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Spanish General Council of the Judiciary blockade

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The Council has a term of five years, after which all 20 members of the council must be re-appointed. The law requires that a three fifths majority is required in the Congress for their appointment, which usually means that a consensus must be reached between the Government and the Opposition. The Opposition has refused to do so principally on the grounds that they want to change the method of appointment (to allow some members to be appointed by the judiciary themselves) but also as a bargaining chip in negotiations on other legislation. The Government has been able to pass legislation to allow some functions of the Council to be exercised without the Council but the Council remains in abeyance after five and a half years.

The same opposition party has blocked the reappointment of the Council twice before, in 1995 until they won government and in 2006 for two years until the following general election.

After an agreement between the two main political parties, on 25 July 2024 the new members of the Council assumed office, ending the crisis. Minor parties complained that they had not been consulted nor was the agreement debated in parliament.

Background

Regulations

The Spanish Constitution establishes that the Judiciary of Spain is governed by itself through the General Council of the Judiciary. This body, chaired by the President of the Supreme Court and made up of twenty other members, has a mandate of five years. According to the constitutional text, of the twenty members mentioned, twelve must belong to the category of "Judges and Magistrates" and eight will be "lawyers and other jurists, all of them of recognized competence and with more than fifteen years of practice in their profession." Regarding the form of election, article 122 of the Constitution establishes that the eight jurists will be chosen by the Cortes Generales, in equal parts between both chambers, while the form of election of judges and magistrates leaves it open to the legal regulation made by the legislator.

At the beginning of 1980, the Cortes approved Organic Law 1/1980, of January 10, of the General Council of the Judiciary, an organic law that developed the powers of the Governing Council of judges. This law, in its twelfth and subsequent articles, established that the twelve judges and magistrates would be elected by the judges and magistrates themselves through a personal, equal, direct and the principle of a secret ballot. The law was definitively approved by the Congress of Deputies on December 28, 1979, with 258 votes in favour (mainly UCD and PSOE), 17 against and two abstentions.

Five years later, in 1985, the definitive Organic Law of the Judiciary was approved, which repealed the previous organic norm of 1980 and integrated it into this one. The main novelty that it brought with it was the modification of the system of these twelve judges and magistrates, who from the entry into force of the new law began to be elected — like the other eight members— by reinforced majorities —three fifths— of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. This idea, initially discarded, was supported by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) — which at that time had 202 seats— considered that the judiciary had a "conservative structure" and that the "parliamentary majority" should weigh more. The law was definitively approved by Congress on 28 March 1985 with 188 votes in favour, 65 against, and three abstentions.

This new law was appealed by the most conservative sector of Parliament, considering that there was a risk of "politicization", as well as by the General Council of the Judiciary itself, presenting various conflicts of competences. Its unconstitutionality was ruled out by the Constitutional Court in two judgments of 1986 (STC 45/1986, of April 17, and STC 108/1986, of July 29). Undoubtedly, the most relevant is 108/1986, which deals in depth with the question related to the election system. In this judgment, the High Court, although it sees coherence in the arguments of the appellants that there could be an implicit limit in the Constitution by establishing that eight of the members must be elected by the Cortes, while this is not the case for the twelve judges and magistrates, It is also true, according to the Court, that the text does not prohibit Parliament from legally appropriating that capacity. Likewise, the constitutional magistrates continue, the resolution of this ambiguity does not find a clear answer in the debate on the elaboration of the Constitution itself. After analysing the spirit of the regulation, the court considers that it is intended to "ensure that the composition of the Council reflects the pluralism existing within society and, especially, within the Judiciary" and that the risk of politicization would not only exist with a parliamentary election, but also with a "corporate election" among the judges and magistrates themselves, which could cause "the electoral procedure to transfer the existing ideological divisions in society to the heart of the Judicial Career."

For all these reasons, the Court concluded that "the existence and even the probability of this risk, created by a precept that makes possible, although not necessary, an action contrary to the spirit of the Constitutional Norm, seems to advise its substitution, but it is not a basis" enough to declare its invalidity, since it is constant doctrine of this Court that the validity of the law must be preserved when its text does not prevent an adequate interpretation of the Constitution. This being so in the present case, since the contested precept is susceptible to an interpretation in accordance with the Constitution and does not necessarily impose actions contrary to it, it is appropriate to declare that this precept is not contrary to the Constitution.

Subsequently, other reforms promoted by conservative governments such as those carried out by Organic Law 2/2001, of June 28, or by Organic Law 4/2013, of June 28, introduced a mixed system, in which the spirit of the 1985 reform was maintained, allowing the parliamentary election of the members of the CGPJ, but giving greater relevance in the procedure for proposing candidates to judges and magistrates, as well as to existing judicial associations.

Politics

As a result of the 1985 reform, the increased importance of the Legislative Branch in the election of the members of the governing body of judges and the majority necessary for it, required greater institutional loyalty and commitment on the part of the political parties, mainly the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and the People's Party, parties that had dominated the political arena since the 1980s. It soon became clear that this would not always happen. In 1995, with Felipe González as Prime Minister of Spain and José María Aznar as leader of the opposition, the mandate of the third General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) expired but was not renewed until 1996, when Aznar's Popular Party won the 1996 general election and, after eight months of interim, it was renewed in a with a conservative majority. At that time, the CGPJ ended up diminished and in practice without the capacity to act, because between vacancies and resignations of members, the council was left with 11 members, insufficient to approve measures.

The second blockade took place in 2006. The Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in the final period of the legislative session, and the Opposition Leader Mariano Rajoy once again refused to renew the CGPJ. It remained so for almost two years. In 2008, after the Socialists won the general election, the People's Party agreed to renew the judicial governing body.

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