Russian Air Force

History

The Russian Air Force, officially established on 12 August 1912, as part of the Imperial Russian Air Service, has a long and complex history. It began as one of the earliest military aviation units globally, although its early years saw slow development due to the constraints of World War I. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the air service was reorganised under the Soviet regime, evolving into the Red Air Fleet in 1918, which later became part of the Soviet Air Forces (VVS).

Early development and Soviet era

After the war, the Soviet Air Force focused on modernising its fleet, developing jet fighters like the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15, which became famous during the Korean War. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Air Force was a pivotal part of the USSR’s military strategy, with long-range bombers like the Tu-95 and advanced fighters such as the MiG-21 and Su-27 becoming iconic symbols of Soviet air power.

1991–2000

In 1993, Pyotr Deynekin announced that a Frontal Aviation Command (Moscow, under General-lieutenant of Aviation Nikolay Antoshkin) and a Reserves and Cadres Training Command (Samara, under Colonel-General Leonid Stepanyuk) were to be established, but little more was heard of these commands.

During the 1990s, the financial stringency that was felt throughout the armed forces made its mark on the VVS as well. Pilots and other personnel could sometimes not get their wages for months, and on occasion resorted to desperate measures: four MiG-31 pilots at Yelizovo in the Far East went on hunger strike in 1996 to demand back pay which was several months overdue, and the problem was only resolved by diverting unit money intended for other tasks.

The former Soviet Air Defence Forces remained independent for several years under Russian control, only merging with the Air Forces in 1998. The decree merging the two forces was issued by President Boris Yeltsin on 16 July 1997. During 1998 altogether 580 units and formations were disbanded, 134 reorganised, and over 600 were given a new jurisdiction.

The number of servicemen in the Air Force was reduced to about 185,000 from the former combined number of 318,000. 123,500 positions were abolished, including almost 1,000 colonel positions. The resignation of 3000 other servicemen included 46 generals of which 15 were colonel generals. On 29 December 1998 Colonel General Anatoly Kornukov, a former Air Defence Forces officer and new commander-in-chief of the merged force succeeding Deynekin, reported to the Russian defense minister that the task had 'in principle been achieved'.

2001–2010

In December 2003 the aviation assets of the Russian Ground Forces—mostly helicopters—were transferred to the VVS, following the shooting down of a Mi-26 helicopter in Chechnya on 19 August 2002 that claimed 19 lives. The former Army Aviation was in its previous form intended for the direct support of the Ground Forces, by providing their tactical air support, conducting tactical aerial reconnaissance, transporting airborne troops, providing fire support of their actions, electronic warfare, setting of minefield barriers and other tasks. The former Army Aviation (Army Aviation of the Russian Federation) was subsequently managed by the Chief of the Department of Army Aviation. In 2010, it was announced that the 2003 decision to transfer Army Aviation to the Air Force was reversed, with the transfer back to the Ground Forces to occur sometime in 2015 or 2016.

During the 2000s, the Air Force continued to suffer from a lack of resources for pilot training. In the 1990s Russian pilots achieved approximately 10% of the flight hours of the United States Air Force. The 2007 edition of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance listed pilots of tactical aviation flying 20–25 hours a year, 61st Air Army pilots (former Military Transport Aviation), 60 hours a year, and Army Aviation under VVS control 55 hours a year.

In 2007 the VVS resumed the Soviet-era practice of deploying its strategic bomber aircraft on long-range patrols. This ended a 15-year unilateral suspension due to fuel costs and other economic difficulties after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Patrols towards the North Pole, the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean were reinstated, bringing the planes often close to NATO territory, including in one instance flying over the Irish Sea between the United Kingdom and Ireland.

During the 2008 South Ossetian War, the VVS suffered losses of between four and seven aircraft due to Georgian anti-aircraft fire. The 2008 Russian military reforms were promptly announced following the war, which according to Western experts were intended to address many inadequacies discovered as a result. The reforms commenced in early 2009, in which air armies were succeeded by commands, and most air regiments became air bases. Aviation Week & Space Technology confirmed that the reorganization would be completed by December 2009 and would see a 40 percent reduction in aircrew numbers.

In February 2009, the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported that 200 of the 291 MiG-29s currently in service across all Russian air arms were unsafe and would have to be permanently grounded. This action would remove from service about a third of Russia's total fighter force, some 650 aircraft. On 5 June 2009, the Chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Makarov said of the VVS that "They can run bombing missions only in the daytime with the sun shining, but they miss their targets anyway". Maj. Gen. Pavel Androsov said that Russia's long-range bombers would be upgraded in 2009 to be able to hit within 20 meters of their targets.

Also in September 2009, it was reported that an East European network of the Joint CIS Air Defense System was to be set up by Russia and Belarus.

By August 2010, according to the Commander-in-Chief of the VVS Alexander Zelin, the average flight hours of a pilot in Russian tactical aviation had reached 80 hours a year, while in army aviation and military transport aviation, it exceeded 100 hours a year.

2011–2020

According to the instructions of the General Staff of the Armed Forces on 1 September 2011, the unmanned aircraft of the VVS and the personnel operating them moved under the command structure of the Russian Ground Forces.

As of 2012, the VVS operated a total of 61 air bases, including 26 air bases with tactical aircraft, of which 14 are equipped with fighter aircraft. In terms of flight hours, pilots in the Western Military District averaged 125 hours over the 2012 training year. Pilots from the Kursk air base achieved an average of 150 hours, with transport aviation averaging 170 hours.

In February 2014, during the early periods of Russia's annexation of Crimea, the assets of the VVS in the Southern Military District were activated and flown to the peninsula for supporting the rest of the operations.

On 1 August 2015, the Russian Air Force, along with the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces and the Air Defense Troops, were merged into a new branch of the armed forces, now officially called the Russian Aerospace Forces.

On 30 September 2015, the VVS launched a military intervention in Syria, in Syria's Homs region. On 24 November 2015, during a bombing mission, a Turkish Air Force F-16 shot down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 that Turkey claimed had violated its airspace.

In March 2020, the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets by the VVS in Syria has been described as "amounting to war crime" by a United Nations Human Rights Council report.

On 9 November 2020, a Russian Mil Mi-24 attack helicopter was shot down mistakenly by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war killing 2 crew members and injuring 1 more. Days later, after the signing of the ceasefire agreement, Russian peacekeepers were deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh with aviation to patrol its borders.

2021–present

Modernization programs initiated during the 2010s continue under Russia’s State Armament Programme for 2018–2027, although their implementation has been affected by economic constraints, Western sanctions, and the demands of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Russian Aerospace Forces continue to receive upgraded variants of Soviet-era aircraft, including the Sukhoi Su-30SM2, Su-34M, and Su-35S, while limited numbers of fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57 fighters have entered service. At the same time, Russia has expanded its use of unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare systems, and precision-guided munitions.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Russian Air Force conducted large-scale strike operations against Ukrainian military infrastructure but has not achieved sustained air superiority over Ukraine. Ukrainian air defenses, including Soviet-era systems and later Western-provided systems such as Patriot and NASAMS, have forced Russian aircraft to operate at greater distances from the front line. As a result, the VKS increasingly relies on long-range missile strikes, stand-off weapons, and glide bombs equipped with Unified Gliding and Correction Modules (UMPK), which allow Soviet-era FAB-series bombs to be converted into guided weapons.

Since 2023, Russian aviation has increasingly relied on glide bombs, particularly those deployed by Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft. These weapons have become a major component of Russian close air support operations, allowing aircraft to strike Ukrainian positions while remaining outside the effective range of many Ukrainian air-defense systems.

The war has resulted in significant losses among Russian aviation assets. Several high-value aircraft have been destroyed or damaged, including A-50 airborne early-warning aircraft, Su-34 fighter-bombers, Su-35 fighters, and Ka-52 attack helicopters. In June 2025, Ukraine conducted Operation Spider’s Web, a long-range drone attack against Russian air bases targeting strategic aviation assets, including Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 bombers. Ukrainian officials claimed dozens of aircraft were destroyed or damaged, while independent assessments estimated lower but still significant losses.

VVS role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

On 24 February 2022, the VVS was deployed in support of the invasion of Ukraine. The VVS had reportedly deployed about 300 combat aircraft within range of Ukraine. On 25 February 2022, Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed several aircraft and set a Russian airbase on fire in the Millerovo air base attack. By March 2022, it was claimed that the VVS had carried out at least 1403 airstrikes on Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion.

The VVS has generally been noted by its relative absence from the invasion and has as of 25 March 2022 failed to subdue Ukrainian air defenses or the Ukrainian Air Force. It has, as of 1 April 2022, also failed to achieve air supremacy. Failure to achieve this has been attributed to the lack of SEAD operations on the part of the VVS likely due to the lack of flying hours for Russian pilots as well as the lack of dedicated SEAD units and precision-guided munitions within the VVS. These weaknesses have been compounded by the mobility of Ukrainian air defenses with the extensive use of MANPADS as well as NATO reportedly sharing early warning information with Ukrainian forces. According to the Ukrainian MoD, as of 16 March 2022, the VVS has also suffered at least 77 aircraft losses, however only 12 were verified by independent sources at the time.

In the first six months of the campaign, Russia's air war was largely a failure. An American intelligence analyst said that less than 40% of the 2,154 missiles fired by Russia hit their targets, such as the Zatoka bridge which sustained over eight air attacks before being disabled. The VVS reportedly flew over 20,000 sorties in the war, fewer than 3,000 of which entered Ukrainian airspace, possibly due to fear of Ukraine's sustained air defense.

The VVS has struck civilian targets during the invasion prompting an International Criminal Court investigation in Ukraine. Notably, during the battle of Mariupol it struck a hospital as well as a theatre. Some reports state Russian pilots in Ukraine flying older aircraft having to use civilian GPS units "taped to the dashboards".

On 19 September US Air Force General James B. Hecker said that Russia had lost 55 military aircraft due to being shot down by Ukrainian air defenses since the start of the invasion. He credits this success to the Ukrainian use of SA-11 and SA-10 air defense systems. As the US doesn't have these systems, getting new missiles from European allies is a "big ask" from Kyiv. Russian airplanes increased their operations due to the September 2022 Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive. This was due to several factors including changing front lines, former safe territory is now held by the enemy. Or because they were under pressure to provide closer ground support.

On 8 October 2022 the chief of the VVS Sergey Surovikin became the commander of all Russian forces invading Ukraine. On 10 October 2022 the VVS re-commenced the bombardment of cities like Kyiv and especially energy infrastructure like electricity grid facilities. The large-scale coordinated attacks also hit Kharkiv, Kryvyi Rih, Lviv, Dnipro, Ternopil, Kremenchuk, Khmelnytskyi, and Zhytomyr. The oblasts of Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Kharkiv, Zhytormyr, Kirovohrad were attacked on this day. When, by 17 October, these energy infrastructure attacks continued unabated the western media labeled the delivery system "kamikaze drones", and Ukrainian president Zelensky called this "terrorizing the civilian population". By 23 October (not yet two weeks) 40% of Ukrainians were without electricity and/or water.

Russian airstrikes against Ukrainian infrastructure again intensified with the deployment of the UMPK (unified gliding and correction module) bomb kits since early 2023, which allowed the Russian Air Force to convert dumb Soviet-era aerial bombs into a precise munition. UMPK bomb kits are being particularly used with general purpose FAB-250, FAB-500 and FAB-1500 aerial bombs containing highly explosive warheads. These glide kits greatly increase range and also add an element of guidance, allowing Russian bombers, namely the Su-34, to execute aerial attacks from safer distances without entering areas covered by Ukrainian air defense systems. According to Ukrainian General Ivan Havryliuk, since start of 2024 year, Russian aviation dropped over 3,500 of these bombs on Ukrainian positions. Employment expanded substantially thereafter. The Joint Air Power Competence Centre assessed that by early 2025 Russia was releasing approximately 3,500 UMPK-equipped bombs per month, or over 100 per day across the front, predominantly against static targets ahead of ground assaults. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine recorded 5,328 guided bombs during October 2025 and a total approaching 44,000 across the first eleven months of that year, an average of about 130 per day.

The kits were progressively refined in response to Ukrainian electronic warfare, with jamming-resistant Kometa antennas, greater reliance on inertial navigation, and glide ranges extended from an initial 60–80 km to around 95 km. In October 2025 a more aerodynamic kit for the FAB-500T appeared on Su-34s, with Russian sources claiming ranges beyond 100 km unpowered and over 200 km for a turbojet-equipped variant.

Usage rose again through 2026. Ukrainian Air Force data recorded 8,266 guided bombs in June 2026, including 391 released across 127 sorties on 13 June, and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence stated on 4 August 2026, citing General Staff figures, that more than 8,300 were employed during July, the highest monthly total recorded during the war. Writing for the Royal United Services Institute in July 2026, Justin Bronk assessed that the Su-34 fleet was striking frontline positions with hundreds of heavy UMPK and UMPB glide bombs per week, and that countering them remained difficult because AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles carried by Ukrainian F-16s could not reach Su-34s releasing at high altitude and speed some 70 km behind Russian lines.

Wagner Group rebellion

During the conflict, the VVS lost one Il-22M Airborne Command Post and five helicopters (three Mi-8, one Mi-35M, and one KA-52) as well as one damaged Mi-8. Two of the destroyed Mi-8s as well as the damaged one were Russia's newest Mi-8MTPR-1 Electronic Warfare variants. Up to 29 crew were killed, assuming the aircraft were fully manned, but the VVS has not released casualties. Wagner lost at least five vehicles during hostilities, but it is unclear how many can be attributed to VVS actions. Reports indicated that the Russian Armed Forces were failing to stop Wagner's momentum toward Moscow when a political resolution to the rebellion was announced. The U.K. Defense Intelligence reported that the Il-22M was a particularly high value asset, being one in a fleet of only 12 special mission aircraft, and that its loss could have an impact on the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

Operation Spider's Web

On 1 June 2025, Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) struck at least two airfields, those being Olenya air base, in the Arctic, and Belaya air base in Siberia, destroying rows of Russian strategic and nuclear capable bombers. Ukrainian sources claimed further strikes at Diaghilev air base and Ivanovo air base, claiming to have destroyed "more than" 40 Russian aircraft including the A-50, Tu-95 and Tu-22M3. According to the Financial Times, the damaged and destroyed aircraft made up around 20% of Russia’s operational long-range aviation fleet. Many of the aircraft types affected, such as the Tu-95 and Tu-22M3, have not been produced since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, making them exceptionally difficult to replace.