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History of the Russian Federation

History of Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union

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President Trump and President Putin posing for a photo during the 2025 Russia–United States Summit.
The White House · Public domain

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Through Russia, Soviet Union and Dissolution of the Soviet Union

The RSFSR was the largest of the fifteen republics that made up the USSR, accounting for over 60% of its GDP and over 50% of its population. Russians also dominated the Soviet military and the Communist Party. As such, the Russian Federation was widely accepted as the USSR's successor state in diplomatic affairs and it assumed the USSR's permanent membership and veto in the UN Security Council (see Russia and the United Nations).

Prior to the dissolution of the USSR, Yeltsin had been elected President of the RSFSR in June 1991 in the first direct presidential election in Russian history. This ensured that he would be the political leader of the Russian successor state following dissolution. This situation resulted in political turmoil as the Soviet and Russian leadership wrestled for control, which culminated in the 1991 August coup, where the Soviet military attempted to overthrow Mikhail Gorbachev. Although the coup was ultimately averted, this situation contributed to rising instability in the Soviet Union. As the USSR was on the verge of collapse by October 1991, Yeltsin announced that Russia would proceed with radical reforms, including shock therapy policies to introduce capitalism. This caused a sustained economic recession, and GDP per capita levels eventually returned to their 1991 levels by the mid-2000s. Following Yeltsin's resignation in December 1999, Russia's politics have since been dominated by Vladimir Putin, serving as either President or Prime Minister. Although the Russian economy has improved significantly under Putin's leadership following relative economic chaos under Yeltsin, Putin has also been widely accused of corruption, authoritarian leadership, and widespread human rights abuses. An authoritarian form of governance in Russia since 2000 has been called Putinism.

For the most part, the Russian armed forces were in near complete disarray by 1992, one year after dissolution. This degraded military effectiveness would become all too clear during the 1994 Chechen War, and in the interim posed significant practical challenges for global security and arms control. Under Russian leadership, the Lisbon Protocol ensured that former Soviet republics would disarm themselves of nuclear weapons. This affected Kazakhstan in particular, as it hosted a significant share of the world's nuclear weapons immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, the former Soviet republics were able to maintain transnational cooperation in other military areas, like establishing shared responsibility for the rocket and space infrastructure such as the Baikonur Cosmodrome.

Reforms

"Shock therapy"

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON and other treaties that served to bind its satellite states to the Soviet Union, the conversion of the world's largest state-controlled economy into a market-oriented economy would have been extraordinarily difficult regardless of the policies chosen. The policies chosen for this transition were (1) liberalization, (2) stabilization and (3) privatization. These policies were based on the Washington Consensus of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and Treasury Department.

On 2 January 1992, Yeltsin—acting as his own prime minister—enacted the most comprehensive components of economic reform by decree, thereby circumventing the Supreme Soviet of Russia and Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, which had been elected in March 1990, before the dissolution of the USSR. While this spared Yeltsin from the prospects of bargaining and wrangling with Soviet deputies, it also eliminated any meaningful discussion of the right course of action for the country.

The programs of liberalization and stabilization were designed by Yeltsin's deputy prime minister Yegor Gaidar, a liberal economist inclined toward radical reform, and widely known as an advocate of "shock therapy". Shock therapy was originally used in Bolivia by notable economist Jeffery Sachs to combat inflation in the 1980s. Having achieved some major successes in Bolivia, shock therapy was then imported to the Polish context following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Russia shortly after.

The partial results of liberalization (lifting price controls) included worsening already apparent hyperinflation, initially due to monetary overhang and exacerbated after the central bank, an organ under parliament, which was skeptical of Yeltsin's reforms, was short of revenue and printed money to finance its debt. This resulted in the near bankruptcy of much of Russian industry.

The process of liberalization would create winners and losers, depending on how particular industries, classes, age groups, ethnic groups, regions, and other sectors of Russian society were positioned. Some would benefit by the opening of competition; others would suffer. Among the winners were the new class of entrepreneurs and black marketeers that had emerged under Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika. But liberalizing prices meant that the elderly and others on fixed incomes would suffer a severe drop in living standards, and people would see a lifetime of savings wiped out.

With inflation at double-digit rates per month as a result of printing, macroeconomic stabilization was enacted to curb this trend. Stabilization, also called structural adjustment, is a harsh austerity regime (tight monetary policy and fiscal policy) for the economy in which the government seeks to control inflation. Under the stabilization program, the government let most prices float, raised interest rates to record highs, raised heavy new taxes, sharply cut back on government subsidies to industry and construction, and made massive cuts in state welfare spending. These policies caused widespread hardship as many state enterprises found themselves without orders or financing. A deep credit crunch shut down many industries and brought about a protracted depression.

The rationale of the program was to squeeze the built-in inflationary pressure out of the economy so that producers would begin making sensible decisions about production, pricing and investment instead of chronically overusing resources—a problem that resulted in shortages of consumer goods in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. By letting the market rather than central planners determine prices, product mixes, output levels, and the like, the reformers intended to create an incentive structure in the economy where efficiency and risk would be rewarded and waste and carelessness were punished. Removing the causes of chronic inflation, the reform architects argued, was a precondition for all other reforms: Hyperinflation would wreck both democracy and economic progress, they argued; they also argued that only by stabilizing the state budget could the government proceed to dismantle the Soviet planned economy and create a new capitalist Russia.

Nonetheless, radical reform continued to face some critical political barriers. The Central Bank was still subordinate to the conservative Supreme Soviet who continued to support socialist policies in opposition to Yeltsin and the presidency. During the height of hyperinflation in 1992–1993, the Central Bank actually tried to derail reforms by actively printing even more money during this period of inflation. After all, the Russian government was short of revenue and was forced to print money to finance its debt. As a result, inflation exploded into hyperinflation, and the Russian economy continued into an evermore serious slump.

Privatization

Upon the Soviet Union's collapse, the new Russian government was forced to manage the huge state enterprise sector inherited from the Soviet economy. Privatization was carried out by the State Committee for State Property Management of the Russian Federation under Anatoly Chubais with the primary goal being to transform the formerly state-owned enterprises into profit-seeking businesses, which would not be dependent on government subsidies for their survival. To distribute property quickly and to win over popular support, the reformers decided to rely mostly on the mechanism of free voucher privatization, which was earlier implemented in Czechoslovakia. The Russian government believed that the open sale of state-owned assets, as opposed to the voucher program, would have likely resulted in the further concentration of ownership among the Russian mafia and the nomenklatura, which they sought to avoid. Nevertheless, contrary to the government's expectations, insiders managed to acquire control over most of the assets, which remained largely dependent on government support for years to come. From 1992 to 1994, ownership of 15,000 firms was transferred from state control via the voucher program.

Privatization of the oil sector was regulated by presidential decree No.1403 approved on 17 November 1992. Vertically integrated companies were created by joining some oil-producing enterprises and refineries into open-stock companies. Starting in 1994 many former state oil companies were privatized. This privatization had been partial because the federal government had obtained ownership positions in several companies and had also retained full control over the transport of oil to lucrative world markets.

In 1995, facing severe fiscal deficit and in desperate need of funds for the 1996 presidential elections, the government of Boris Yeltsin adopted a "loans-for-share" scheme proposed by banker Vladimir Potanin and endorsed by Anatoly Chubais, then a deputy prime minister, whereby some of the largest state industrial assets (including state-owned shares in Norilsk Nickel, Yukos, Lukoil, Sibneft, Surgutneftegas, Novolipetsk Steel, and Mechel) were leased through auctions for money lent by commercial banks to the government. The auctions were rigged and lacked competition, being largely controlled by favored insiders with political connections or used for the benefit of the commercial banks themselves. As neither the loans nor the leased enterprises were returned in time, this effectively became a form of selling, or privatizing, state assets at very low prices.

The privatization facilitated the transfer of significant wealth to a relatively small group of business oligarchs and New Russians, particularly natural gas and oil executives.

Obstacles to reform

The former Soviet Union had to deal with a number of unique obstacles during the post-Soviet transition including political reform, economic restructuring and the redrawing of political boundaries. The discomfort associated with these changes was not felt the same in each former Soviet republic. As a general rule, states to Russia's west, such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, have fared slightly better than their eastern neighbors since the collapse of the Eastern bloc, while Russia itself and countries to Russia's east experienced greater difficulties and found themselves on worse footing immediately after dissolution. A major reason that Russia's transition has been so wrenching is that it is remaking both its Soviet-era political and economic institutions at once. In addition to institutional reforms designed to create a new political-economic system, Russia was also charged with remaking itself into a new national state following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The first major problem facing Russia was the legacy of the Soviet Union's enormous commitment to the Cold War. In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union devoted a quarter of its gross economic output to the defense sector (at the time most Western analysts believed that this figure was 15 percent). At the time, the military-industrial complex employed at least one of every five adults in the Soviet Union. In some regions of Russia, at least half of the workforce was employed in defense plants (the comparable U.S. figures were roughly one-sixteenth of gross national product and about one of every sixteen in the workforce). These over-reliance on the military sector made Russian industry and human capital relatively noncompetitive upon entry into a market-oriented system. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and the cutback in military spending affected industry quite dramatically making it difficult to quickly retool equipment, retrain workers, and find new markets. In the process of economic re-tooling, an enormous body of experience, qualified specialists and know-how was lost or misallocated, as the plants were sometimes switching from, for example, producing hi-tech military equipment to making kitchen utensils.

A second obstacle, partly related to the sheer vastness and geographical diversity of the Russian landmass, was the sizable number of "mono-industrial" regional economies (regions dominated by a single industrial employer) that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union. The concentration of production in a relatively small number of big state enterprises meant that many local governments were entirely dependent on the economic health of a single employer; when the Soviet Union collapsed and the economic ties between Soviet republics and even regions were severed, the production in the whole country dropped by more than fifty percent. Roughly half of Russia's cities had only one large industrial enterprise, and three fourths had no more than four. Consequently, the decrease in production caused tremendous unemployment and underemployment.

Thirdly, post-Soviet Russia did not inherit a system of state social security and welfare from the USSR. Instead the companies, mainly large industrial firms, were traditionally responsible for a broad range of social welfare functions—building and maintaining housing for their work forces, and managing health, recreational, educational, and similar facilities. The towns in contrast possessed neither the apparatus nor the funds for the provision of basic social services. Industrial employees were left heavily dependent on their firms. Thus, economic transformation created severe problems in maintaining social welfare since local governments were unable to assume finance or operational responsibility for these functions.

Finally, there is a human capital dimension to the failure of post-Soviet reforms in Russia. The former Soviet population was not necessarily uneducated. Literacy was nearly universal, and the educational level of the Soviet population was among the highest in the world with respect to science, engineering, and some technical disciplines, although the Soviets devoted little to what would be described as "liberal arts" in the West. With the move to a post-Communist system, the Russian university system collapsed. Rampant credential inflation in the Russian university system made it difficult for employers to determine who was really skilled and the problems of the higher education system more generally made it difficult to remedy other issues of human capital that came from the transition to a market-oriented system, such as upskilling and re-skilling. For example, former state enterprise managers were highly skilled at coping with the demands on them under the Soviet system of planned production targets, but discouraged the risk-and-reward centered behavior of market capitalism. These managers were responsible for a broad array of social welfare functions for their employees, their families, and the population of the towns and regions where they were located. Profitability and efficiency, however, were generally not the most prominent priorities for Soviet enterprise managers. Thus, almost no Soviet employees or managers had firsthand experience with decision-making in the conditions of a market economy.

Economic depression and mortality crisis

After the initial turmoil and euphoria of early marketizations, Russia's economy sank into deep depression by the mid-1990s due to botched reform efforts and low commodity prices globally but not before George H. W. Bush helped Yeltsin with "an unparalleled opportunity to change the nuclear posture of both the United States and the Soviet Union" and to end the Cold War peacefully with the Nunn–Lugar cash-for-weapons scheme, in order to avoid the worst of the dissolution of the vast Soviet technological empire. Russia's economy was hit further by the financial crash of 1998 before experiencing a modest recovery in 1999–2000 as commodity prices began to rise again. According to Russian government statistics, the economic decline was far more severe than the Great Depression was in the United States in terms of gross domestic product.

In 1995, a little over 3% of the work force was officially registered as unemployed, but, in addition to the technically jobless, 4.4% of the labour force were working only part time, while a further 3.9% had been sent on involuntary leave. Also millions of Russians turned up for work each day, but were not paid by the employers. If all these categories of jobless, semi-employed and unpaid workers were taken into account, the 18% Russian unemployment figure cited in June 1995 by labour market expert Tatyana Maleva of the Institute of Economic Analysis seemed real. With unemployment benefits sufficient only to buy a small loaf of bread each day, trying to survive without some other income was not an option for those who lost jobs. They were toiling during the warmer months to grow food in family vegetable plots, selling newspapers or lottery tickets on the streets, busking, begging, turning to prostitution. Often they sank into the criminal underworld.

In 1997, at least 98,400 companies were defaulting on payments to employees. It was estimated that one out of four Russian workers, or close on 20 million people, were not paid for months. Some were paid "in kind": for example, women workers were paid in brassieres and shoes that they resold in the streets, workers of Moskvich, the auto plant in Moscow, were paid in spare parts, those of the Ivanovo textile plants were paid in bedsheets, and those of the Gus-Khrustalny porcelain factory were paid in crystal and ceramic vases.

By way of a domestic comparison, the post-Soviet economic decline was about half as severe as the economic catastrophe borne out of the immediate consequence of World War I, the fall of Tsarism, and the Russian Civil War.

Following the economic collapse of the early 1990s, Russia suffered from a sharp increase in the rates of poverty and economic inequality. Estimates by the World Bank based on both macroeconomic data and surveys of household incomes and expenditures indicate that whereas 1.5% of the population was living in poverty (defined as income below the equivalent of $25 per month) in the late Soviet era, by mid-1993 between 39% and 49% of the population was living in poverty. Per capita incomes fell by another 15% by 1998, according to government figures.

Public health indicators show a dramatic corresponding decline. Although all post-Soviet countries experience an immediate decline in birth-rates due to economic turmoil this may have been particularly acute in Russia. In 1999, total population fell by about three-quarters of a million people. Meanwhile, life expectancy dropped for men from 64 years in 1990 to 57 years by 1994, while women's dropped from 74 to about 71. Both health factors and a sharp increase in deaths of the youth demographic from unnatural causes (such as murders, suicides, and accidents) have significantly contributed to this trend. Closely related to the declining life expectancy, alcohol-related deaths skyrocketed 60% in the 1990s and deaths from infectious and parasitic diseases shot up 100%, mainly because medicines were no longer affordable to the poor. The mortality crisis resulted in approximately 1.6 million excess deaths during 1990–1995 when compared to earlier levels. During 1998–2001, the excessive rate of mortality was predominantly represented by suicide, traffic incidents, homicide, unintentional alcohol poisoning and falls. Mortality was lower in areas where privatisation was more gradual, with this effect continuing into the 2000s.

While the opening of the Russian market to imports in the early 1990s meant the nation no longer suffered from the supply shortages of consumer goods that was often characteristic of the USSR (see Consumer goods in the Soviet Union), the relative impoverishment of the Russian people during this time meant only a limited number saw any significant benefit. Russians on fixed incomes (the vast majority of the workforce) saw their purchasing power drastically reduced, so while the stores might have been well stocked in the Yeltsin era, average people could now afford to buy little, if anything from these stores. By 2011, the average income has risen to more than $700 per month, emblematic of the mild recovery in recent years largely due to high oil prices. The growing revenue, however, has not been evenly distributed. Social inequality has risen sharply since the 1990s with the Gini coefficient, for example, reaching 42% by the end of 2010. Russia's income disparities are now nearly as large as Brazil (which has long been a world leader in the area) while regional disparities in the level of poverty continue to trend upwards.

Backlash

Structural reform and a severe devaluation of the ruble lowered the standard of living for most segments of the Russian population. As a result, there was powerful political opposition to reform. Democratization opened the political channels for venting these frustrations, which translated into votes for anti-reform candidates, especially those of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and its allies in the Duma. Russian voters, able to vote for opposition parties in the 1990s, often rejected economic reforms and yearned for the stability and personal security of the Soviet era. These were the groups that had enjoyed the benefits of Soviet-era state-controlled wages and prices, high state spending to subsidize priority sectors of the economy, protection from competition with foreign industries, and welfare entitlement programs. During the Yeltsin years in the 1990s, these anti-reformist groups were well organized, voicing their opposition to reform through strong trade unions, associations of directors of state-owned firms, and political parties in the popularly elected parliament whose primary constituencies were among those vulnerable to reform. A constant theme of Russian history in the 1990s was the conflict between economic reformers and those hostile to the new capitalism.

In the 1990s, former Soviet bureaucrats, factory directors, aggressive businessmen and criminal organizations used insider deals, bribery and simple brute force in order to grab lucrative assets, which were previously state-owned. Russia's new "capitalists" spent millions of dollars for protection. However, almost every business in Russia, from curbside vendors to huge oil and gas companies, made payments to the organized crime for protection ("krysha"). Businessmen said that they needed the "krysha" because the laws and the court system were not functioning properly in Russia. The only way for them to enforce a contract was to turn to a criminal "krysha". They also used it to intimidate competitors, collect debts or take over new markets. It was also increasingly common for businesses to turn to the "red krysha" — corrupt police who ran protection rackets. Within this system, a sharp rise in contract killings developed.

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