Ablai Khan

Campaigns in Dzungaria

By the late 1740s and early 1750s, the once-powerful Dzungar Khanate had entered a period of accelerating decline. Following the death of Galdan Tseren, a succession struggle broke out in Dzungaria. The throne passed to Galdan Tseren's middle son, who was only thirteen years old. His brief reign was marked by executions, political repression, economic decline, and increasing decentralization. He was eventually overthrown and succeeded by Lama Dorji. From the beginning of his reign, Lama Dorji faced hostility from many leading Dzungar nobles. Among his most formidable opponents was Dawachi, a direct descendant of Batur Khong Tayiji, the founder of the Dzungar Khanate. In the autumn of 1751, Dawachi and his supporters were defeated and fled to Kazakhstan. At first, the refugees were received hospitably. Although the Kazakh elite closely followed developments in Dzungaria, they initially maintained neutrality. However, the arrival of three prominent Dzungar noyons forced them to reconsider their position and determine a common course of action.

Upon learning that Dawachi and Amursana had found refuge with Abilai, the Dzungar khan Lama Dorji dispatched an embassy demanding their immediate extradition. He also appealed to the influential Kazakh elders Malaisary and Yapik, asking them to persuade Abilai to surrender the fugitives so that "discord and unnecessary bloodshed might be avoided." In this situation, Abilai played the decisive role. Before a council of Kazakh elders could be convened, he refrained from making a final decision and replied that he had not summoned the fugitives, but that they had come to him of their own accord. Nevertheless, the Kazakh nomadic camps were subsequently moved northward, closer to the Russian frontier fortresses and farther away from the Dzungar border.

Meanwhile, Dawachi began to attract followers dissatisfied with the new ruler of Dzungaria, who expected him to return to the khanate accompanied by Kazakh forces. By the summer of 1752, about 150 supporters had gathered around him. Initially, the fugitives had intended to travel through Kazakh territory to join the Volga Kalmyks. Gradually, however, the growing number of former subjects wishing to rally around them altered these plans. Dawachi increasingly urged the Kazakh leaders to provide him with a military force for an invasion of Dzungaria. At the same time, another Dzungar embassy arrived demanding the extradition of the fugitives. The envoys were detained until the assembly of the Middle Jüz reached a decision. Representatives of all clans and tribes of the Middle Jüz attended the council, together with delegates from the Junior and Senior Jüzes.

Abilmambet Khan supported handing over the Dzungar nobles, but Abilai believed that his position was motivated by personal interests and the advantages he hoped to gain from cooperation with the Dzungar khan. Abilai's stance was backed by influential tribal leaders and batyrs, including Bogenbay, Dawut Tarkhan, Yapak, and Sultan Eraly of the Junior Jüz, all of whom insisted that Dawachi, Amursana, and Banjur should under no circumstances be surrendered to the Dzungars. Personal friendship also played a role: according to Captain A. Yakovlev, during Abilai's captivity in Dzungaria between 1741 and 1743, he and Dawachi had "pledged friendship" to one another. Abilai was likewise supported by Töle Bi, who opposed the extradition of the Dzungar nobles. This broad support strengthened Abilai's position, and the Dzungar envoys once again returned empty-handed. Abilai subsequently sent an embassy informing Lama Dorji that the fugitives had come voluntarily and therefore could not be surrendered. The Russian government, having learned that the two Dzungar noyons had taken refuge in the Middle Jüz, also decided to intervene actively in the situation and sought to have them transferred into Russian custody. The principal objective of the Kazakhs, however, was to place their own protégé on the Oirat throne. Ablai argued that Dawachi was "the most distinguished noyon" and that, under the circumstances, supporting his claim would be the most advantageous course of action.

In September, a 20,000-strong Oirat army invaded the Kazakh frontier pastures. The Dzungars launched two major offensives, devastating many Naiman, Kerei, and other Kazakh clans, taking numerous captives. They also seized several tribal leaders and demanded their exchange for Dawachi, Amursana, and Amursana's brother. Upon learning of the invasion, Ablai sent messengers throughout the steppe calling on the Kazakh forces to assemble at Bayan-Aul. Despite the Dzungar offensive, Ablai and his supporters initially sought a peaceful resolution and hoped to preserve the agreements that had existed during the reign of Galdan Tseren. At the same time, attitudes toward Dawachi among the Kazakhs began to change. The invasion of Kazakh territory, together with Dawachi's unsuccessful attempt to transfer his ulus into the Middle Jüz, undermined the confidence that Ablai and other Kazakh leaders had placed in him. The commanders of the Kazakh militia increasingly favoured surrendering the fugitives, provided they received guarantees that they would be "received with good intentions, that his uluses would be restored to him, and that he would be treated as a ruler rather than put to death." Aware of these changing attitudes, Dawachi and his followers kept their distance from the Kazakh army.

During the autumn and winter of 1752, fighting between the Oirat army and the Kazakh militia continued with mixed results. However, the strategic advantage gradually shifted in favour of the Kazakhs, and reports began to circulate of Dzungar defeats. Ablai hoped to carry the war into Dzungarian territory. Despite these setbacks, Lama Dorji rejected all of Ablai's proposals for peace negotiations. Ablai dispatched envoys, but the embassy was intercepted: one envoy was killed, while the other was detained and forced to guide the Dzungars to Kazakh encampments. At the same time, Kazakh and Oirat interests increasingly clashed in Central Asia. Both sides sought to establish supremacy over the nomadic and settled peoples living along the Syr Darya, including the Karakalpaks. Lama Dorji sent envoys to the Karakalpaks to announce their "punishment" for "disobedience" and to persuade them to resettle in Dzungaria. The Karakalpaks had suffered heavily from repeated Kazakh raids, and according to information obtained by the Senior Jüz, only about 3,000 Karakalpak families remained. Although the Karakalpak rulers initially agreed to Lama Dorji's proposal, they changed their minds at the last moment and appealed to the Kazakh rulers for assistance. Kazakh detachments under Kabanbai Batyr and Khanbaba, the son of Sultan Barak, were immediately dispatched to their aid.

Having committed the bulk of his forces to the campaign in Kazakhstan, Lama Dorji left his headquarters poorly defended, an opportunity that his rivals quickly exploited. Dawachi and Amursana launched a surprise raid from Kazakh territory with a force of 600 warriors and successfully seized power. Following these events, Dawachi became khan of Dzungaria. Kazakh–Oirat relations entered a new phase, characterized by increasingly active Kazakh involvement in the Oirat civil wars. After assuming power, Dawachi withdrew his troops from Kazakhstan and sent messages to Abilmambet and Ablai proposing peaceful relations. Ablai likewise sent a letter expressing his desire to maintain the friendly ties that had existed previously. The overthrow of Lama Dorji, however, did not bring an end to the civil conflict in Dzungaria. Lama Dorji fled to Amursana, who attempted to exploit the situation by demanding half of the khanate, only to receive a categorical refusal. Ablai and the Kazakh elders supported both Dawachi and Amursana. On 23 December 1753, the headman of the Naiman volosts informed a Russian ensign that the Kazakhs had gone "to render assistance, defeated many Kalmyk uluses... and Sultan Ablai himself joined that expedition."

In the autumn of 1753, Kazakh detachments numbering about 5,000 men were operating in Dzungaria. Their principal attacks were directed against the Derbets. The Bargat *otok*, belonging to Dzungar princes, was also destroyed. Documentary evidence indicates that Abilai and Dawachi had concluded an agreement on joint military operations. Oirat prisoners captured by the Kazakhs were handed over to Dawachi. Men from the Derbet otoks (territorial unit) were delivered to him, while the women and children were distributed among the Kazakh leaders. These accounts are corroborated by Balchuk, the headman of a Kerei volost, who personally took part in the campaign. According to the available sources, Dawachi received the greater part of the captured livestock. During the winter of 1753–1754, another Kazakh militia force again marched into Dzungaria.

At the same time, other Dzungar noyons, including Amursana and Nemekhu-Jirgali, also began to resist Dawachi. Having expanded the number of their followers to approximately 7,000 households, they openly challenged his authority. Amursana's envoys appealed to Abilai for assistance, requesting 20,000 sheep and as many camels as possible in return for future payment. Abilai agreed to provide the requested aid, and the Khoit noyon subsequently revealed his plans and invited his allies to join him. It remains unclear whether these developments prompted Abilai and the other Kazakh leaders to abandon their alliance with Dawachi, thereby bringing the Dzungar Khanate and the Middle Jüz to the brink of war. It can, however, be concluded that the parties reached an understanding regarding the future relationship between the Dzungar Khanate and the Kazakh jüzes.

In the autumn of 1753, Kazakh detachments numbering about 5,000 men were operating in Dzungaria. Their principal attacks were directed against the Derbets. The Bargat otok, belonging to Dzungar princes, was also destroyed. Documentary evidence indicates that Ablai and Dawachi had concluded an agreement on joint military operations. Oirat prisoners captured by the Kazakhs were handed over to Dawachi. Men from the Derbet otoks were delivered to him, while the women and children were distributed among the Kazakh leaders. These accounts are corroborated by Balchuk, the headman of a Kerei volost, who personally took part in the campaign. According to the available sources, Dawachi received the greater part of the captured livestock. During the winter of 1753–1754, another Kazakh militia force again marched into Dzungaria.

At the same time, other Dzungar noyans, including Amursana and Nemekhu-Jirgali, also began to resist Dawachi. Having expanded the number of their followers to approximately 7,000 households, they openly challenged his authority. Amursana's envoys appealed to Ablai for assistance, requesting 20,000 sheep and as many camels as possible in return for future payment. Ablai agreed to provide the requested aid, and the Khoit noyon subsequently revealed his plans and invited his allies to join him. It remains unclear whether these developments prompted Ablai and the other Kazakh leaders to abandon their alliance with Dawachi, thereby bringing the Dzungar Khanate and the Middle Jüz to the brink of war. It can, however, be concluded that the parties reached an understanding regarding the future relationship between the Dzungar Khanate and the Kazakh jüzes.

The first joint campaign undertaken by the Kazakh militia and the forces allied with Amursana ended in defeat. Poor coordination between the allied forces, combined with Dawachi's numerical superiority, forced Abilai's troops to retreat. The Oirat Lazun Sanchikov informed Sergeant Stepan Myakinin that in April 1754 a Kazakh force of approximately 1,700 men unexpectedly appeared near the Karatal River. According to Soviet historians, this defeat proved to be of considerable importance for subsequent events.

Ablai's support for Amursana prompted Dawachi to send a large embassy to the Middle Jüz demanding the return of all captured property and an end to Kazakh military incursions. Speaking on Dawachi's behalf, one of the envoys declared:

"Why have you, Ablai, brought such utter devastation upon the people of my Dzungar dominion? Until now I have always lived with you in brotherly friendship and never expected such insolence and plundering from you. Together with Amursana you have attacked my subjects, carrying off many men and women, horses, cattle, yurts, and property. I ask that all of this be returned to me without further quarrel. Otherwise, I shall send part of my army against you in war."

Ablai dismissed the envoys without giving any reply.

In July–August 1754, Ablai launched another campaign into Dzungaria. Dawachi's diplomatic efforts to restore friendly relations with Ablai proved unsuccessful. Although Ablai achieved a military success, it was no longer sufficient to save Amursana from defeat. Pursued by Oirat and Uriankhai forces, Amursana fled to Qing China with only a small retinue. Ablai, meanwhile, prepared for further incursions into Dzungaria. Having eliminated Amursana as a threat, Dawachi planned to strike at Ablai's nomadic encampments, where the noyon Erinchin had also taken refuge. At the same time, Dawachi intended to request military assistance from the Russian government in his struggle against the Kazakhs. The onset of winter, together with another outbreak of civil conflict, forced the Dzungar khan to withdraw his troops. Many Dzungar noyons and zaisangs spent the winter in the upper Ili valley, fearing another Kazakh invasion. However, a new and far more formidable enemy was already advancing from the east—one against whom the Oirat state proved powerless—as the Qing Empire began its conquest of Dzungaria.

The repeated incursions of the Kazakh forces severely disrupted the economy of the Dzungar Khanate and encouraged continued revolts by various Dzungar nobles against the central government. The Uyghur merchant Ishtamir Baloyarov reported to Sergeant Myakinin that in Dzungaria "everyone has been ruined, some have fallen into extreme poverty and have no food even for a single day. Theft has become widespread, people have grown unruly, no longer fearing the zaisangs or noyans, each man makes himself a chief, and they destroy one another... the whole country has fallen into disorder."

According to Vladimir Moiseev, the conflict that began in 1752 stemmed from the efforts of a group of Kazakh leaders, particularly Ablai and Töle Bi, to place their own candidates on the Dzungar throne first Dawachi and later Amursana. Attempts by the Russian authorities to remain uninvolved in the conflict likewise proved unsuccessful. According to him, "Such was the situation in Dzungaria on the eve of the Qing invasion. It would probably not be an exaggeration to say that the active involvement of the Kazakh rulers in the internecine struggles among the Oirat princes contributed to the decline and ultimate destruction of the Dzungar Khanate."

Kazakh–Qing Conflicts

In early spring 1755, a large Qing army numbering approximately 200,000 soldiers invaded the territory of the Dzungar Khanate. By the summer of the same year, Qing forces had completed the conquest of Dzungaria. Following the fall of the khanate, the Oirat noyon Amursana led a national liberation movement against Qing rule. However, not all Oirat nobles were prepared to recognize his authority, which resulted in internal conflicts among the Oirats.

Abandoned by many of his supporters and commanding only about two hundred warriors, Amursana sought refuge in the nomadic camps of Sultan Ablai. The Qing court was then faced with the question of how to deal with the Kazakh khanates and how to compel Kazakh rulers to cease supporting the liberation movement of the Turkic and Mongolic peoples of Central Asia. During this period, political contacts were established between the Middle Jüz and the Qing Empire.

While preparing for a large-scale war against Dzungaria, Qing China closely monitored the contenders for the Dzungar throne. Qing agents and Oirat defectors were well informed about the role of the Kazakh rulers, particularly Sultan Ablai, who conducted campaigns into Dzungaria throughout the winter and spring of 1755.

After the defeat of Dawachi and his flight to Eastern Turkestan, as well as the elimination of the Dzungar Khanate as a political entity, the emperor ordered his commanders to consider two possible solutions to the "Kazakh question".

• To use diplomatic means to persuade Kazakh detachments to withdraw from Dzungaria.
• To secure recognition from the Kazakhs of the suzerainty of the Manchu Emperor, and, in case of resistance, to employ Qing military forces against the Kazakh warriors.

Ablai refused to comply with this ultimatum and marched against the Qing forces at the head of the Middle Jüz militia, supported by a detachment from the Junior Jüz commanded by Sultan Eraly.

Chinese sources, based on reports from Qing commanders and written with the aim of presenting events favourably, described victories by Manchu-Chinese forces and the capture of Kazakh warriors. According to Russian sources, however, the summer campaign was characterized by fluctuating fortunes. At the Ayaguz River, for example, the Kazakh army inflicted several severe defeats on Qing forces. Nevertheless, the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Qing army, combined with the reluctance of other Kazakh rulers and elders to continue the war against the invaders, forced Ablai, Eraly, and other leaders of Kazakh resistance to withdraw. Ablai was also wounded. In August 1756, a battle took place between Ablai's militia and a combined Qing-Dzungar force, ending in a Kazakh defeat. Afterwards, the Kazakhs were forced to request permission to move their livestock and families behind the line of Russian fortifications.

From the summer of 1756 until the middle of 1757, intense and bloody battles took place between Kazakh detachments and the large Qing armies in the northeastern regions of Central Asia and in Semirechye. According to L. A. Bobrov, the military actions against the Qing armies in 1755–1758 cannot be considered a conventional Dzungar–Qing War. On the one hand, many Dzungars themselves fought on the Qing side; on the other hand, Kazakh militias sent by Ablai, an ally of Amursana, increasingly played an important role among Amursana's forces, and in some cases the number of Kazakh warriors even exceeded that of the Oirats. Initially, the forces of the rebels and the Qing Empire were vastly unequal. Nevertheless, the Dzungars and Kazakhs inflicted several crushing defeats on Qing troops. Angered by the fierce resistance of the recently conquered population, Qing authorities resorted to genocide—the mass extermination of the Dzungars—in which hundreds of thousands of Oirats perished.

In the summer of 1757, due to the enemy's overwhelming numerical and technological superiority, Ablai was forced to end military operations and begin negotiations with Qing commanders in order to establish peace and develop relations with the new southeastern neighbour.

In the autumn of 1757, a Kazakh embassy arrived in China. The Khalkha interpreter F. Shamin reported upon his return:

"From the Kazakh Horde, envoys are going to Beijing with a request that they be forgiven for having, through ignorance, killed a considerable number of Chinese troops in two battles, since previously they had no quarrel or war with the Chinese."

The arrival of the Kazakh embassy and the presentation of gifts to the emperor—traditional diplomatic practices—were interpreted by the Qing Empire as a desire by Ablai and other Kazakh leaders to acknowledge Qing suzerainty. In accordance with the Sinocentric principles that dominated imperial China's foreign policy, which theoretically did not recognize equal relations between China and other states, the Manchu court immediately classified Ablai among the emperor's new vassals. The gifts sent by him were recorded as "tribute" in the imperial chronicle of events, the Shilu.

Campaigns in Kyrgyzstan Kokand

Relations between the Senior and Middle Jüzes and their southern neighbours, the Kyrgyz, were complex. During periods of devastating invasions by foreign conquerors, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz often united against common enemies. However, after the disappearance of the Qing threat, conflicts once again emerged between individual Kazakh and Kyrgyz tribal leaders.

In 1759, the Middle Jüz sultans Abulfayiz and Khanbaba launched a campaign against the Kyrgyz Teyit tribe with a force of approximately 15,000 warriors. According to reports submitted by the Kazakhs to the Russian authorities, the cause of the campaign was that the Kyrgyz had been raiding Kazakh livestock and obstructing trade with the Qing Empire and the Central Asian khanates. The Kazakh sultans undertook the campaign in order to bring the Kyrgyz under their authority and to obtain amanats (hostages) as a guarantee of loyalty.

In October 1765, Ablai Sultan launched a military campaign. Many Kazakh elders urged Ablai to resolve the disputes with the Kyrgyz through peaceful means and avoid a war with such a powerful opponent. Ablai succeeded in taking nine children of the elders of the Talas Kyrgyz as amanats (hostages). Following Ablai's successful campaign, a temporary period of calm was established between the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz.

Soon after the campaign against the Kyrgyz, Ablai turned against his former ally — the Kokand ruler Irdana. The cause of the conflict was the struggle for control over important trade routes in the region. Ablai sent a reconnaissance detachment of 300 warriors under the command of his adopted son Buri Sultan. However, the numerically superior Kokand forces surrounded the detachment and captured it. Ablai failed to rescue his men. Internal disagreements then broke out in his camp, caused by disputes over the division of captured booty. After keeping the detachment for two months, Abdurrahman released all the prisoners without causing them any harm.

Later, the Kazakhs told representatives of the Russian imperial administration that Ablai had not come to Buri Sultan’s aid because he had almost no army left. This was explained by the fact that he had not rewarded the Kazakhs who had accompanied him for the gifts obtained during raids on the nomadic camps of Baldybek. Offended by this, they divided the remaining prisoners among themselves and returned to their own uluses, effectively leaving Ablai without support. According to other accounts, the reason for their inaction was the fear that a war with the Kokand Khanate would negatively affect trade with Central Asia. Many elders who had previously participated in the campaign against the Kyrgyz refused to support Ablai, stating that if war began, merchants from Tashkent would stop coming for trade exchanges.

I ask peace of the Supreme Ejen, Sacred Khan. I send you a letter to clarify the circumstances of the war from the year before last. Originally, our Kazakh is composed of three tribes: Senior Zhuz, Middle Zhuz, and Junior Zhuz. The two tribes of the Buruts and Irdana, in cooperation with each other, plundered our Senior Zhuz. We also sent our troops and plundered the Buruts the year before last. After that, we dispatched negotiators to pursue reconciliation. There is a proverb of the Muslims in Bukhara, Samarqand, and the surrounding towns that ‘All persons who talk can reach harmony’; however, Irdana still attacked us. All of us are the descendants of the three sons of Janibek khan. Two of their descendants were living in Tashkent and Pishkent. In the past year, Irdana killed a khan named Iskandar, who was my sworn brother, living in Pishkent. Moreover, Irdana killed Iskandar’s two younger brothers and four sons and took his sons’ wives prisoners. He cut open the belly of the pregnant wife of Iskandar and killed his children. He occupied the pasture land. They committed such sins. In addition, some of the Oyirads, who had followed Khwaja Jahan and were overthrown by you before, escaped and now follow Irdana. Irdana also recruited a small number of the escaped Burut. For these reasons, we went to subdue them. Because they made a sally before us, we killed their chief named Bazarci Batur at the very beginning, and [after that] killed many people. After being defeated by us, Irdana entered Pishkent Castle and has not come out. Although we want to seize Pishkent Castle, we have no cannon. Although we want to attack, he never comes out. If we say that it is impregnable, our surrendered pastures would not know peace. For these reasons, we request two thousand troops and cannons from the Supreme Great Ejen.

Finding himself in an extremely difficult situation, Ablai did not abandon resistance. Moving to the Kazakh nomadic camps near Tashkent, he gathered several hundred warriors and advanced against the army of Irdana Biy. However, the battle ended in defeat. Ablai was seriously wounded struck in the side and back and would have died if not for his chainmail and protective clothing, which softened the blows. Realizing that his forces were exhausted, he retreated and settled near Turkestan, at a place near a stone known as Karatau. After Ablai decided to turn to diplomatic methods. He began secret negotiations with influential elders connected with the rulers of Tashkent, offering them a peace agreement. The elders, unaware of Ablai’s recent defeat, sent an embassy to him with rich gifts. However, Ablai took the envoys prisoner and marched with his army into their lands, which he subsequently devastated. The captured booty was sent to his nomadic camps under the protection of his son Wali.

According to the testimony of several Oirats questioned by the Qing authorities in Ili Valley after returning from the Kazakh Steppe, Ablai's war against Kokand in 1766–1767 had reached a stalemate. They reported that the Kazakhs excelled in cavalry warfare, whereas the Kokand's forces were skilled in siege warfare, preventing either side from achieving a decisive victory.

Ablai also demanded the extradition of a local ruler named Bayastan, who had allegedly refused to pay him tribute and had taken refuge in Tashkent. The local governor Mulla Samsi helped Bayastan escape. In response, Ablai ordered the execution of Mulla Samsi, seized his family, and once again sent envoys to Irdana Biy. After receiving a refusal, Ablai attacked the Kyrgyz again without waiting for the return of the next embassy, and this time achieved victory.

No major battles took place between Ablai’s forces and the Kokand troops. Sources indicate that the rulers of the cities preferred to buy off the attackers with valuable gifts gold, silver, and other goods in order to avoid destruction. After receiving tribute, Ablai moved on without causing further harm to them.

After collecting tribute from Tashkent, Ablai sent envoys to the Kokand ruler Irdan Beg. He proposed returning several disputed cities in order to remove the cause of the conflict. However, Irdana Biy rejected the proposal and put forward his own conditions he demanded that Ablai personally come to Kokand for negotiations or send his son and Sultan Abulfayiz as hostages. Ablai rejected these conditions. At the same time, difficulties arose within his own army. The elders accompanying him learned about the rich gifts received from the cities and demanded their share of the spoils. When Ablai refused to divide them, they declared that they would not support him in a possible war and began preparing to return home.

In 1767, Ablai resumed military operations, and the population of Tashkent agreed to recognize his authority and pay tribute. Although an envoy from Irdana Biy arrived expressing submission, Ablai again sent a delegation to China seeking support, while simultaneously spreading rumours that the Qing court had approved his actions. However, these rumours proved unfounded, and the Qing court once again proposed that the sides conclude peace rather than provide military assistance.

After the campaign against the Kokand Khanate, Ablai informed the Russian authorities that the aim of the war had been the restoration of seven cities captured by Irdana Biy. Although the Kokand ruler refused to make concessions, the populations of Tashkent, Bukhara, and Samarkand voluntarily recognized Ablai’s authority. In 1768, Ablai repeated his campaign. According to sources, the inhabitants of Tashkent surrendered without a fight and agreed to pay tribute. Irdana Biy sent an embassy to Ablai expressing submission. As a result of these campaigns, Ablai restored control over key cities in the region, and the rulers of Kokand and Bukhara recognized his authority. To strengthen the alliance, the ruler of Bukhara even proposed a dynastic marriage and sent Ablai rich gifts. Ablai Sultan's war against Tashkent and Khojand resulted in his advance as far as Jizzakh and ended with the establishment of control over several cities. Turkestan, Sayram, Shymkent, and Suzak came under his authority, while Tashkent was obliged to pay tribute.

In December 1770, Ablai launched another campaign against the Kyrgyz with a mounted force numbering approximately 20,000 men. The stated reasons for the campaign were "the Kyrgyz obstruction of Kazakh trade with Tashkent, frequent attempts at attacks, and the killing of people." According to some sources, the army numbered about 10,000 warriors. Before the main campaign, one of Ablai's sons conducted a reconnaissance raid into Kyrgyz territory with 2,000 warriors.

Ablai defeated the auls of the Solto and Sayak clans. After the destruction of these settlements, Kazakh detachments encountered a large Kyrgyz militia force. According to Shoqan Walikhanov

"The Kazakhs remained victorious, although the Kyrgyz fought to the death, seeking to free their captives... The Kyrgyz suffered terrible losses: of the Chongbagysh clan only two auls remained, and of the Chontolkan branch only 40 people survived."

After this battle, the Kyrgyz sent an embassy to Ablai to negotiate peace. As a sign of loyalty, prominent clan leaders gave their children as amanats. Ablai accepted these terms, and peace was temporarily established between the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. However, conflicts between them did not completely cease.

In a letter dated 8 December 1772, Sultan Sultanmamet informed Lieutenant General Ivan Dekolong, commander of the Siberian Corps, about a planned joint campaign against the Kyrgyz together with Ablai Khan: "Ablai Sultan, having stayed with me as a guest, has safely departed for his nomadic lands, which you should know. We have concluded an agreement that in the spring he will go with two of his sons, while I will go with eight thousand of our subjects, the Kyrgyz, against the wild Kyrgyz."

When the military campaign began, Ablai and Abulfayiz requested military assistance from the Qing Empire, but their request was categorically rejected. In an edict to the Military Council dated 29 March 1774, the Qianlong Emperor refused Ablai and Abulfayiz's request because he wished to maintain neutrality. Referring to information from his informants, the emperor stated that Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were constantly hostile toward each other and carried out raids against one another, and therefore the Ili governors should not interfere in their affairs. He also emphasized that if assistance were provided to one side, the other would soon request similar support.

On 9 June 1774, Sultan Wali reported to the Petropavlovsk Fortress about the victory of Ablai Khan's Kazakh forces over the Kyrgyz. In his report, he wrote: "These days I received news from my father that he defeated his enemies, numbering up to eight thousand, many of whom he took captive. He has also sent troops to pursue the remaining ones." According to Sultan Wali's report, a Kyrgyz force of up to 8,000 men was defeated, a significant number were captured, and additional detachments were sent to pursue the survivors.

At a meeting of the Military Council held on 27 October 1774, the Ili governor Iletu reported on the development of the Kazakh–Kyrgyz conflict. According to his report, Ablai and Abulfayiz "with a large number of troops" entered the Khalabaladan area and engaged the Kyrgyz. As a result of the confrontation, they captured many people and livestock, as well as a Kyrgyz leader named Aitike. Continuing their advance, they reached the Talas Valley, where they inflicted another defeat on the Kyrgyz, killing more than one thousand people and capturing one thousand prisoners, including many elders.

The Russian Empress requested that the title of khan should be recognized and officially approved by Russia. To that end, she sent an official letter to Qyzyljar, where Abylai was expected to receive the title in 1779. He never showed up at the fort, so a Russian officer was sent to confer the title in his camp. In contrast to Ablai, other khans and sultans had been competing for the lavish gifts and stipends of the Emperors of Russia in return for their submission. Ablai Khan refused to bow down to the expanding Russian Empire and instead chose to strengthen the Kazakhs by promoting Islam and the concept of jihad throughout the state as an effort to resist foreign powers. Ablai may also have been deterred from swearing his oath out of fear of insulting the Chinese.

Following his death, Ablai's sons, namely Khanzada Wali Sultan, Khanzada Qasim Sultan, and Khanzada Adil Sultan, fought against each other to take the throne. In 1781, Wali Sultan became khan of the Kazakhs, succeeding his father after months of battle for succession, but he only succeeded in ruling over the northern clans of the Middle jüz.

Legacy

• One of his descendants was Shoqan Walikhanov (1835-1865), a Kazakh scholar and historian.
• His grandson Kenesary Kasymov led a revolt against the Russians in the 1830s and 40s.
• Abylai Khan University, founded in 1941, is named after Ablai Khan.
• In 1993, Ablai Khan appeared on the 100 Kazakh tenge banknote.
• The life of Ablai Khan is the subject of the 2005 Kazakhstani film Nomad.
• There is a ceremonial slow march in the Military Band Service composed by Talgat Berdigulov named after Ablai Khan
• A street in central Almaty is named after Ablai Khan.
• Abylai Khan (monument)