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Franco-Dutch War

1672–1678 European war

  • 35 min read
  • 7 chapters
Franco-Dutch War Collave
DavidDijkgraaf · CC BY-SA 4.0

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In May 1672, France nearly overran the Netherlands, an event remembered in Dutch history as the Rampjaar, or "Disaster Year". However, by late July the position had stabilised, while concern over French gains brought the Dutch support from Emperor Leopold I, Spain and Brandenburg-Prussia. Previously an ally of France, England exited the war in February 1674.

Now facing a war of attrition on several fronts, Louis XIV of France instead focused on strengthening French borders with the Spanish Netherlands and Rhineland, while a coalition led by William of Orange sought to minimise any losses. By 1677, France had occupied Franche-Comté and made gains in the Spanish Netherlands and Alsace, but neither side was able to achieve a decisive victory.

France failed to conquer the Dutch Republic; but the September 1678 Peace of Nijmegen is still often seen as the high point of French power in this period. Spain recovered Charleroi from France, but in return ceded Franche-Comté, as well as much of Artois and Hainaut. Under William of Orange, the Dutch regained all the territory lost at the beginning, making him dominant in domestic politics. This position helped him create the anti-French Grand Alliance that fought in the Nine Years' War (1688-1697), and the subsequent War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714).

Origins

As part of a general policy of opposition to Habsburg power in Europe, France backed the Dutch Republic during the 1568 to 1648 Eighty Years War against Spain. The 1648 Peace of Münster confirmed Dutch independence and permanently closed the Scheldt estuary, benefiting Amsterdam by eliminating its rival, Antwerp. Preserving this monopoly was a Dutch priority, but this increasingly clashed with French aims in the Spanish Netherlands, which included reopening Antwerp.

William II of Orange's death in 1650 led to the First Stadtholderless Period, with political control vested in the urban patricians or Regenten. This maximised the influence of the States of Holland and Amsterdam, the power base of Johan de Witt, Grand Pensionary from 1653 to 1672. He viewed his relationship with Louis XIV of France as crucial for preserving Dutch economic power, but also to protect him from his domestic Orangist opponents.

Although France and the Republic concluded an assistance treaty in 1662, the States of Holland refused to support a division of the Spanish Netherlands, convincing Louis his objectives could only be achieved by force. The Dutch received limited French support during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667) but increasingly preferred a weak Spain as a neighbour to a strong France. Shortly after talks to end the Anglo-Dutch War began in May 1667, Louis launched the War of Devolution, rapidly occupying most of the Spanish Netherlands and Franche-Comté.

In July, the Treaty of Breda ended the Anglo-Dutch War, leading to talks between the Dutch and Charles II of England on a common diplomatic front against France. This was supported by Spain and Emperor Leopold, who was also concerned by French expansion. After his first suggestion of an Anglo-French alliance was rejected by Louis, Charles entered the 1668 Triple Alliance, between England, the Republic and Sweden. After the Alliance mediated between France and Spain, Louis relinquished many of his gains in the 1668 Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

While Breda and Aix-la-Chapelle were seen as Dutch diplomatic triumphs, they also presented significant dangers; De Witt himself was well aware of these, but failed to convince his colleagues. Louis considered the January 1668 Partition Treaty with Leopold confirmation of his right to the Spanish Netherlands, a point reinforced by Aix-la-Chapelle, despite his concessions. He no longer saw the need to negotiate, and decided their acquisition was best achieved by first defeating the Republic.

The Dutch also over-estimated their own power; defeat at Lowestoft in 1665 exposed the shortcomings of their navy and the federal command system, while the successful Raid on the Medway was largely due to English financial weakness. In 1667, the Dutch States Navy was at the height of its power, an advantage rapidly eroded by English and French naval expansion. The Anglo-Dutch War was primarily fought at sea, masking the poor state of the Dutch army and forts, deliberately neglected since they were viewed as bolstering the power of the Prince of Orange.

In preparation for an attack on the Republic, Louis embarked on a series of diplomatic initiatives, the first being the 1670 Secret Treaty of Dover, an Anglo-French alliance against the Dutch. It contained secret clauses not revealed until 1771, including the payment to Charles of £230,000 per year for providing a British brigade of 6,000. Agreements with the Bishopric of Münster and Electorate of Cologne allowed French forces to bypass the Spanish Netherlands, by attacking via the Bishopric of Liège, then a dependency of Cologne (see Map). Preparations were completed in April 1672, when Charles XI of Sweden accepted French subsidies in return for invading areas of Pomerania claimed by Brandenburg-Prussia.

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