russia and Libya signed a contract with the Russian consortium, the Atomenergoeksport, for a partial overhaul of the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center.

Dismantlement

In 1992, the rollback of the Libya's nuclear program started with the Clinton administration according to the U.S. diplomat, Martin Indyk, who maintained that the negotiations and diplomatic efforts rolling back Libyan nuclear program were started as early as Bill Clinton assuming the presidency.