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Ivy Mike

1952 American nuclear bomb test

  • 11 min read
  • 5 chapters

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Through Soviet Union, Cold War and Vacuum flask

US President Harry S. Truman ordered a full-scale hydrogen bomb program in January 1950, five months after the first Soviet nuclear test RDS-1. By March 1951, physicists Edward Teller and Stanisław Ulam produced a report detailing a two-stage design, where the X-rays from a fission bomb are directed toward radiation implosion of a secondary device containing fusion fuel. The experimental Greenhouse George test in May produced fusion with this design; Teller remarked "Eniwetok would not be large enough for the next one".

The device, nicknamed Sausage, was more than 20 ft (6.1 m) tall, and a proof of concept, unsuitable for use as a deliverable weapon. It was designed and constructed at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, while design calculations led by John Archibald Wheeler used the UNIVAC I computer. The device consisted of a fission-based Mark 5 nuclear bomb acting as the nuclear primary, which compressed the cylindrical secondary fusion device. This was fuelled by 1,000 liters of cryogenic liquid deuterium in a vacuum flask. A plutonium sparkplug rod in the flask's center aided fusion ignition in the secondary, while the majority of the device yield came from the natural uranium tamper of the secondary, which underwent fast fission by fusion neutrons.

Samples from the explosion led to the discovery of the predicted elements with atomic number 99 and 100, later named einsteinium and fermium. They also contained traces of the isotopes plutonium-246, and plutonium-244. These new nuclei had been produced by the rapid neutron capture process, later formalized in nuclear astrophysics in 1957. The Soviet Union tested a single-stage thermonuclear design, RDS-6s, in August 1953, and a three-megaton two-stage design, RDS-37, in 1955. The United Kingdom (in 1957), China (in 1967), and France (in 1968) later tested multi-megaton thermonuclear devices in the atmosphere.

Schedule

US President Harry S. Truman ordered a full-scale hydrogen bomb program in January 1950, five months after the first Soviet nuclear test RDS-1. Physicists Edward Teller and Stanisław Ulam produced a report detailing the two-stage concept now called the Teller–Ulam design in March 1951, where the X-rays from a fission bomb are directed toward radiation implosion of secondary device containing fusion fuel. There was steady progress made on the issues involved in a thermonuclear explosion and there were additional resources devoted to staging, and political pressure towards seeing, an actual test of a hydrogen bomb. The experimental Greenhouse George test in May produced fusion with this design; Teller remarked "Eniwetok would not be large enough for the next one".

A date within 1952 seemed feasible. In October 1951 physicist Edward Teller pushed for July 1952 as a target date for a first test, but project head Marshall Holloway thought October 1952, a year out, was more realistic given how much engineering and fabrication work the test would take and given the need to avoid the summer monsoon season in the Marshall Islands. On June 30, 1952, United States Atomic Energy Commission chair Gordon Dean showed President Harry S. Truman a model of what the Ivy Mike device would look like; the test was set for November 1, 1952.

One attempt to significantly delay the test, or not hold it at all, was made by the State Department Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, chaired by J. Robert Oppenheimer, who felt that avoiding a test might forestall the development of a catastrophic new weapon and open the way for new arms agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. The panel lacked political allies in Washington, however, and no test delay was made on this account.

There was a separate desire voiced for a very short delay in the test, for more political reasons: it was scheduled to take place just a few days before the 1952 presidential election. Truman wanted to keep the thermonuclear test away from partisan politics but had no desire to order a postponement of it himself; however he did make it known that he would be fine if it was delayed past the election due to "technical reasons" being found. Atomic Energy Commission member Eugene M. Zuckert was sent to the Enewetak test site to see if such a reason could be found, but weather considerations – on average there were only a handful of days each month that were suitable for the test – indicated it should go ahead as planned, and in the end no schedule delay took place.

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