Accession of Serbia to the European Union

Membership talks

No further progress on the opening or closing of chapters has been achieved since December 2021. Benchmarks were met for the opening of all three remaining chapters in cluster 3 (chapter 10, 16 and 19) in December 2024, but this was postponed due the opening being conditional on "substantial further progress made by Serbia, in particular in accordance with...the rule of law (chapter 23+24) and the normalisation of relations with Kosovo".

In June 2026, EU officials had discussed proposals to open Cluster 3 (Competitiveness and inclusive growth) after the Serbian parliament rolled back a series of controversial judicial reforms. The European Commission proposed to open Cluster 3, but this proposal faced opposition from several member states, most notably the Netherlands, which threatened to veto the opening of the cluster over rule of law concerns.

Main political issues

Obstacles for accession include the requirement to recognize statehood for Kosovo, foreign policy alignment with Russia, democratic backsliding, and domestic policies such as rule of law and media freedom.

Democratic backsliding

Serbia’s EU accession is hindered by democratic backsliding, including weakened rule of law, media restrictions, and an “illiberal” concentration of power under Aleksandar Vučić, alongside government responses to protests that have raised concerns in Brussels. Progress is further slowed by Serbia’s limited alignment with EU foreign policy—particularly its ties with Russia and China and refusal to join sanctions—as well as the unresolved normalization dispute with Kosovo. Combined with slow adoption of EU legislation and stalled negotiations, these factors have effectively put Serbia’s accession process on hold.

Electoral Issues

Serbia’s electoral framework faced criticism for requiring comprehensive reform. Recommendations from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) remained unimplemented, including measures to ensure voter transparency, campaign oversight, and media independence. A parliamentary working group on electoral reform, chaired by a civil society organization (CSO) representative, failed to reach consensus, leading to the withdrawal of opposition and CSOs by February 2025. Local elections in Zaječar and Kosjerić in June 2025 were deemed "neither free nor fair" by domestic CSO observers, citing a climate of fear, institutional pressure, and heavy police presence. Gender representation in politics remained inadequate, particularly at the local level, despite a 40% gender quota for electoral lists.

Parliamentary Challenges

The Serbian Parliament faced issues of limited autonomy, infrequent sessions, and lack of genuine political debate. The government dominated the legislative agenda, with nearly all laws proposed by the executive. Plenary and committee sessions were marked by tensions, offensive language, and occasional verbal and physical incidents. The Speaker was criticized for biased responses during debates. In November 2024, 68 acts, including the state budget, were adopted without discussion, and opposition motions to dismiss the Speaker were excluded from the agenda, violating constitutional rules. Public hearings were limited, with only 11 held in 2025 and two in 2024.

EU Integration

Serbia aimed to meet EU membership criteria by the end of 2026, adopting a revised National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) and a plan for fulfilling EU accession obligations in 2025. However, progress in aligning with the EU acquis was slow, with centralized coordination structures limiting civil society involvement. The Ministry for European Integration served as the focal point for consultations, but the National Convention on the EU (NCEU), a CSO platform, suspended cooperation with authorities in February 2025, citing a deteriorating environment for civil society and lack of meaningful participation.

Governance

The practical exercise of presidential powers sparked debate, with concerns that the President’s influence exceeded constitutional limits. Following the Novi Sad tragedy, two ministers resigned in late 2024, and the Prime Minister resigned on January 28, 2025. A new government, with no change in political composition or ministerial posts, was appointed on April 16, 2025, including nine women and representatives of national minorities. The autonomy of independent bodies remained limited, with their recommendations often ignored. Local self-government faced challenges, including weak administrative capacity and delays in adopting the Law on Vojvodina’s financing resources.

Civil Society

Civil society organizations (CSOs) operated in an increasingly hostile environment, facing verbal attacks, smear campaigns, and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs). Reports emerged of spyware targeting human rights defenders and journalists. In February 2025, police searched the offices of four CSOs, accusing them of money laundering, an action widely perceived as intimidation. A proposed law on foreign influence agents, though not discussed in Parliament, further threatened CSOs. In response, 29 CSOs withdrew from government working groups, and the Council for Cooperation and Development of Civil Society saw frozen memberships due to inadequate responses to attacks on activists.

Security Oversight

The parliamentary Committee for the Oversight of Security Services dismissed allegations of excessive measures, such as the use of a sonic device during a March 15, 2025, protest in Belgrade. The civilian security agency (BIA) was reported to have detained and questioned activists during the protests, with claims of an attempted "colour revolution." A law granting access to state security files remained unadopted.

Impact and Legacy

The 2024–2025 protests highlighted deep-seated issues in Serbia’s democratic institutions, including electoral integrity, parliamentary effectiveness, and civil society freedoms. The government’s response, oscillating between tolerance and repression, underscored tensions in Serbia’s political landscape. The events also strained Serbia’s EU accession process, with calls for more transparent and inclusive reforms to align with democratic standards.

Kosovo

The biggest obstacle to Serbia's accession to the EU is its strained relationship with Kosovo, which escalated after the 2008 Kosovo declaration of independence. The Serbian government has declared that the status of Kosovo should not be tied to the EU negotiations. In 2012, the EU Enlargement Commissioner, Štefan Füle, denied that the European Union would insist on Serbia's recognition of Kosovo before it can join the organisation.

In 2013, the governments of Kosovo and Serbia completed the Brussels Agreement, which was hailed as a major step towards normalising relations and enabled the start of EU accession talks with Serbia. Later that year, Kosovo's Minister of Foreign Affairs Enver Hoxhaj suggested that the EU should approve the accession of Kosovo and Serbia simultaneously due to concerns that if Serbia was admitted first they could veto Kosovo's membership. However, Serbia's accession negotiations were not halted.

In 2021, the European Parliament adopted a report on Serbia, which, amongst other things, emphasized that the normalization of relationships between Serbia and Kosovo is "a priority and a requirement for EU accession."

In 2024, the opening of remaining chapters in Cluster 3 was postponed partially due to "substantial further progress made by Serbia, in particular in accordance with...the normalisation of relations with Kosovo", further evidencing an expectation that the country address the issue as part of accession negotiations.

Alignment with the EU's foreign policy

Serbia refused to join international sanctions against Russia following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In response, the European Parliament passed a resolution that stated in part it "strongly regrets Serbia’s non-alignment with EU sanctions against Russia, which damages its EU accession process".

Public opinion on EU membership

Serbian public support for the country joining the EU has significantly waned over the years, while at the same time leaning toward maintaining strong ties with Russia and China which are seen as reliable allies. Serbia’s EU membership has experienced growing skepticism stemming from slow accession negotiations progress, and the Kosovo dispute.

The European Union's push for Serbia to normalize relations with Kosovo, which is seen in Serbia as including implicit recognition, in particular is a major factor contributing to waning support. The vast majority of the Serbian public view Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, and the EU’s stance is seen as pressuring Serbia to relinquish its sovereignty. Russia and China’s support for Serbia’s position on Kosovo (non-recognition) bolsters their favorability over the EU.

The most recent poll, from March 2025, found that if a referendum on joining the EU took place, 38.9% would vote in favour of joining the EU, with 43.2% voting against, and 17.9% unsure or abstaining.

According to the 2025 annual survey of opinion in Serbia, 38% of citizens have a positive attitude towards the EU (11% very positive, 27% fairly positive), while trust in the EU is 38%. It is also revealed that 33% of citizens would vote in favour of Serbia's membership of the EU if a referendum was held, while 41% of citizens believe that EU membership would bring more advantages than disadvantages.

Bilateral relations with EU member states