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Regulatory capture

Form of political corruption

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Through Politics, Manufacturing and Profession

When regulatory capture occurs, a special interest is prioritized over the general interests of the public, leading to a net loss for society. The theory of client politics is related to that of rent-seeking and political failure; client politics "occurs when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, reasonably small interest (e.g., industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers)".

Theory

For public choice theorists, regulatory capture occurs because groups or individuals with high-stakes interests in the outcome of policy or regulatory decisions can be expected to focus their resources and energies to gain the policy outcomes they prefer, while members of the public, each with only a tiny individual stake in the outcome, will ignore it altogether. Regulatory capture refers to the actions of interest groups when this is successful at influencing the staff or commission members of the regulator.

Regulatory capture theory is a core focus of the branch of public choice referred to as the economics of regulation; economists in this specialty are critical of conceptualizations of governmental regulatory intervention as being motivated to protect the public good. Often cited articles include Bernstein (1955), Huntington (1952), Laffont & Tirole (1991), and Levine & Forrence (1990). The theory of regulatory capture is associated with Nobel laureate economist George Stigler, one of its major developers.

The likelihood of regulatory capture is a risk to which an agency is exposed by its very nature. This suggests that a regulator should be protected from outside influence as much as possible. Alternatively, it may be better to not create a given agency at all. A captured regulator is often worse than no regulation, because it wields the authority of government. However, increased transparency of the agency may mitigate the effects of capture. Recent evidence suggests that, even in mature democracies with high levels of transparency and media freedom, more extensive and complex regulatory environments are associated with higher levels of corruption (including regulatory capture).

Stigler framed the problem of regulatory capture as "the problem of discovering when and why an industry is able to use the state for its purposes". He focuses on whole industries. But, it is never a whole industry that is 'capturing' its regulators, but only the big companies that, using the tool of the revolving door, 'highjack' the regulator by offering high salaries. Brezis and Cariolle (2019) have shown that the connected firms are always the big firms. Indeed, the top 5 financial companies concentrate around 80% of the stock of revolving door movements and regulatory capture. This leads to inequality of influence among firms in the same sector.

It should also be noted that regulatory capture in developed countries is not anymore related to corruption and illegal behavior, but to abuse of power.

Types

There are two basic types of regulatory capture:

  • Materialist capture, also called financial capture, in which the captured regulator's motive is based on its material self-interest. This can result from bribery, revolving doors, political donations, political corruption or the regulator's desire to maintain its funding.
  • Non-materialist capture, also called cognitive capture, can be caused by bias in the representation of public interests, which through consensus decision-making can be adopted by regulatory agencies and law. This can result from interest groups lobbying for the industry. Highly specialized technical industries can pose a risk of cultural capture because the regulating agency typically needs to employ experts in the regulated area, and the pool of such experts typically consists largely of existing or former employees from the regulated industry.

While large firms can capture regulators due to their larger material and non-material resources, small firms are more prone to retain capture via a special underdog rhetoric.

Relationship with federalism

There is substantial academic literature suggesting that smaller government units are easier for small, concentrated industries to capture than large ones. For example, a group of states or provinces with a large timber industry might have their legislature and/or their delegation to the national legislature captured by lumber companies. These states or provinces then become the voice of the industry, even to the point of blocking national policies that would be preferred by the majority across the whole country. Moore and Giovinazzo (2012) call this the "distortion gap".

The opposite is possible. Very large and powerful industries (e.g., energy, banking, weapon system construction) can capture national governments, and then use that power to block policies at the national, state or provincial level that the voters may want, although even local interests can thwart national priorities.

Economic rationale

Regulatory capture has an economic basis: vested interests in an industry have the greatest financial stake in regulations affecting them, and so are more likely to try to influence the regulator than relatively dispersed individual consumers, each with little incentive. When regulators form expert bodies to examine policy, these invariably feature current or former industry members, or at the very least, individuals with lives and contacts in the industry. Capture is also facilitated where consumers or taxpayers have a poorer understanding of underlying issues than businesses.

Jon Hanson and his co-authors argue that the phenomenon extends beyond political agencies and organizations. Businesses have an incentive to control anything that has power over them, including the media, academia and popular culture, and will try to capture them too. This is called "deep capture".

Regulatory public interest is based on market failure and welfare economics. It holds that regulation is the response of the government to public needs. Its purpose is to make up for market failures, improve the efficiency of resource allocation, and maximize social welfare. Posner states that the public interest theory contains the assumption that the market is fragile, and that if left unchecked, it will tend to be unfair and inefficient, and government regulation is a costless and effective way to meet the needs of social justice and efficiency. Mimik states that government regulation is a public administration policy that focuses on private behavior. It is a rule drawn from the public interest. Irving and Brouhingan state that regulation is a way of obeying public needs and weakening the risk of market operations. They also expressed the view that regulation reflects the public interest.

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