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National Union Party (United States)

American Civil War-era political coalition

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Through American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln and President of the United States

Lincoln won the 1860 United States presidential election, polling 180 electoral votes and 53 percent of the popular vote in the free states; opposition to Lincoln was divided, with most Northern Democrats voting for the senior U.S. senator from Illinois, Stephen Douglas. Following his inauguration, Lincoln sought support from Douglas Democrats and Southern Unionists for his efforts to preserve the Union. He encouraged the formation of bipartisan Union coalitions in the loyal states that replaced the Republican Party throughout much of the Lower North. Besides allowing voters of diverse pre-war partisan allegiances to act collectively, the Union label served a valuable propaganda purpose by implying the coalition's opponents were dis-unionists.

The preeminent policy of the Union Party was the preservation of the Union by the prosecution of the war to its ultimate conclusion. They rejected proposals for a negotiated peace as humiliating and ultimately ruinous to the authority of the national government. The party's 1864 platform called for the abolition of slavery by constitutional amendment, a "liberal and just" immigration policy, completion of the transcontinental railroad, and condemned the French intervention in Mexico as dangerous to republicanism.

Background

Antebellum, 1850–59

Creation of a "Union Party" was proposed frequently in the decade preceding the American Civil War. During the presidency of Millard Fillmore, Daniel Webster and others envisioned the Union Party as a vehicle for political moderates to support the Compromise of 1850 against attacks from abolitionists and secessionist Fire-Eaters. The Union Party movement failed to displace the established party system; however, some state parties lingered into the 1850s. The decline and collapse of the Whig Party after 1854 prompted a national political realignment in which members of the anti-extensionist Free Soil Party joined Whig and Democratic opponents of the Kansas-Nebraska Act to organize the Republican Party on a broad antislavery basis. In the 1856 presidential election, the Republican candidate John C. Fremont polled a plurality of votes cast in the free states, making the Republicans the largest party in the North. However, a significant number of ex-Whigs, including various opponents of the Democrats in the slave states, remained aloof from the new Republican organization, in part because of the party's reputation for abolitionism. Many of these conservatives joined the Constitutional Union Party that nominated John Bell and Edward Everett in the 1860 presidential election. The Bell-Everett ticket carried the states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia, ran second in the remaining slave states, and claimed 14% of the popular vote in Massachusetts, but the Republicans won the votes of most former Whigs and thus the election.

Antebellum Americans were steeped in antiparty ideology, even as political parties played an essential role in the political culture of the nation. In the crisis of the 1850s, Revolutionary era warnings against the ill effects of factionalism in a republic attracted renewed attention and commentary. Observers frequently attributed rising sectionalism and radicalization to the work of unscrupulous party agitators whose reckless pursuit of power had brought the nation to the brink of destruction. These "ignorant, vicious, and corrupt" individuals sowed divisions amongst the electorate and substituted appeals to self-interest for concern for the general good. Simultaneously, the belief that the success of one's party was in the best interest of the survival of the nation naturally lent itself to the conclusion that partisan rivals were a threat to Union and republicanism. Calls for a "Union Party" appealed to both ideals by dissolving old party allegiances in favor of a coalition of all loyal citizens while identifying its opposition as disloyal and disunionist.

Secession Crisis, 1860–61

Lincoln's election precipitated the secession of 11 slave states between December 1860 and June 1861, plunging the nation into an unprecedented political crisis. Lincoln owed his election to conservative ex-Whigs in Indiana, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, who maintained a strained relationship with the Republican Party's radical wing. He received few votes in the border states and none in 10 states that later joined the Confederacy, where Douglas made a late appeal for unionist votes. Any attempt to restore national authority and mobilize support for the war effort would therefore require Lincoln to unite with those who shared his unionist orientation but could not be easily integrated within existing Republican organizations.

In the months between Lincoln's election and inauguration, conservatives implored the incoming administration to break with the Republican Party in order to facilitate an alliance with Southern moderates that could restore the Union and avert a civil war. They claimed that most white Southerners still opposed secession, but that the suspicion of abolitionism prevented them from cooperating with the Republican Party. A new conservative party would remove this obstacle by making preservation of the Union the only test of loyalty to the administration. At a dinner in honor of the French ambassador to the United States, William H. Seward, soon to be secretary of state in Lincoln's cabinet, charged attendees to renounce "all parties, all platforms of previous committals and whatever else will stand in the way of a restoration of the American Union." Seward and the conservatives believed that any attempt to restore the Union by force would alienate unionists in the slave states. Instead, they hoped to use the proposed Union Party as a vehicle to mobilize opposition to secession and secure reunion peacefully and on the basis of sectional compromise.

Lincoln, however, was unwilling for the Republican Party to follow the fate of the Whigs and alienate its supporters in the free states in pursuit of an alliance with Southern conservatives. During the winter of 1860–61, he intervened decisively to defeat the Crittenden Compromise, a set of proposed constitutional amendments that would have guaranteed the existence of slavery in perpetuity south of the 36°30′ line. This would have constituted an abandonment of the Republican platform pledge to oppose the extension of slavery into the U.S. territories, a reversal that Lincoln predicted would damn the Republican Party to be a "mere sucked egg, all shell and no principle in it." Rather than court conditional unionists, as Whig president Millard Fillmore had done in 1850, Lincoln sought to recruit unconditional unionists from the border states for positions in his administration. In his first inaugural address, the new president endorsed the proposed Corwin Amendment, which would have guaranteed slavery in the slave states, but not in the territories—an offer the secessionists had already rejected. While Lincoln and his advisors knew this compromise proposal could not be accepted, it allowed them to shift the onus for war to the secessionists and "meet Disunion as patriots rather than as partizans." In this way, Lincoln went about laying the foundation for a future Union Party that gave cover to border state unionists to affiliate with the administration without compromising his 1860 campaign pledge to oppose the admission of new slave states.

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