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Chernobyl disaster

1986 nuclear accident in the Soviet Union

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Historical collections of the Chernobyl accident from the Ukrainian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (USFCRFC). April 26, 1986, signified the boundary between life
IAEA Imagebank · CC BY-SA 2.0

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The disaster occurred while conducting a test to simulate the cooling of the reactor during a serious accident in blackout conditions. The operators carried out the test following an accidental drop in reactor power. Upon shutting down the reactor in such conditions, pervasive design flaws led to a power surge. The reactor components ruptured and lost coolant, and the resulting steam explosions and meltdown destroyed the reactor building. This was followed by a meltdown and fire that dispersed radioactive contaminants across the Soviet Union and Europe. The Soviet government established an exclusion zone with a 10-kilometre (6.2 mi) radius 36 hours after the accident, initially evacuating around 49,000 people. This was later expanded to 30 kilometres (19 mi), resulting in the evacuation of approximately 68,000 more people. The government did not publicly acknowledge the disaster until two days after the explosion, when elevated radiation levels were detected in Sweden.

Following the explosion, which killed two engineers and severely burned two others, an emergency operation began to put out the fires and stabilize the reactor. Of the 237 workers hospitalized, 134 showed symptoms of acute radiation syndrome (ARS); 28 of them died within three months. Over the next decade, 14 more workers (nine of whom had ARS) died of various causes mostly unrelated to radiation exposure. It is the only instance in commercial nuclear power history where radiation-related fatalities occurred. As of 2005, 6000 cases of childhood thyroid cancer occurred within the affected populations (15 of them fatal), "a large fraction" being attributed to the accident. Long-term death estimates range from up to 4,000 in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia (per the United Nations) to 16,000 in total across Europe.

Pripyat was abandoned and replaced by the purpose-built city of Slavutych. The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant sarcophagus, completed in December 1986, reduced the spread of radioactive contamination and provided radiological protection for the crews of the undamaged reactors. In 2016–2018, the Chernobyl New Safe Confinement was constructed around the old sarcophagus to enable the removal of the reactor debris, and clean-up is scheduled for completion by 2065.

Accident sequence

Background

Reactor cooling after shutdown

In nuclear-reactor operation, most heat is generated by nuclear fission, but over 6% comes from radioactive decay, which continues after the reactor shuts down. Continued coolant circulation is essential to prevent core overheating or a core meltdown. RBMK reactors, like those at Chernobyl, use water as a coolant, circulated by electrically driven pumps. Reactor no.4 had 1,661 individual fuel channels, requiring over 45 million litres of coolant per hour for the entire reactor.

In case of a total power loss, each of Chernobyl's reactors had three backup diesel generators, but they took 60–75 seconds to reach full load and generate the 5.5 MW needed to run one main pump. Special counterweights on each pump provided coolant via inertia to bridge the gap to generator startup. However, a potential safety risk existed in the event that a station blackout occurred simultaneously with the rupture of a coolant pipe. In this scenario the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) is needed to pump additional water into the core.

It had been theorized that the rotational momentum of the reactor's steam turbine could be used to generate the required electrical power to operate the ECCS via the feedwater pumps. The turbine's speed would run down as energy was taken from it, but that there might have been sufficient energy to provide electrical power to run the coolant pumps for 45 seconds. This would not quite bridge the gap between an external power failure and the full availability of the emergency generators, but would alleviate the situation.

Safety test

The turbine run-down energy capability still needed to be confirmed experimentally, and previous tests had ended unsuccessfully. An initial test carried out in 1982 indicated that the excitation voltage of the turbine-generator was insufficient. The electrical system was modified and the test was repeated in 1984, but again proved unsuccessful. In 1985, the test was conducted a third time, but also yielded no results due to a problem with the recording equipment. The test procedure was to be run again in 1986 and was scheduled to take place during a controlled power-down of reactor no.4, which was preparatory to a planned maintenance outage.

A test procedure had been written, but the authors were not aware of the unusual RBMK-1000 reactor behaviour under the planned operating conditions. It was regarded as purely an electrical test of the generator, even though it involved critical unit systems. According to the existing regulations, such a test did not require approval by either the chief design authority for the reactor (NIKIET) or the nuclear safety regulator. The test program called for disabling the emergency core cooling system, a passive/active system of core cooling intended to provide water to the core in a loss-of-coolant accident. Approval from the site chief engineer had been obtained according to regulations.

The test procedure was intended to run as follows:

  1. The reactor thermal power was to be reduced to between 700 MW and 1,000 MW (to allow for adequate cooling, as the turbine would be spun at operating speed while disconnected from the power grid).
  2. The steam-turbine generator was to be run at normal operating speed.
  3. Four out of eight main circulating pumps were to be supplied with off-site power, while the other four would be powered by the turbine.
  4. When the correct conditions were achieved, the steam supply to the turbine generator would be closed, which would trigger an automatic reactor shutdown in ordinary conditions.
  5. The voltage provided by the coasting turbine would be measured, along with the voltage and revolutions per minute (RPMs) of the four main circulating pumps being powered by the turbine.
  6. When the emergency generators supplied full electrical power, the turbine generator would be allowed to continue free-wheeling down.

Test delay and shift change

The test was to be conducted during the day-shift of 25 April 1986 as part of a scheduled reactor shutdown. The day shift had been instructed in advance on the reactor operating conditions to run the test, and a special team of electrical engineers was present to conduct the electrical test once the correct conditions were reached. As planned, a gradual reduction in the output of the power unit began at 01:06 on 25 April, and the power level had reached 1600 MW of its nominal 3,200 MW thermal level by the beginning of the day shift.

The day shift was scheduled to perform the test at 14:15. Preparations for the test were carried out, including the disabling of the emergency core cooling system. Meanwhile, another regional power station unexpectedly went offline. At 14:00, the Kiev electrical grid controller requested that the further reduction of Chernobyl's output be postponed, as power was needed to satisfy peak evening demand.

Soon, the day shift was replaced by the evening shift. Despite the delay, the emergency core cooling system was left disabled. This system had to be disconnected via a manual isolating slide valve, which in practice meant that two or three people spent the whole shift manually turning sailboat-helm–sized valve wheels. The system had no influence on the disaster, but allowing the reactor to run for 11 hours outside of the test without emergency protection was indicative of a general lack of safety culture.

At 23:04, the Kiev grid controller allowed the reactor shutdown to resume. The day shift had long since departed, the evening shift was also preparing to leave, and the night shift would not take over until midnight, well into the job. According to plan, the test should have been finished during the day shift, and the night shift would only have had to maintain decay heat cooling systems in an otherwise shut-down plant.

The night shift had very limited time to prepare for and carry out the experiment. Anatoly Dyatlov, deputy chief-engineer of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP), was present to direct the test. He was one of the test's chief authors and he was the highest-ranking individual present. Unit shift supervisor Aleksandr Akimov was in charge of the Unit 4 night shift, and Leonid Toptunov was the senior reactor control engineer responsible for the reactor's operational regimen, including the movement of the control rods. 25-year-old Toptunov had worked independently as a senior engineer for approximately three months.

Unexpected drop of the reactor power

The test plan called for a gradual decrease in reactor power to a thermal level of 700–1000 MW, and an output of 720 MW was reached at 00:05 on 26 April. However, due to the reactor's production of a fission byproduct, xenon-135, which is a reaction-inhibiting neutron absorber, power continued to decrease in the absence of further operator action, a process known as reactor poisoning. In steady-state operation, this is avoided because xenon-135 is "burned off" as quickly as it is created, becoming the highly stable xenon-136. However, with reactor power reduced, large quantities of previously produced iodine-135 decayed into the neutron-absorbing xenon-135 faster than the reduced neutron flux could "burn it off". Xenon poisoning in this context made reactor control more difficult but was a predictable phenomenon during such a power reduction.

When the reactor power had decreased to approximately 500 MW, the reactor power control was switched from local automatic regulator to the automatic regulators, to manually maintain the required power level. AR-1 then activated, removing all four of AR-1's control rods automatically, but AR-2 failed to activate due to an imbalance in its ionization chambers. In response, Toptunov reduced power to stabilize the automatic regulators' ionization sensors. The result was a sudden power drop to an unintended near-shutdown state, with a power output of 30 MW thermal or less. The exact circumstances that caused the power drop are unknown. Most reports attribute the power drop to Toptunov's error, but Dyatlov reported that it was due to a fault in the AR-2 system.

The reactor was now producing only 5% of the minimum initial power level prescribed for the test. This low reactivity inhibited the burn-off of xenon-135 within the reactor core and hindered the rise of reactor power. To increase power, control-room personnel removed numerous control rods from the reactor. Several minutes elapsed before the reactor was restored to 160 MW at 00:39, at which point most control rods were at their upper limits, but the rod configuration was still within its normal limit, calculated as equivalent to having more than 15 rods inserted. Over the next twenty minutes, reactor power would be increased further to 200 MW.

Reactor conditions priming the accident

When an output of 200 MW was reached, preparation for the experiment continued, although power was still much lower than the prescribed 700 MW. As part of the test, two additional main circulating pumps were activated at 01:05. The increased coolant flow lowered the overall core temperature and reduced bubbles (voids) from boiling coolant. Because water absorbs neutrons better than steam, neutron flux and power accordingly decreased. The operators responded by removing more manual control rods to maintain power, resulting in the inserted control rod equivalent value falling below its required level of 15. This was not apparent to the operators, because there were no instruments capable of calculating this value in real time.

These actions left the reactor in an extremely unstable state. Nearly all of the 211 control rods had been withdrawn, and excessive coolant flow prevented the water from adequately cooling between cycles, causing it to re-enter the core at close to boiling point. Unlike other light-water reactor designs, the RBMK design had a positive void coefficient, meaning that voids formed during boiling had the effect of increasing rather than decreasing core reactivity. More boiling and hence more voids tended to intensify the nuclear chain reaction, which caused yet more boiling. Unknown to the operators, this positive feedback loop had little to restrain it, and the reactor became highly sensitive to void formation, and at risk of an uncontrolled power surge.

Accident

Test execution

At 01:23:04, the test began. Four of the eight main circulating pumps (MCP) were to be powered by voltage from the coasting turbine, while the remaining four pumps received electrical power from the grid as usual. The steam to the turbines was shut off, beginning a run-down of the turbine generator. The diesel generators started and sequentially picked up loads; the generators were to have completely picked up the MCPs' power needs by 01:23:43. As the momentum of the turbine generator decreased, so did the power it produced for the pumps. The water flow rate decreased, leading to increased formation of steam voids in the coolant flowing through the fuel pressure tubes.

Reactor shutdown and power excursion

At 01:23:40, as the experiment was wrapping up, an operator pressed the emergency AZ-5 button to initiate a scram (emergency shutdown) of the reactor, perhaps in preparation for scheduled maintenance. The reason for the timing is uncertain, as both Akimov and Toptunov would die shortly after the alarm. The atmosphere in the control room at that point was calm, according to eyewitnesses, and there were no active emergency signals at that time. Representatives of the reactor's design team would later argue that the button must have been pressed only after the reactor had begun to self-destruct.

The AZ-5 button engaged a drive mechanism to fully insert all control rods, including the manual control rods that had been withdrawn earlier. In the RBMK design, each control rod had attached to its end a graphite neutron moderator extension, the purpose of which was to boost reactor output by displacing neutron-absorbent water when the main part of the control rod was fully withdrawn. When the control rod was at maximum extraction, the graphite extension sat within the water of the core, its neutron-moderating effect operating to increase reactor power.

The rods moved at 0.4 m/s, taking 18 to 20 seconds to travel the full height of the core, about 7 m (23 ft). As the control rods moved downward into the reactor, their extensions initially displaced neutron-absorbing water with neutron-moderating graphite. It was known that in the RBMK design a scram could therefore initially increase the reaction rate within the core. This behaviour had been discovered in 1983, when the insertion of control rods in a similar reactor at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant had induced a power spike. Countermeasures were, however, not implemented. The IAEA investigative report INSAG-7 later stated, "Apparently, there was a widespread view that the conditions under which the positive scram effect would be important would never occur. However, they did appear in almost every detail in the course of the actions leading to the Chernobyl accident."

A few seconds into the scram, a power spike occurred, and the core overheated, causing some of the fuel rods to fracture. It has been speculated that this may have blocked the control rods, jamming them at one-third insertion. Within three seconds the reactor's output rose above 530 MW.

Instruments did not register the subsequent course of events; they were reconstructed through mathematical simulation. The power spike would have caused an increase in fuel temperature and steam buildup, leading to a rapid increase in steam pressure. This caused the fuel cladding to fail, releasing the fuel elements into the coolant and rupturing the channels in which these elements were located.

Explosions

As the scram continued, the reactor output jumped to around 30,000 MW thermal, 10 times its normal operational output, the last indicated reading on the control panel. According to some estimates, the power spike may have been 10 times higher than that. It was not possible to reconstruct the precise sequence that led to the destruction of the reactor and the power unit building, but a steam explosion appears to have been the next event. Explosive steam pressure from the damaged fuel channels escaping into the reactor's exterior cooling structure that caused the explosion that destroyed the reactor casing, tearing off and blasting the upper plate called the upper biological shield (to which the entire reactor assembly was fastened) through the roof of the reactor building. This is believed to be the first explosion that many heard.

This explosion ruptured further fuel channels, as well as severing most of the coolant lines feeding the reactor chamber. As a result, the remaining coolant flashed to steam and escaped the reactor core. The total water loss combined with a high positive void coefficient further increased the reactor's thermal power.

A second, more powerful explosion, estimated to have had the power equivalent of 225 tons of TNT, occurred two or three seconds after the first, dispersing the damaged reactor core and effectively terminating the nuclear chain reaction. The blast further compromised the reactor containment vessel, ejecting red-hot fragments of graphite moderator and damaged fuel channel material. Observers outside Unit 4 reported burning lumps of material and sparks shooting into the air above the reactor, some of which fell onto the roof of the machine hall and started fires. Approximately 25% of the graphite blocks and overheated material from the fuel channels were expelled. Damage to the building established an airflow through the core, which fanned graphite fires and significantly contributed to the release and spread of radioactive fallout.

After the larger explosion, several employees went outside to get a clearer view. One survivor, Aleksandr Yuvchenko, said that he looked up towards the reactor hall and saw a "very beautiful" laser-like beam of blue light caused by the ionized-air glow that appeared to be "flooding up into infinity".

Possible causes of the second explosion

There are several hypotheses about the nature of the second, larger explosion. One view was that the second explosion was caused by the combustion of hydrogen, which had been produced either by the overheated steam-zirconium reaction or by the reaction of red-hot graphite with steam that produced hydrogen and carbon monoxide. Another hypothesis, by Konstantin Checherov, published in 1998, was that the second explosion was a thermal explosion of the reactor due to the uncontrollable escape of fast neutrons caused by the complete water loss in the reactor core.

The force of the second explosion and the ratio of xenon radioisotopes released after the accident led Sergei A. Pakhomov and Yuri V. Dubasov to theorize in 2009 that the second explosion could have been an extremely fast nuclear power transient resulting from core material melting in the absence of its water coolant and moderator. Pakhomov and Dubasov argued that there was no delayed supercritical increase in power but a runaway prompt criticality, similar to the explosion of a fizzled nuclear weapon.

Their evidence came from Cherepovets, a city 1000 km northeast of Chernobyl, where physicists from the V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute had measured anomalous high levels of xenon-135—a short half-life isotope—four days after the explosion. This meant that a nuclear event in the reactor may have ejected xenon to higher altitudes in the atmosphere than the later fire did, allowing widespread movement of xenon to remote locations. This was an alternative to the more accepted explanation of a positive-feedback power excursion where the reactor disassembled itself by a steam explosion. The energy released by the second explosion, which produced the majority of the damage, was estimated by Pakhomov and Dubasov to be at 40 billion joules, the equivalent of about 10 tons of TNT.

The nuclear fizzle hypothesis was examined in 2017 by Lars-Erik De Geer, Christer Persson and Henning Rodhe, who considered such an event to be the more probable cause of the first explosion. Both analyses argue that the nuclear fizzle event, whether producing the second or first explosion, consisted of a prompt chain reaction that was limited to a small portion of the reactor core, since self-disassembly occurs rapidly in fizzle events.

Accident investigation

The IAEA had created the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) in 1985. INSAG produced two significant reports on Chernobyl: INSAG-1 in 1986, and a revised report, INSAG-7, in 1992. According to INSAG-1, the main cause of the accident was the operators' actions, but according to INSAG-7, the main cause was the reactor's design. Both reports identified an inadequate "safety culture" at all managerial and operational levels as a major underlying factor.

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