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Operation All Clear

2003–04 Bhutanese anti-separatist operation

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Through India and Bangladesh

Background

In 1990, India launched Operations Rhino and Bajrang against Assam separatist groups. Facing continuous pressure, Assamese militants relocated their camps to Bhutan.

In 1996, the Bhutan government became aware of a large number of camps on its southern border with India. The camps were set up by four Assamese separatist movements: the ULFA, NDFB, Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) and Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO). The camps also harbored separatists belonging to the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF).

The camps had been established with the goal of training cadres and storing equipment, while the thick jungles of the region also enabled the militants to easily launch attacks into Indian territory.

India then exerted diplomatic pressure on Bhutan, offering support in removing the rebel organisations from its soil. The government of Bhutan initially pursued a peaceful solution, opening dialogue with the militant groups on 1998. Five rounds of talks were held with ULFA, three rounds with NDFB, with KLO ignoring all invitations sent by the government. In June 2001 ULFA agreed to close down four of its camps; however, the Bhutanese government soon realized that the camps had simply been relocated.

KLO had also been allegedly involved in creating the Bhutan Tiger Force, the military wing of the Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist–Leninist–Maoist), together with Nepalese Maoists. Additionally, the KLO, along with ULFA and NDFB, were allegedly involved in forming another militant outfit, the Bhutan Gorkha Liberation Front, made up of ethnic Nepalese immigrants and refugees from southern Bhutan. This strengthened the Bhutanese government's resolve to launch the operation.

On 19 July 2003, a group of Bhutanese parliamentarians proposed to raise the number of Bhutanese militia, by introducing a Swiss-style militia training for all citizens aged between 18 and 50. The motion was dismissed by foreign minister Jigme Thinley and Brigadier General Batoo Tshering, who asserted that 5,000 Royal Bhutan Army soldiers have been deployed to the country's border with India.

On 3 August 2003, more than 15 gunmen attacked an ULFA base in Kinzo, 22 kilometers from Samdrup Jongkhar, leaving two ULFA members dead. The attackers fled after the rebels returned fire. The following day, a group of between 10 and 12 gunmen attacked ULFA members residing in an abandoned house in Babang. Four gunmen and one ULFA fighter perished in the encounter. In response, a ULFA spokeswoman blamed the attacks on mercenaries and SULFA fighters hired by the Indian government. Indian officials called the attacks rebel infighting.

During the course of 2003, Bhutan reestablished its militia force. By 15 September 2003, the Bhutanese militia consisted of 634 volunteers. The militia volunteers were deployed in the southern regions of the country, after undergoing a two-month training. Bhutan's militia played a supporting role during the conflict.

By 2003 the talks had failed to produce any significant result. On 14 July 2003, military intervention was approved by the National Assembly. On 13 December 2003, the Bhutanese government issued a two-day ultimatum to the rebels. On 15 December 2003, after the ultimatum had expired, Operation All Clear – the first operation ever conducted by the Royal Bhutan Army – was launched.

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