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European Coal and Steel Community

Regulator of coal and steel markets, 1952–67

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Through Europe, International organization and World War II

The ECSC was first proposed via the Schuman Declaration by French foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 (commemorated in the EU as Europe Day), the day after the fifth anniversary of the end of World War II, to prevent another war between France and Germany. He declared "the solidarity in production" from pooling "coal and steel production" would make war between the two "not only unthinkable but materially impossible". The Treaty created a common market among member states that stipulated free movement of goods (without customs duties or taxes) and prohibited states from introducing unfair competitive or discriminatory practices.

Its terms were enforced by four institutions: a High Authority composed of independent appointees, a Common Assembly composed of national parliamentarians, a Special Council composed of national ministers, and a Court of Justice. These would ultimately form the blueprint for today's European Commission, European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and the Court of Justice of the European Union, respectively.

The ECSC set an example for the pan-European organizations created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957: the European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community, with whom it shared its membership and some institutions. The 1967 Merger (Brussels) Treaty merged the ECSC's institutions into the European Economic Community, but the former retained its own independent legal personality until the Treaty of Paris expired in 2002, leaving its activities fully absorbed by the European Community under the frameworks of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice.

History

As Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Schuman was instrumental in turning French policy away from the Gaullist objective of permanent occupation or control of parts of German territory such as the Ruhr or the Saar. Despite stiff ultra-nationalist, Gaullist and communist opposition, the French Assembly voted a number of resolutions in favour of his new policy of integrating Germany in a community. The International Authority for the Ruhr changed in consequence.

Background: Schuman declaration

The Schuman Declaration had the stated aim of preventing further antagonism between France and Germany and among other European states by tackling the root cause of war through the establishment of common foundations for economic development. Schuman proposed the formation of the ECSC primarily with France and Germany in mind: "The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries." Portraying the coal and steel industries as integral to the production of munitions, Schuman proposed that uniting these two industries across France and Germany under an innovative supranational system (that also included a European anti-cartel agency) would "make war between France and Germany [...] not only unthinkable but materially impossible".

Negotiations

Following the Schuman Declaration in May 1950, negotiations on what became the Treaty of Paris (1951) began on 20 June 1950. The objective of the treaty was to create a single market in the coal and steel industries of the member states. Customs duties, subsidies, discriminatory and restrictive practices were all to be abolished. The single market was to be supervised by a High Authority, with powers to handle extreme shortages of supply or demand, to tax, and to prepare production forecasts as guidelines for investment.

A key issue in the negotiations for the treaty was the break-up of the excessive concentrations in the coal and steel industries of the Ruhr, where the Konzerne, or trusts, had underlain the military power of the former Reich. The Germans regarded the concentration of coal and steel as one of the bases of their economic efficiency, and a right. The steel barons were a formidable lobby because they embodied a national tradition.

The United States was not officially part of the treaty negotiations, but it was a major force behind the scenes. The US High Commissioner for Occupied Germany, John McCloy, was an advocate of decartelization and his chief advisor in Germany was a Harvard anti-trust lawyer, Robert Bowie. Bowie was asked to draft anti-trust articles, and texts of the two articles he prepared (on cartels and the abuse of monopoly power) became the basis of the treaty's competition policy regime. Also, Raymond Vernon in the State Department (of later fame for his studies on industrial policy at Harvard university) carefully reviewed successive drafts of the treaty. He stressed the importance of the freedom of the projected common market from restrictive practices.

The Americans insisted that the German coal sales monopoly, the Deutscher Kohlenverkauf (DKV), should lose its monopoly, and that the steel industries should no longer own the coalmines. It was agreed that the DKV would be broken up into four independent sales agencies. The steel firm Vereinigte Stahlwerke was to be divided into thirteen firms, and Krupp into two. Ten years after the Schuman negotiations, a US State Department official noted that while the articles as finally agreed were more qualified than American officials in touch with the negotiations would have wished, they were "almost revolutionary" in terms of the traditional European approach to these basic industries.

Political pressures and treaty ratification

In West Germany, Karl Arnold, the Minister President of North Rhine-Westphalia, the state that included the coal and steel producing the Ruhr, was initially spokesman for German foreign affairs. He gave a number of speeches and broadcasts on a supranational coal and steel community at the same time as Robert Schuman began to propose this Community in 1948 and 1949. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (German: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD), in spite of support from unions and other socialists in Europe, decided it would oppose the Schuman plan. Kurt Schumacher's personal distrust of France, capitalism, and Konrad Adenauer aside, he claimed that a focus on integrating with a "Little Europe of the Six" would override the SPD's prime objective of German reunification and thus empower ultra-nationalist and Communist movements in democratic countries. He also thought the ECSC would end any hopes of nationalising the steel industry and lock in a Europe of "cartels, clerics and conservatives". Younger members of the party like Carlo Schmid, were, however, in favour of the Community and pointed to the long socialist support for the supranational idea.

In France, Schuman had gained strong political and intellectual support from all sections of the nation and many non-communist parties. Notable amongst these were ministerial colleague Andre Philip, president of the Foreign Relations Committee Edouard Bonnefous, and former prime minister, Paul Reynaud. Projects for a coal and steel authority and other supranational communities were formulated in specialist subcommittees of the Council of Europe in the period before it became French government policy. Charles de Gaulle, who was then out of power, had been an early supporter of "linkages" between economies, on French terms, and had spoken in 1945 of a "European confederation" that would exploit the resources of the Ruhr. However, he opposed the ECSC as a faux (false) pooling ("le pool, ce faux semblant") because he considered it an unsatisfactory "piecemeal approach" to European unity and because he considered the French government "too weak" to dominate the ECSC as he thought proper. De Gaulle also felt that the ECSC had an insufficient supranational mandate because its Assembly was not ratified by a European referendum and he did not accept Raymond Aron's contention that the ECSC was intended as a movement away from United States domination. Consequently, de Gaulle and his followers in the RPF voted against ratification in the lower house of the French Parliament.

Despite these attacks and those from the extreme left, the ECSC found substantial public support. It gained strong majorities votes in all eleven chambers of the parliaments of the Six, as well as approval among associations and European public opinion. In 1950, many had thought another war was inevitable. The steel and coal interests, however, were quite vocal in their opposition. The Council of Europe, created by a proposal of Schuman's first government in May 1948, helped articulate European public opinion and gave the Community idea positive support.

The UK Prime Minister Clement Attlee opposed Britain joining the proposed European Coal and Steel Community, saying that he 'would not accept the [UK] economy being handed over to an authority that is utterly undemocratic and is responsible to nobody.'

Founding treaty

The 100-article Treaty of Paris, which established the ECSC, was signed on 18 April 1951 by "the inner six": France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The ECSC was based on supranational principles and was, through the establishment of a common market for coal and steel, intended to expand the economy, increase employment, and raise the standard of living within the Community. The market was also intended to progressively rationalise the distribution of production whilst ensuring stability and employment. The common market for coal was opened on 10 February 1953, and for steel on 1 May 1953. Upon taking effect, the ECSC replaced the International Authority for the Ruhr.

On 11 August 1952, the United States was the first non-ECSC member to recognise the Community and stated it would now deal with the ECSC on coal and steel matters, establishing its delegation in Brussels. Monnet responded by choosing Washington, D.C., as the site of the ECSC's first external presence. The headline of the delegation's first bulletin read "Towards a Federal Government of Europe".

Six years after the Treaty of Paris, the Treaty of Rome was signed by the six ECSC members, creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom). These "Communities" were based, with some adjustments, on the ECSC. The Treaty of Rome was to be in force indefinitely, unlike the Treaty of Paris, which was to last for a renewable period of fifty years. These two new Communities worked on the creation of a customs union and nuclear power community respectively.

Merger Treaty

Despite being separate legal entities, the ECSC, EEC and Euratom initially shared the Common Assembly and the European Court of Justice, although the Councils and the High Authority/Commissions remained separate. To avoid duplication, the Merger Treaty merged these separate bodies of the ECSC and Euratom with those of the EEC. The EEC later became one of the three pillars of the present day European Union.

The Treaty of Paris was frequently amended as the EC and EU evolved and expanded.

Expiry

With the treaty due to expire in 2002, debate began at the beginning of the 1990s on what to do with it. It was eventually decided that it should be left to expire. The areas covered by the ECSC's treaty were transferred to the Treaty of Rome and the financial loose ends and the ECSC research fund were dealt with via a protocol of the Treaty of Nice. The treaty finally expired on 23 July 2002. That day, the ECSC flag was lowered for the final time outside the European Commission in Brussels and replaced with the EU flag.

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