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1959 Tibetan uprising

Uprising in Lhasa, Tibet against China

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Tsarong in captivity
Unknown author Unknown author · Public domain

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Armed resistance in Kham and Amdo

In 1951, the Seventeen Point Agreement between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and representatives of the Dalai Lama was put into effect. Socialist reforms such as redistribution of land were delayed in Tibet proper. However, eastern Kham and Amdo (western Sichuan / Xikang and Qinghai provinces in the Chinese administrative hierarchy) were outside the administration of the Tibetan government in Lhasa, and were thus treated more like other Chinese provinces, with land redistribution implemented in full. The Khampas and nomads of Amdo traditionally owned their own land. Armed resistance broke out in Amdo and eastern Kham in June 1956.

Prior to the PLA invasion, relations between Lhasa and the Khampa chieftains had deteriorated, although the Khampa remained spiritually loyal to the Dalai Lama throughout. Because of these strained relations, the Khampa had actually assisted the Chinese communists in their initial invasion, before becoming the guerrilla resistance they are now known for. Pandatsang Rapga, a pro-Kuomintang and pro-Republic of China Khampa revolutionary leader, offered the governor of Chamdo, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, some Khampa fighters in exchange for the Tibetan government recognizing the independence of Kham. Ngabo refused the offer. After the defeat of the Tibetan Army in Chamdo, Rapga started mediating in negotiations between the PRC and the Tibetan rebels. Rapga and Topgay engaged in negotiations with the Chinese during their assault on Chamdo. Khampas either defected to the Chinese PLA forces or did not fight at all. The PLA attack succeeded.

In 1956, armed conflict between Tibetan guerrillas and the PLA started in the Kham and Amdo regions, which had been subjected to socialist reform. Guerrilla warfare later spread to other areas of Tibet. By 1957, Kham was in chaos. Resistance fighters' attacks and People's Liberation Army reprisals against Khampa resistance groups such as the Chushi Gangdruk became increasingly brutal. Kham's monastic networks came to be used by guerrilla forces to relay messages and hide rebels. Punitive strikes were carried out by the Chinese government against Tibetan villages and monasteries. Tibetan exiles assert that threats to bomb the Potala Palace and the Dalai Lama were bluffs made by Chinese military commanders in an attempt to intimidate the guerrilla forces into submission. The CIA provided limited support to the Kham uprising, including training for Tibetan fighters, logistical assistance through camps based in Nepal, and the organization of several aerial supply missions. Some regard the Xunhua Incident in 1958 as a precursor of the Tibetan uprising.

Lhasa continued to abide by the seventeen-point agreement and sent a delegation to Kham to quell the rebellion. After speaking with the rebel leaders, the delegation instead joined the rebellion. Kham leaders contacted the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but the CIA under President Dwight D. Eisenhower insisted it required an official request from Lhasa to support the rebels. Lhasa did not act. Eventually the CIA began to provide covert support for the rebellion without word from Lhasa. By then the rebellion had spread to Lhasa which had filled with refugees from Amdo and Kham. Opposition to the Chinese presence in Tibet grew within the city of Lhasa.

In mid-February 1959 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party's Administrative Office circulated the Xinhua News Agency internal report on how "the revolts in the Tibetan region have gathered pace and developed into a nearly full-scale rebellion," in a "situation report" for top CCP leaders.

The next day, the Chinese leader saw a report from the PLA General Staff's Operations Department describing rebellions by Tibetans in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai. He again stressed that "rebellions like these are extremely favorable for us because they will benefit us in helping to train our troops, train the people, and provide a sufficient reason to crush the rebellion and carry out comprehensive reforms in the future".

The PLA used Hui soldiers, who formerly had served under Ma Bufang to crush the Tibetan revolt in Amdo. Hui cavalry were stationed in Southern Kham. The situation in all of Tibet became increasingly tense, as a growing number of Tibetans began to support the Khampa uprising, while "anti-Chinese communist agitation" spread among the Tibetans. The regional government in Lhasa neither wanted to back a rebellion nor publicly oppose it. Dissatisfied, the Chinese Communist Party put pressure on the Dalai Lama's government to join the operations against the rebels, and made it increasingly clear that a spread of the insurgency would lead to "all-out repression" in Tibet. In this unstable situation, the Chinese generals resident in Lhasa was summoned back to mainland China, leaving the inexperienced PLA commander Tan Guansan in charge, just as the date of the Monlam Prayer Festival approached. This festival had previously been used by participants to voice "anti-Chinese sentiments".

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