Evidentiality

Types according to Aikhenvald

Following the typology of Alexandra Aikhenvald, there are two broad types of evidential marking:

1. indirectivity marking ("type I")
2. evidential marking ("type II")

The first type (indirectivity) indicates whether evidence exists for a given statement, but does not specify what kind of evidence. The second type (evidentiality proper) specifies the kind of evidence (such as whether the evidence is visual, reported, or inferred).

Indirectivity (type I)

Indirectivity (also known as inferentiality) systems are common in Uralic and Turkic languages. These languages indicate whether evidence exists for a given source of information; thus, they contrast direct information (reported directly) and indirect information (reported indirectly, focusing on its reception by the speaker/recipient). Unlike the other evidential "type II" systems, an indirectivity marking does not indicate information about the source of knowledge: it is irrelevant whether the information results from hearsay, inference, or perception; however, some Turkic languages distinguish between reported indirect and non-reported indirect, see Johanson 2003, 2000 for further elaboration. This can be seen in the following Turkish verbs:

In the word geldi, the unmarked suffix -di indicates past tense. In the second word gelmiş, the suffix -miş also indicates past tense but indirectly. It may be translated into English with the added phrases 'obviously', 'apparently' or 'as far as I understand'. The direct past tense marker -di is unmarked (or neutral) in the sense that whether or not evidence exists supporting the statement is not specified.

Evidentiality (type II)

The other broad type of evidentiality systems ("type II") specifies the nature of the evidence supporting a statement. These kinds of evidence can be divided into such categories as:

• Sensory
  • Visual
  • Non-visual
• Inferential
• Assumed
• Reportative
  • Hearsay
  • Quotative

Sensory evidentials can often be divided into different types. Some languages mark visual evidence differently from nonvisual evidence that is heard, smelled, or felt. The Kashaya language has a separate auditory evidential.

An inferential evidential indicates information was not personally experienced but was inferred from indirect evidence. Some languages have different types of inferential evidentials. Some of the inferentials found indicate:

1. Information inferred by direct physical evidence
2. Information inferred by general knowledge
3. Information inferred/assumed because of speaker's experience with similar situations
4. Past deferred realization

In many cases, different inferential evidentials also indicate epistemic modality, such as uncertainty or probability (see epistemic modality below). For example, one evidential may indicate that the information is inferred but of uncertain validity, while another indicates that the information is inferred but unlikely to be true.

Reportative evidentials indicate that the information was reported to the speaker by another person. A few languages distinguish between hearsay evidentials and quotative evidentials. Hearsay indicates reported information that may or may not be accurate. A quotative indicates the information is accurate and not open to interpretation, i.e., is a direct quotation. An example of a reportative from Shipibo (-ronki):

Aronkiai.

a-

do-

ronki-

REPRT-

ai

INCOMPL

"It is said that she will do it." / "She says that she will do it."

Typology of evidentiality systems

The following is a brief survey of evidential systems found in the languages of the world as identified in Aikhenvald (2004). Some languages only have two evidential markers while others may have six or more. The system types are organized by the number of evidentials found in the language. For example, a two-term system (A) will have two different evidential markers; a three-term system (B) will have three different evidentials. The systems are further divided by the type of evidentiality that is indicated (e.g. A1, A2, A3, etc.). Languages that exemplify each type are listed in parentheses.

The most common system found is the A3 type.

Two-term systems:

• A1. witness, nonwitness (e.g. Jarawara, Yukaghir languages, Mỹky, Godoberi, Kalasha-mun, Khowar, Yanam)
• A2. nonfirsthand, everything else (e.g. Abkhaz, Mansi, Khanty, Nenets, Enets, Selkup, Northeast Caucasian languages)
• A3. reported, everything else (e.g. Turkic languages, Tamil, Enga, Tauya, Lezgian, Kham, Estonian, Livonian, Tibeto-Burman languages, several South American languages)

Three-term systems:

• B1. visual sensory, inferential, reportative (e.g. Aymara, Shastan languages, Qiang languages, Maidu, most Quechuan languages, Northern Embera languages)
• B2. visual sensory, nonvisual sensory, inferential (e.g. Washo)
• B3. nonvisual sensory, inferential, reportative (e.g. Retuarã, Northern Pomo)
• B4. witness (direct), nonwitness (indirect), inferential, reportative (e.g. Tsezic and Dagestanian languages)

Four-term systems:

• C1. visual sensory, nonvisual sensory, inferential, reportative (e.g. Tariana, Xamatauteri, Eastern Pomo, East Tucanoan languages)
• C2. visual sensory, inferential #1, inferential #2, reportative (e.g. Tsafiki, Pawnee, Ancash Quechua)
• C3. nonvisual sensory, inferential #1, inferential #2, reportative (e.g. Wintu)
• C4. visual sensory, inferential, reportative #1, reportative #2 (e.g. Southeastern Tepehuan)
• C5. witness (non-subjective, non-renarrative), inferential (subjective, non-renarrative), renarrative (non-subjective, renarrative), dubitative (subjective, renarrative) (e.g. Bulgarian)

Five-plus term systems:

• visual sensory, nonvisual sensory, inferential, reportative, assumed (e.g. Tuyuca, Tucano)
• witness, inferential, reportative, assumed, "internal support" (e.g. Nambikwaran languages)
• visual sensory, nonvisual sensory, inferential, reported, heard from known source, direct participation (e.g. Fasu)
• nonvisual sensory, inferential #1, inferential #2, inferential #3, reportative (e.g. Western Apache)
• inferential, anticipation, performative, deduction, induction, hearsay, direct observation, opinion, assumed, "to know by culture", "to know by internal" (Lojban)

Evidentiality marking and other categories

Evidential systems in many languages are often marked simultaneously with other linguistic categories. For example, according to Aikhenvald, a given language may use the same element to mark both evidentiality and mirativity, i.e., unexpected information. She claims that this is the case of Western Apache where the post-verbal particle lą̄ą̄ primarily functions as a mirative but also has a secondary function as an inferential evidential. This phenomenon of evidentials developing secondary functions, or other grammatical elements such as miratives and modal verbs developing evidential functions is fairly widespread. The following types of mixed systems have been reported:

• evidentiality with mirativity
• evidentiality with tense-aspect
• evidentiality with modality (this is discussed in the next section below)

In addition to the interactions with tense, modality, and mirativity, the usage of evidentials in some languages may also depend on the clause type, discourse structure, and/or linguistic genre.

However, despite the intersection of evidentiality systems with other semantic or pragmatic systems (through grammatical categories), Aikhenvald believes that several languages do mark evidentiality without any grammatical connection to these other semantic/pragmatic systems. More explicitly stated, she believes that there are modal systems which do not express evidentiality, and evidential systems which do not express modality. Likewise, there are mirative systems which do not express evidentiality, and evidential systems which do not express mirativity.

Aside from those, egophoricity may interact with evidentiality as well.

Tense

Some languages may only distinguish between direct and indirect evidentials in the past tense. This is the case for Georgian (Kartvelian), Komi-Zyrian (Finno-Ugric), Haida (a language isolate in British Columbia and Alaska), and Ika (Chibchan).

Epistemic modality

Evidentiality is often considered to be a sub-type of epistemic modality (see, for example, Palmer 1986, Kiefer 1994). Other linguists consider evidentiality (marking the source of information in a statement) to be distinct from epistemic modality (marking the degree of confidence in a statement). An English example:

I see that he is coming. (evidential)

I know that he is coming. (epistemic)

For instance, de Haan states that evidentiality asserts evidence while epistemic modality evaluates evidence and that evidentiality is more akin to a deictic category marking the relationship between speakers and events/actions (like the way demonstratives mark the relationship between speakers and objects; see also Joseph 2003). Aikhenvald (2003) finds that evidentials may indicate a speaker's attitude about the validity of a statement but this is not a required feature of evidentials. Additionally, she finds that evidential-marking may co-occur with epistemic-marking, but it may also co-occur with aspectual/tense or mirative marking.

Considering evidentiality as a type of epistemic modality may only be the result of analyzing non-European languages in terms of the systems of modality found in European languages. For example, the modal verbs in Germanic languages are used to indicate both evidentiality and epistemic modality (and are thus ambiguous when taken out of context). Other (non-European) languages clearly mark these differently. De Haan (2001) finds that the use of modal verbs to indicate evidentiality is comparatively rare (based on a sample of 200 languages).

Clause type

Evidential categories are more likely to be marked in a main declarative clause than in the other types of clauses. In some languages, however, evidential forms may appear in questions or commands as well.

Terminology

Although some linguists have proposed that evidentiality should be considered separately from epistemic modality, other linguists conflate the two. Because of this conflation, some researchers use the term evidentiality to refer both to the marking of the knowledge source and the commitment to the truth of the knowledge.

In English (not grammaticalized)

Evidentiality is not considered a grammatical category in English because it is expressed in diverse ways and is always optional. In contrast, many other languages (including Quechua, Aymara, and Yukaghir) require the speaker to mark the main verb or the sentence as a whole for evidentiality, or offer an optional set of affixes for indirect evidentiality, with direct experience being the default assumed mode of evidentiality.

Consider these English sentences:

I am hungry.

Bob is hungry.

We are unlikely to say the second unless someone (perhaps Bob himself) has told us that Bob is hungry (We might still say it for someone incapable of speaking for themself, such as a baby or a pet). If we are simply assuming that Bob is hungry based on the way he looks or acts, we are more likely to say something like:

Bob looks hungry.

Bob seems hungry.

Bob would be hungry by now.

Bob must be hungry by now.

Here, the fact that we are relying on sensory evidence, rather than direct experience, is conveyed by our use of the word look or seem.

Another situation in which the evidential modality is expressed in English is in certain kinds of predictions, namely those based on the evidence at hand. These can be referred to as "predictions with evidence". Examples:

Look at those clouds! It's going to rain! (Compare "It will rain!").

Western history of the concept

The notion of evidentiality as obligatory grammatical information was first made apparent in 1911 by Franz Boas in his introduction to The Handbook of American Indian Languages in a discussion of Kwakiutl and in his grammatical sketch of Tsimshianic. The term evidential was first used in the current linguistic sense by Roman Jakobson in 1957 in reference to Balkan Slavic (Jacobsen 1986:4; Jakobson 1990) with the following definition:

"EⁿE^ns/E^s evidential is a tentative label for the verbal category which takes into account three events — a narrated event (Eⁿ), a speech event (E^s), and a narrated speech event (E^ns). The speaker reports an event on the basis of someone else's report (quotative, i.e. hearsay evidence), of a dream (revelative evidence), of a guess (presumptive evidence) or of his own previous experience (memory evidence)."

Jakobson also was the first to clearly separate evidentiality from grammatical mood. By the middle of the 1960s, evidential and evidentiality were established terms in linguistic literature.

Systems of evidentiality have received focused linguistic attention only relatively recently. The first major work to examine evidentiality cross-linguistically is Chafe & Nichols (1986). A more recent typological comparison is Aikhenvald (2004).