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Venezuelan crisis of 1902–1903

Naval blockade from December 1902 to February 1903

  • 19 min read
  • 4 chapters
Engraving by the German Willy Stower depicting the blockade of Venezuelan ports in 1902
Willy Stöwer · Public domain

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Through Blockade, United States Senate and Berlin

Years later, Roosevelt claimed he forced the Germans to back down by sending his own larger fleet to Venezuela and threatening war if the Germans landed. However, he made no preparations for war against a major power, nor did he alert the Senate or officials at the State, War, and Navy Departments.

With Castro failing to back down, U.S. pressure and increasingly negative British and American press reaction to the affair, the blockading nations agreed to a compromise, but maintained the blockade during negotiations over the details. This led to the signing of an agreement on 13 February 1903 which saw the blockade lifted, and Venezuela commit 30% of its customs duties to settling claims.

When the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague subsequently awarded preferential treatment to the blockading powers against the claims of other nations, the U.S. feared this would encourage future European intervention. The episode contributed to the development of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, asserting a right of the United States to intervene to stabilize the economic affairs of small states in the Caribbean and Central America if they were unable to pay their international debts, in order to preclude European intervention to do so.

Background

At the turn of the 20th century, German traders dominated Venezuela's import/export sector and informal banking system. Most of these, however, had little influence in Berlin; rather it was German industrialists and bankers, including those associated with building railroads, who had connections and influence. The revolutionary turmoil of the last decade of the 19th century in Venezuela saw these suffer, and send "a stream of complaints and entreaties for protection" to Berlin. Matters were particularly bad during the Venezuelan Civil War of 1892 which had brought Joaquín Crespo to power, which saw six months of anarchy with no effective government, but the Civil War of 1898 again saw forced loans and the taking of houses and property.

Importantly, in 1893, the French, Spanish, Belgian and German envoys in Caracas had collectively agreed that joint action was the best route for settling claims from 1892's civil war, although this had not been necessary in that event because reparations related to that conflict were paid out.

Prior to the Civil War of 1898, while German investment in Venezuela was substantially less than in countries such as Argentina or Brazil, Krupp's Great Venezuela Railway Company was valued at 60 million marks, and was "individually one of the more valuable German South American ventures"; and despite a renegotiation of the concession terms in 1896, Venezuelan payments were irregular after 1897 and stopped in August 1901. Additionally the signing of the Paris award that decided the boundary issue with British Guiana on 3 October 1899 there were insurrectional movements during Ignacio Andrade's administrative management and serious economic difficulties were experienced - motivated by the international drop in the price of coffee, that represented more than 80% of Venezuela's exports. In addition, Cipriano Castro, one of a succession of Venezuelan caudillos (military strongmen) to seize the Presidency, halted payment on foreign debts after seizing Caracas in October 1899. Britain had similar grievances, and was owed the bulk of the nearly $15 million of debt Venezuela had incurred in 1881 and then defaulted on.

In July 1901, Germany urged Venezuela in friendly terms to pursue international arbitration via the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. Between February and June 1902 the British representative in Venezuela sent Castro 17 notes about the British government's concerns, but did not receive a reply to any of them. Castro assumed that the Monroe Doctrine would see the U.S. intervene to prevent European military intervention. However, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt saw the Doctrine as applying to European seizure of territory, rather than intervention per se. In July 1901, as Vice-President, Roosevelt said that "if any South American country misbehaves toward any European country, let the European country spank it", and reiterated that view to Congress as President on 3 December 1901.

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