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Through Airbus, Electrical wiring and New product development

Airbus studies started in 1988, and the project was announced in 1990 to challenge the dominance of the Boeing 747 in the long-haul market. The then-designated A3XX project was presented in 1994 and Airbus launched the €9.5 billion (US$10.7 billion) A380 programme on 19 December 2000. The first prototype was unveiled in Toulouse, France on 18 January 2005, commencing its first flight on 27 April 2005. It then obtained its type certificate from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on 12 December 2006.

Due to difficulties with the electrical wiring, the initial production was delayed by two years and the development costs almost doubled. It was first delivered to Singapore Airlines on 15 October 2007 and entered service on 25 October. Production peaked at 30 per year in both 2012 and 2014, with manufacturing of the aircraft ending in 2021. The A380's estimated $25 billion development cost was not recouped by the time Airbus ended production.

The full-length double-deck aircraft has a typical seating for 525 passengers, with a maximum certified capacity for 853 passengers. The quadjet is powered by Engine Alliance GP7200 or Rolls-Royce Trent 900 turbofans providing a range of 8,000 nmi (14,800 km; 9,200 mi). As of December 2021, the global A380 fleet had completed more than 800,000 flights over 7.3 million block hours with no fatalities and no hull losses. As of April 2024, there were 189 aircraft in service with 10 operators worldwide. Of its fifteen total operating airlines, five have fully retired the A380 from their fleets.

Development

Background

In mid-1988, Airbus engineers, led by Jean Roeder, began work in secret on the development of an ultra-high-capacity airliner (UHCA), both to complete its own range of products and to break the dominance that Boeing had enjoyed in this market segment since the early 1970s with its Boeing 747. McDonnell Douglas unsuccessfully offered its double-deck MD-12 concept for sale. Lockheed was exploring the possibility for a Very Large Subsonic Transport. Roeder was given approval for further evaluations of the UHCA after a formal presentation to the president and CEO in June 1990.

The megaproject was announced at the 1990 Farnborough Airshow, with the stated goal of 15% lower operating costs than the Boeing 747-400. Airbus organised four teams of designers, one from each of its partners (Aérospatiale, British Aerospace, Deutsche Aerospace AG, CASA) to propose new technologies for its future aircraft designs. The designs were presented in 1992 and the most competitive designs were used. In January 1993, Boeing and several companies in the Airbus consortium started a joint feasibility study of a Very Large Commercial Transport (VLCT), aiming to form a partnership to share the limited market.

In June 1994, Airbus announced its plan to develop its own very large airliner, designated as A3XX. Airbus considered several designs, including an unusual side-by-side combination of two fuselages from its A340, the largest Airbus jet at the time. The A3XX was pitted against the VLCT study and Boeing's own New Large Aircraft successor to the 747. In July 1995, the joint study with Boeing was abandoned, as Boeing's interest had declined due to analysis that such a product was unlikely to cover the projected $15 billion development cost. Despite the fact that only two airlines had expressed public interest in purchasing such a plane, Airbus was already pursuing its own large-plane project. Analysts suggested that Boeing would instead pursue stretching its 747 design, and that air travel was already moving away from the hub-and-spoke system that consolidated traffic into large planes, and toward more non-stop routes that could be served by smaller planes.

From 1997 to 2000, as the 1997 Asian financial crisis darkened the market outlook, Airbus refined its design, targeting a 15–20% reduction in operating costs over the existing Boeing 747-400. The A3XX design converged on a double-decker layout that provided more passenger volume than a traditional single-deck design. Airbus did so in line with traditional hub-and-spoke theory, as opposed to the point-to-point theory with the Boeing 777, after conducting an extensive market analysis with over 200 focus groups. Although early marketing of the huge cross-section touted the possibility of duty-free shops, restaurant-like dining, gyms, casinos and beauty parlours on board, the realities of airline economics have kept such dreams grounded.

On 19 December 2000, the supervisory board of newly restructured Airbus voted to launch a €9.5 billion ($10.7 billion) project to build the A3XX, re-designated as A380, with 50 firm orders from six launch customers. The A380 designation was a break from previous Airbus families, which had progressed sequentially from A300 to A340. It was chosen because the number 8 resembles the double-deck cross section, and is a lucky number in many East Asian countries where the aircraft was being marketed. The aircraft configuration was finalised in early 2001, and manufacturing of the first A380 wing-box component started on 23 January 2002. The development cost of the A380 had grown to €11–14 billion when the first aircraft was completed.

Total development cost

In 2000, the projected development cost was €9.5 billion. In 2004, Airbus estimated that €1.5 billion (US$2 billion) would need to be added, totalling the developmental costs to €10.3 billion ($12.7 billion). In 2006, Airbus stopped publishing its reported cost after reaching costs of €10.2 billion and then it provisioned another €4.9 billion, after the difficulties in electric cabling and two years delay for an estimated total of €18 billion.

In 2014, the aircraft was estimated to have cost $25bn (£16bn, €18.9bn) to develop. In 2015, Airbus said development costs were €15 billion (£11.4 billion, $16.64 billion), though analysts believe the figure is likely to be at least €5bn ($5.55 Bn) more for a €20 Bn ($22.19 Bn) total. In 2016, The A380 development costs were estimated at $25 billion for 15 years, $25–30 billion, or €25 billion ($28 billion).

To start the programme in 2000, the governments of France, Germany and the UK loaned Airbus €3.5 billion and refundable advances reached €5.9 billion ($7.3 billion). In February 2018, after an Emirates order secured production of the unprofitable programme for ten years, Airbus revised its deal with the three loan-giving governments to save $1.4 billion (17%) and restructured terms to lower the production rate from eight per year in 2019 to six per year.

On 15 May 2018, in its EU appeal ruling, a WTO ruling concluded that the A380 received improper subsidies through $9 billion of launch aids, but Airbus acknowledged that the threat posed to Boeing by the A380 is so marginal with 330 orders since its 2000 launch that any US sanctions should be minimal, as previous rulings showed Boeing's exposure could be as little as $377 million. In 2018, unit cost was US$445.6 million.

In February 2019, the German government disclosed that it was conducting talks with Airbus regarding €600 million in outstanding loans. Following the decision to wind down the A380 programme, Europe argues that the subsidies in effect no longer exist and that no sanctions are warranted.

Production

Major structural sections of the A380 were built in France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Due to the sections' large size, traditional transportation methods proved unfeasible, so they were taken to the Jean-Luc Lagardère Plant assembly hall in Toulouse, France, by specialised road and water transportation, though some parts were moved by the A300-600ST Beluga transport aircraft. A380 components were provided by suppliers from around the world; the four largest contributors, by value, were Rolls-Royce, Safran, United Technologies and General Electric.

For the surface movement of large A380 structural components, a complex route known as the Itinéraire à Grand Gabarit was developed. This involved the construction of a fleet of roll-on/roll-off (RORO) ships and barges, the construction of port facilities and the development of new and modified roads to accommodate oversized road convoys. The front and rear fuselage sections were shipped on one of three RORO ships from Hamburg in northern Germany to Saint-Nazaire in France. The ship travelled via the UK, where the wings were manufactured at Broughton, north Wales, and were then transported by barge to the nearby docks of Mostyn, where they were loaded for ship transport.

In Saint-Nazaire, the ship exchanged the fuselage sections from Hamburg for larger, assembled sections, some of which included the nose. This ship unloaded in Bordeaux. It then went to pick up the belly and tail sections from Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA in Cádiz, Spain, and delivered them to Bordeaux. From there, the A380 parts were transported by barge to Langon, and by oversize road convoys to the assembly hall in Toulouse. To avoid damage from direct handling, parts were secured in custom jigs carried on self-powered wheeled vehicles.

After assembly, the aircraft were flown to the Airbus Hamburg-Finkenwerder plant to be furnished and painted. Airbus sized the production facilities and supply chain for a production rate of four A380s per month.

Testing

In 2005, five A380s were built for testing and demonstration purposes. The first A380, registered F-WWOW, was unveiled in Toulouse 18 January 2005. It first flew on 27 April 2005. This plane, equipped with Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines, flew from Toulouse–Blagnac Airport with a crew of six headed by chief test pilot Jacques Rosay. Rosay said flying the A380 had been "like handling a bicycle".

On 1 December 2005, the A380 achieved its maximum design speed of Mach 0.96, (its design cruise speed is Mach 0.85) in a shallow dive. In 2006, the A380 flew its first high-altitude test at Addis Ababa Bole International Airport. It conducted its second high-altitude test at the same airport in 2009. On 10 January 2006, it flew to José María Córdova International Airport in Colombia, accomplishing the transatlantic testing, and then it went to El Dorado International Airport to test the engine operation in high-altitude airports. It arrived in North America on 6 February 2006, landing in Iqaluit, Nunavut, in Canada for cold-weather testing.

On 14 February 2006, during the destructive wing strength certification test on MSN5000, the test wing of the A380 failed at 145% of the limit load, short of the required 150% level. Airbus announced modifications adding 30 kg (66 lb) to the wing to provide the required strength. On 26 March 2006, the A380 underwent evacuation certification in Hamburg. With 8 of the 16 exits randomly blocked, 853 mixed passengers and 20 crew exited the darkened aircraft in 78 seconds, less than the 90 seconds required for certification. Three days later, the A380 received European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approval to carry up to 853 passengers.

The first A380 using GP7200 engines – serial number MSN009 and flew on 25 August 2006. On 4 September 2006, the first full passenger-carrying flight test took place. The aircraft flew from Toulouse with 474 Airbus employees on board, in a test of passenger facilities and comfort. In November 2006, a further series of route-proving flights demonstrated the aircraft's performance for 150 flight hours under typical airline operating conditions. As of 2014, the A380 test aircraft continue to perform test procedures.

Airbus obtained type certificates for the A380-841 and A380-842 model from the EASA and FAA on 12 December 2006 in a joint ceremony at the company's French headquarters, receiving the ICAO code A388. The A380-861 model was added to the type certificate on 14 December 2007.

Production and delivery delays

Initial production of the A380 was troubled by delays attributed to the 530 km (330 mi) of wiring in each aircraft. Airbus cited as underlying causes the complexity of the cabin wiring (98,000 wires and 40,000 connectors), its concurrent design and production, the high degree of customisation for each airline, and failures of configuration management and change control. The German and Spanish Airbus facilities continued to use CATIA version 4, while British and French sites migrated to version 5. This caused overall configuration management problems, at least in part because wire harnesses manufactured using aluminium rather than copper conductors necessitated special design rules including non-standard dimensions and bend radii; these were not easily transferred between versions of the software. File conversion tools were initially developed by Airbus to help solve this problem; however, the digital mock-up was still unable to read the full technical design data. Furthermore, organisational culture was also cited as a cause of the production delays. The communication and reporting culture at the time frowned upon delivery of bad news, meaning Airbus was unable to take early actions to mitigate technical and production issues.

Airbus announced the first delay in June 2005 and notified airlines that deliveries would be delayed by six months. This reduced the total number of planned deliveries by the end of 2009 from about 120 to 90–100. On 13 June 2006, Airbus announced a second delay, with the delivery schedule slipping an additional six to seven months. Although the first delivery was still planned before the end of 2006, deliveries in 2007 would drop to only 9 aircraft, and deliveries by the end of 2009 would be cut to 70–80 aircraft. The announcement caused a 26% drop in the share price of Airbus' parent, EADS, and led to the departure of EADS CEO Paul Dupont, Airbus CEO Gustav Humbert, and A380 programme manager Charles Champion. On 3 October 2006, upon completion of a review of the A380 programme, Airbus CEO Christian Streiff announced a third delay, pushing the first delivery to October 2007, to be followed by 13 deliveries in 2008, 25 in 2009, and the full production rate of 45 aircraft per year in 2010. The delay also increased the earnings shortfall projected by Airbus through 2010 to €4.8 billion.

As Airbus prioritised the work on the A380-800 over the A380F, freighter orders were cancelled by FedEx and United Parcel Service, or converted to A380-800 by Emirates and ILFC. Airbus suspended work on the freighter version, but said it remained on offer, albeit without a service entry date. For the passenger version Airbus negotiated a revised delivery schedule and compensation with the 13 customers, all of which retained their orders with some placing subsequent orders, including Emirates, Singapore Airlines, Qantas, Air France, Qatar Airways, and Korean Air.

Beginning in 2007, the A380 was considered as a potential replacement for the existing Boeing VC-25 serving as Air Force One presidential transport, but in January 2009 EADS declared that they were not going to bid for the contract, as assembling only three planes in the US would not make financial sense.

On 13 May 2008, Airbus announced reduced deliveries for the years 2008 (12) and 2009 (21). After further manufacturing setbacks, Airbus announced its plan to deliver 14 A380s in 2009, down from the previously revised target of 18. A total of 10 A380s were delivered in 2009. In 2010, Airbus delivered 18 of the expected 20 A380s, due to Rolls-Royce engine availability problems. Airbus planned to deliver "between 20 and 25" A380s in 2011 before ramping up to three a month in 2012. In fact, Airbus delivered 26 units, thus outdoing its predicted output for the first time. As of July 2012, production was 3 aircraft per month. Among the production problems are challenging interiors, interiors being installed sequentially rather than concurrently as in smaller planes, and union and government objections to streamlining to improve manufacturing productivity.

Entry into service

Nicknamed the "Superjumbo", the first A380, MSN003, was delivered to Singapore Airlines on 15 October 2007 and entered service on 25 October 2007 with flight number SQ380 between Singapore and Sydney. Passengers bought seats in a charity online auction paying between $560 and $100,380. Two months later, Singapore Airlines CEO Chew Choong Seng stated the A380 was performing better than either the airline or Airbus had anticipated, burning 20% less fuel per seat-mile than the airline's 747-400 fleet. Emirates' Tim Clark claimed that the A380 has better fuel economy at Mach 0.86 than at 0.83, and that its technical dispatch reliability is at 97%, the same as Singapore Airlines. Airbus is committed to reach the industry standard of 98.5%.

Emirates was the second airline to receive the A380 and commenced service between Dubai and New York in August 2008. Qantas followed, with flights between Melbourne and Los Angeles in October 2008. By the end of 2008, 890,000 passengers had flown on 2,200 flights.

In February 2008, the A380 became the first airliner to fly using synthetic liquid fuel. The fuel is processed from gas to liquid form (GTL fuel). The flight was 3 hours long, taking off from Filton, UK, and landing in Toulouse, France, and was a significant step in evaluating the suitability of sustainable aviation fuels.

Improvements and upgrades

In 2010, Airbus announced a new A380 build standard, incorporating a strengthened airframe structure and a 1.5° increase in wing twist. Airbus also offered, as an option, an improved maximum take-off weight, thus providing a better payload/range performance. Maximum take-off weight was increased by 4 t (8,800 lb), to 573 t (1,263,000 lb) and the range was extended by 100 nautical miles (190 km; 120 mi); this was achieved by reducing flight loads, partly from optimising the fly-by-wire control laws. British Airways and Emirates were the first two customers to have received this new option in 2013. Emirates asked for an update with new engines for the A380 to be competitive with the Boeing 777X around 2020, and Airbus was studying 11-abreast seating.

In 2012, Airbus announced another increase in the A380's maximum take-off weight to 575 t (1,268,000 lb), a 6 t increase from the initial A380 variant and 2 t higher than the increased-weight proposal of 2010. This increased the range by some 150 nautical miles (280 km; 170 mi), taking its capability to around 8,350 nautical miles (15,460 km; 9,610 mi) at current payloads. The higher-weight version was offered for introduction to service early in 2013.

Post-delivery problems

During repairs following the Qantas Flight 32 engine failure incident, cracks were discovered in wing fittings. As a result, the European Aviation Safety Agency issued an Airworthiness Directive in January 2012 which affected 20 A380 aircraft that had accumulated over 1,300 flights. A380s with under 1,800 flight hours were to be inspected within 6 weeks or 84 flights; aircraft with over 1,800 flight hours were to be examined within four days or 14 flights. Fittings found to be cracked were replaced. On 8 February 2012, the checks were extended to cover all 68 A380 aircraft in operation. The problem was considered to be minor and is not expected to affect operations. EADS acknowledged that the cost of repairs would be over $130 million, to be borne by Airbus. The company said the problem was traced to stress and material used for the fittings. Additionally, major airlines were seeking compensation from Airbus for revenue lost as a result of the cracks and subsequent grounding of fleets. Airbus switched to a different type of aluminium alloy so aircraft delivered from 2014 onwards should not have this problem.

Around 2014, Airbus changed about 10% of all A380 doors, as some leaked during flight. One occurrence resulted in dropped oxygen masks and an emergency landing. The switch was estimated to cost over €100 million. Airbus stated that safety was sufficient, as the air pressure pushed the door into the frame.

Further continuation of programme

At the July 2016 Farnborough Airshow, Airbus announced that in a "prudent, proactive step", starting in 2018, it expected to deliver 12 A380 aircraft per year, down from 27 deliveries in 2015. The firm also warned production might slip back into unprofitability on each aircraft produced at that time, though it anticipated production would remain profitable for 2016 and 2017. "The company would continue to improve the efficiency of its industrial system to achieve breakeven at 20 aircraft in 2017 and targeted additional cost reduction initiatives to lower breakeven further." Airbus expected that healthy demand for its other aircraft would allow it to avoid job losses from the cuts.

As Airbus expected to build 15 airliners in 2017 and 12 in 2018, Airbus Commercial Aircraft president Fabrice Brégier said that, without orders in 2017, production would be reduced to below one per month while remaining profitable per unit and allowing the programme to continue for 20 to 30 years. In its 2017 half-year report, Airbus adjusted 2019 deliveries to eight aircraft. In November 2017, its chief executive Tom Enders was confident Airbus would still produce A380s in 2027 with more sales to come, and would further develop it to keep it competitive beyond 2030. Airbus was profitable at a rate of 15 per year and was trying to drive breakeven down further but expected to take losses at eight per year.

An order from Emirates for 36 A380s would have ensured production beyond 2020, but the airline wanted guarantees that production would be maintained for 10 years, until 2028: reducing output to six a year would help to bridge that period and would support second-hand values while other buyers were approached, but the programme would still be unprofitable. If it had failed to win the Emirates order, Airbus claimed that it was ready to phase out its production gradually as it fulfilled remaining orders until the early 2020s. In January 2018, Emirates confirmed the order for 36 A380s, but the deal was thrown back into question in October 2018 over a disagreement regarding engine fuel burn.

To extend the programme, Airbus offered China a production role in early 2018. While state-owned Chinese airlines could order A380s, it would not help their low yield, as it lowered frequency; they did not need more volume as widebody aircraft were already used on domestic routes and using the A380 on its intended long-haul missions would free only a few airport slots.

After achieving efficiencies to sustain production at a lower level, in 2017, Airbus delivered 15 A380s and was "very close" to production breakeven, expecting to make additional savings as production was being further reduced: it planned to deliver 12 in 2018, eight in 2019 and six per year from 2020 with "digestible" losses. As of February 2018, Enders was confident the A380 would gain additional orders from existing or new operators, and saw opportunities in Asia and particularly in China where it was "under-represented".

In 2019, Lufthansa had retired 6 of its 14 A380s due to their unprofitability. Later that year, Qatar Airways announced a switch from the A380 to the Boeing 777X starting from 2024.

End of production

In February 2019, Airbus announced it would end A380 production by 2021, after its main customer, Emirates, agreed to drop an order for 39 of the aircraft, replacing it with 40 A330-900s and 30 A350-900s. At the time of the announcement, Airbus had 17 more A380s on its order book to complete before closing the production line – 14 for Emirates and three for All Nippon Airways – taking the total number of expected deliveries of the aircraft type to 251. Airbus would have needed more than $90 million profit from the sale of each aircraft to cover the estimated $25 billion development cost of the programme. However, the $445 million price tag of each aircraft was not sufficient to even cover the production cost. With orders decreasing, the decision was made to cease production. Enders stated on 14 February 2019, "If you have a product that nobody wants anymore, or you can sell only below production cost, you have to stop it."

One reason that the A380 did not achieve commercial viability for Airbus has been attributed to its extremely large capacity being optimised for a hub-and-spoke system, which was projected by Airbus to be thriving when the programme was conceived. However, airlines underwent a fundamental transition to a point-to-point system, which gets customers to their destination in one flight instead of two or three flights. The massive scale of the A380 design was able to achieve a very low cost for passenger seat-distance, but efficiency within the hub-and-spoke paradigm was not able to overcome the efficiency of fewer flights required in the point-to-point system. Specifically, US based carriers had been using a multihub strategy, which justified the need for only a handful of VLAs (very large aircraft with more than 400 seats) such as the A380, and having too few VLAs meant that they could not achieve economy of scale to spread out the enormous fixed cost of the VLA support infrastructure. Consequently, orders for VLAs slowed in the mid-2010s, as widebody twin jets now offer similar range and greater fuel efficiency, giving airlines more flexibility at a lower upfront cost.

Another reason was that the A380 was designed primarily as a passenger-carrying plane, with a hypothetical freighter having cargo-carrying capacity which far exceeds its maximum takeoff weight; this stands in contrast to its main competitor, the Boeing 747, which was designed as a freight-carrying plane. For this reason, the Airbus A380 could not rely on freight orders for its continued production after demand for its passenger version waned (a factor which extended the 747's production by six years). As an example of the A380's passenger-oriented design, the cockpit is located adjacent to the lower deck, and the upper deck flooring forms part of the plane's load-bearing structure. Both of these factors preclude a freighter A380's ability to carry oversize loads, as it can neither be installed with a hinged nose at the front (as on the 747) nor have the upper deck flooring removed to form a singular cargo deck with a high ceiling.

On 25 September 2020, Airbus completed assembly of the final A380 fuselage. Nine aircraft remained to be delivered (eight for Emirates, one for All Nippon Airways) and production operations continued to finish those aircraft. On 17 March 2021, the final Airbus A380 (manufacturing serial number 272) made its maiden flight from Toulouse to Hamburg for cabin outfitting, before being delivered to Emirates on 16 December 2021.

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