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Lusaka Manifesto

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Through Apartheid, United Nations and War of independence

The Lusaka Manifesto represented one of two strategies to deal with white minority rule in Southern Africa: To try to contain violence, preserve the status quo, and improve the humanitarian situation little by little through diplomatic means, small reforms, and compromises. The other strategy, to wage independence wars, would eventually prevail.

Background

In the late 1960s South Africa's apartheid regime became increasingly politically isolated, both internationally and continental. Under Prime Minister B.J. Vorster it developed the so-called "outward-looking policy", an effort to bind southern African countries economically, and in this way to discourage them from openly criticising its repressive internal politics. This policy was at first openly opposed only by Tanzania under president Julius Nyerere and Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda, but their lobbying made the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) reject any further dialogue with South Africa.

At that time independence movements had been formed in all white-ruled territories of Southern Africa, either with an explicit commitment to guerrilla warfare and sabotage or recently having scaled their activities from passive resistance, petitioning, and lobbying to an openly armed struggle. The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa had launched its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in 1961. It immediately executed several sabotage acts against the country's infrastructure. In South-West Africa SWAPO's paramilitary wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) was founded in 1962, its first military action occurred in Omugulugwombashe in 1966.

Yet South Africa was politically strong at the time of the declaration agreed upon in Lusaka. Its border states except Botswana were all ruled by white minorities. In the United States, National Security Study Memorandum number 39, issued by US president Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, had just reiterated that "the Whites in southern Africa [are] there to stay". Memorandum 39, nicknamed Tar baby memorandum for its reluctant acceptance of apartheid and minority rule in order to gain anti-communist allies in Southern Africa, strengthened South Africa's position internationally.

Prime Minister Vorster had had a secret conversation with Kaunda for some time since 1968, eventually leading to the manifesto. A threat to reveal existence and content of this conversation was issued by Vorster to influence Kaunda's public presentation of South African politics. When Kaunda did not react, Vorster published the complete exchange and later in 1970 confirmed it in the South African parliament.

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