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Analogia entis

Philosophical claim about the class of language or knowledge of the "being" of God

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Through Inductive reasoning, Deductive reasoning and Intuition

This entails that God's existence is entirely different to the being and modes of being of all things in the cosmos (all "creatures") and therefore to us is ineffable directly: however, analogy can provide true but indirect (though not necessarily reliable) cognition. All other predications apart from "being" may be treated in the same way, as analogical. It has also been summarized as the proposition that there is no (e.g. natural or conceptual) system of which God and creatures are both directly part.

It has been called a guiding principle of Catholic thought (or Denkform) which synthesizes many disparate themes in Catholic doctrine and theology: that general names or predications about God (not only names such as "is a Consuming Fire", "is our Father", "is Patient" or predications of God's perfections "is infinite", "is love", "is just", but even being itself: that God "is") are true but analogies. It is associated with the Latin phrase "maior dissimulitudo in tanta similitudine":

For between creator and creature there can be noted no similarity so great that a greater dissimilarity cannot be seen between them.

— Fourth Lateran Council, 1215.

The modern formulation of the analogia entis emphasizes a cognitive rhythm (drawing on Aquinas' via credentia): a double motion of in and beyond:

What is meant by analogia entis is precisely this: that in the very same act in which the human being comes to intimate God in the likeness of the creature, he also comes to intimate Him as the one who is beyond all likeness.

— Przywara, Schriften vol 2, p404

Some 20th century Protestant theologians suspected analogia entis as proposing a different source of knowledge of God to divine revelation, or proposing acts competitive to the event of faith, or for tending to emphasize God's transcendence over his immanence.

Background

There is no single, universally authoritative, and unambiguous doctrine of the analogia entis.

— Ry O. Siggelkow

Analogia entis has had rather different meanings in particular philosophical, theological or devotional disciplines: sometimes with broad meaning (e.g., used for any divine predication) or narrow meaning (e.g., used strictly about divine being only), and sometimes used to name its perceived implications.

The term comes from Greek geometry, where it is used for a rule (in the sense of a measurement: κανών kanōn, this being sometimes extended into the sense of a requirement or law.) Used in this sense, "analogy" relates to the geometric/epistimological question "what can we soundly measure against to understand God?" rather than the mental/phenomenological/theological question "what does analogy let us say about God?" which this article more concentrates on.

Development

The term was originally coined around 1250 by Albert Magnus and developed subsequently, notably in the 1920s and 1930s by Jesuit Erich Przywara and Germanic theologians, such as former Jesuit Hans Urs von Balthasar. The concept has a longer history than the term, and drew on commentary by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Aristotle.

Analogy

Analogia entis is not a fancy synonym for analogy; however, the term is sometimes enlarged so that 'being' includes all kinds of analogous predication about God not just essential and infinite being.

Analogy has the general form A is to B as C is to D:

A : B :: C : D

So "one and the same term is analogically attributed to two realities whenever it is attributed to each of them in a way which is partially the same and partially different."

Some analogies get presented condensed (e.g., into metaphors) by leaving out terms so that one thing is referred to by mentioning another: A is a C. (There is a core case, which other terms relate to in various pros hen ways.) So "God is Good" is the analogy "the goodness of humans is to their nature as the goodness of God is to his nature.."

Analogical reasoning can be distinguished from other modes, such as induction and deduction. Analogical statements can be distinguished from other kinds of statement, such as univocal and equivocal.

Such analogy is asymmetric, working in one direction only: the metaphor "God is Father" (i.e., the analogy "God is to us as a human father is to their child") does not imply "Father is God." Similarly, an analogical statement does not rule out another statement that would be contradictory if interpreted univocally: "God is Father" does not rule out "God is Mother." But every analogy breaks down when extended too far.

In Christian thought, God is commonly analogized against many created or experienced things: being, goodness, truth, beauty, just, kindness, love, a friend, a judge, an advocate, a fire, a hound, a worm, divine law.

Cognition

Scientist Douglas Hofstadter has claimed that analogy is the "core of human cognition." Pseudo-Dionysius' purported book Symbolic Theology discussed dissimilar similarities and the need for the human mind to have and use symbols.

One facet of analogia entis is as a fallible, non-mystical human cognitive event involving the characteristic double motion of in-and-beyond (and distinct from deduction, intuition, instress, etc.) and subsequent unresolveable oscillation between the in and the beyond.

Religious cognition

In Catholic usage, the analogia entis is a foundational organizing and epistemological principle of religious cognition: for Bonaventure, for example, the cosmos is conceived as a treasury of things that can be used for analogy.

All created things of the sensible world lead the mind of the contemplator and wise man to eternal God[...] They are the shades, the resonances, the pictures of that efficient, exemplifying, and ordering art; they are the tracks, simulacra, and spectacles; they are divinely given signs set before us for the purpose of seeing God. They are exemplifications set before our still unrefined and sense-oriented minds, so that by the sensible things which they see they might be transferred to the intelligible which they cannot see, as if by signs to the signified."

— Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis ad Deum, 2.11, as quoted

Aquinas' ideas on analogy presuppose that "cognition of the supernatural realm cannot be attained from this world by the mere exercise of our natural cognitive powers, but only through divine revelation and faith in the content of this revelation."

Modern Popes have treated analogy as one cognitive mechanism which revelation may use:

I want only to state that reality and truth do transcend the factual and the empirical, and to vindicate the human being's capacity to know this transcendent and metaphysical dimension in a way that is true and certain, albeit imperfect and analogical. [...]Faith clearly presupposes that human language is capable of expressing divine and transcendent reality in a universal way—analogically, it is true, but no less meaningfully for that.

— Pope John Paul II, Fides et ratio., S83, S84

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