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Democratic legitimacy of the European Union

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Through European Union, Accountability and Polity

Opinions differ as to whether the EU has a democratic deficit or how it should be remedied if it exists. Some scholars argue that the EU does not suffer from a democratic deficit as it is more constrained by its plural structure of checks and balances than any national polity. Moravcsik (2002) argues that the EU has legitimacy through its member states, as their democratically elected governments take part in EU decision-making through the Council of the European Union. He argues that the EU is an intergovernmental institutional framework where democratically elected national governments bargain with each other, and is contained by a structure of checks and balances rather than any polity. In his later work, Moravscik (2008) described the "myth" of Europes democratic deficit, believing that the EU functions as an interstate organisation, which is held accountable member state governments rather than citizens. This makes direct democratic accountability to EU-level electorates less important

Majone argues that the democratic deficit creates inappropriate standards to what is essentially a regulatory body. According to his analysis, non-accountable institutions, such as the European Commission or the Court of Justice, are insulated from democratic contestation to achieve greater efficiency and protect minority rights, similar to independent central banks or regulatory agencies at the national level that are legitimised because of their expertise and effectiveness, rather than direct elections. Pro-Europeans (i.e. those in favour of the EU) argue that the European Union should reform its institutions to make them more accountable, while Eurosceptics argue that the EU should reduce its powers and often campaign for withdrawal from the EU.

Use and meaning of the term

The phrase "democratic deficit" is cited as having first been used in 1977 by the Young European Federalists in their Manifesto, which was drafted by Richard Corbett. In 1979 it was used by David Marquand in reference to the then European Economic Community, the forerunner of the European Union. He argued that the European Parliament (then the Assembly) suffered from a democratic deficit as it was not directly elected by the citizens of the Community. 'Democratic deficit', in relation to the European Union, refers to a perceived lack of accessibility to the ordinary citizen, or lack of representation of the ordinary citizen, and lack of accountability of European Union institutions. Generally, the term 'democratic deficit' describes when there is a gap between the electorate's idea of what a democracy should be, and their perceived conception of how their democracy is currently performing.

Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix give the clearest critique of EU democratic legitimacy. They give five key issues:

  • Increased executive power with decreased national parliamentary control.
  • Weak European Parliament despite reforms.
  • No genuine European Elections where citizens can choose EU governance.
  • Complicated Institutional structure that makes accountability close to impossible.
  • Policy drift without an electoral mandate, where technocrats create policy not elected representatives with democratic authority.

Follesdal and Hix argue that together, these problems creates a structural democratic deficit that can't be reformed through evolutionary reforms alone.

Constitutional nature of the democratic deficit

In the European Union, there are two sources of democratic legitimacy: the European Parliament, chosen by the electorates of the individual EU countries; and the Council of the European Union (the "Council of Ministers"), together with the European Council (of heads of national governments), that represent the peoples of the individual states. The European Commission (the executive branch of the Union) is appointed by the two bodies acting together. Democratic legitimacy within the EU can be compared with the dual legitimacy provided for in a federal polity, such as the United States, where there are two independent sources of democratic legitimacy, the House of Representatives and the Senate, and, to become law, decisions must be approved both by one institution representing the people as a whole and by a separate body representing the peoples of the individual states.

The German Constitutional Court referred to a "structural democratic deficit" inherent in the construction of the European Union. It found that the decision-making processes in the EU remained largely those of an international organisation, which would ordinarily be based on the principle of the equality of states and that the principle of equality of states and the principle of equality of citizens cannot be reconciled in a Staatenverbund. In other words, in a supranational union or confederation (which is not a federal state) there is a problem of how to reconcile the principle of equality among nation states, which applies to international (intergovernmental) organisations, and the principle of equality among citizens, which applies within states. A 2014 report from the British Electoral Reform Society wrote that "[t]his unique institutional structure makes it difficult to apply the usual democratic standards without significant changes of emphasis. Certainly, the principles of representativeness, accountability and democratic engagement are vital, but the protection of the rights of minorities is perhaps especially important. The EU is a political regime that is, in one sense at least, entirely made up of minorities."

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