Lably
Skip to content

Hizb ut-Tahrir

Pan-Islamist and fundamentalist organization

  • 87 min read
  • 6 chapters

Related on Lably

Through Caliphate, State (polity) and Arabs

Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1953 as a political organization in then-Jordanian-controlled Jerusalem by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, a Palestinian Islamic scholar from Haifa who was educated in Egypt and served as a qadi (religious court judge) in Mandatory Palestine. He formulated a program and a "draft constitution" for the establishment of a Caliphate. The organization sees world history as an eternal conflict between Islam and non-believers, with the state system considered a historical assault on Islam. The group views Jihad as an essential aspect of its vision and considers it an imperative duty aimed at combating disbelief until all submit to Islamic rule, making no distinction between the violent and spiritual dimensions of Jihad. As an initial step, HT directs attention to the 'near enemy', advocating the removal of rulers "pretending to be Muslims", a step they consider a prerequisite for the global spread of Islam.

Since 1953, Hizb ut-Tahrir has spread to more than 50 countries, and has a membership estimated to be between "tens of thousands" to "about one million". Hizb ut-Tahrir is active in Western countries, including the UK, and also in several Arab and Central Asian countries despite being banned by some governments. Members typically meet in small private study circles, but in countries where the group is not illegal, it also engages with the media and organizes rallies and conferences. The organization's leadership is centered in Jordan, with additional headquarters in London. This dual presence leverages the relative freedom in Europe to oversee activities in Muslim nations where HT faces more stringent restrictions.

Hizb ut-Tahrir has been banned in Bangladesh, China, Russia, Pakistan, India, Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Kazakhstan and "across Central Asia", Indonesia, Australia, and all Arab countries except Lebanon, Yemen and the UAE. In July 2017, the Indonesian government revoked Hizb ut-Tahrir's legal status, citing incompatibility with government regulations on extremism and national ideology.

Goals, methods, and organization

Hizb ut-Tahrir states its aim as unification of all Muslim countries (or as it calls them "Islamic lands") over time in a unitary Islamic state or caliphate, headed by a caliph elected by Muslims. This, it holds, is an obligation decreed by God, warning that Allah will punish those Muslims "who neglect this duty". Once established, the caliphate will expand into non-Muslim areas, through "invitation" and through military jihad, so as to expand the land of Islam and diminish the land of unbelief. To "achieve its objective" HT seeks "to gain the leadership of the Islamic community" so that the community will "accept it as her [the community's] leader, to implement Islam upon her and proceed with it in her struggle against the Kuffar (unbelievers) and in the work towards the return of the Islamic State".

The nature of the "Islamic state"/caliphate/khilafah is spelled out in a detailed program and "draft constitution" which notes the caliphate being a unitary state,, opposing federalism in the process, run by a caliph acting as head of state elected by Muslims. Other specified features include: "The currency of the State is to be restricted to gold and silver"—article 163; "every male Muslim, fifteen years and over, is obliged to undergo military training"—article 56; "Arabic is the language of Islam and the sole language of the State"—article 8; in marriage the wife is "obliged to obey her husband" and the husband "to provide"—article 116, in schools "the weekly lessons of Islamic disciplines and Arabic language must be equal to the lessons of all other sciences in terms of number and time"—article 173. Such things as copyrights on educational materials (article 175), military treaties (article 185), and memberships by the state in secular international organizations (article 186) are forbidden by the constitution. In addition to the constitution, "many detailed books" expand on the HT ideology and "method of work", according to its 2010 Information pack.

Although hizb means party in Arabic, in the countries where Hizb ut-Tahrir is active it has not registered as a political party or attempted to elect candidates to political office, although it did early in its history. Hizb ut-Tahrir put forward candidates for office in Jordan in the 1950s when it was first formed and before it was banned, according to Suha Taji-Farouki. Kyrgyz Hizb ut-Tahrir members campaigned unsuccessfully for an affiliated candidate in Kyrgyzstan's national presidential election in July 2005, and have participated in municipal elections where their followers have won in a number of regions. Olivier Roy describes the strategy as a "global, grassroots revolution, culminating in a sudden, millenarian victory", as opposed to a slog through a political process "that risks debasing the Koran and perpetuating the ummah's subjugation to the West".

The party plans its political progress in three stages, taking after the process "by which the Prophet Muhammad established the Caliphate in thirteen years". According to an analyst of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kazakhstan, where the group is outlawed: "First they convert new members. Secondly, they establish a network of secret cells, and finally, they try to infiltrate the government to work to legalize their party and its aims." A more sympathetic description of this strategy is that Hizb ut-Tahrir works to:

  1. Establish groups of elite citizens as a community of Hizb ut-Tahrir members who carry the da'wah to Muslim societies to support an Islamic state. Members should accept the goals and methods of the organization as their own and be ready to work to fulfill these goals. (This process of building a party attempts to copy Muhammad's work in Mecca where he built a core of supporters.)
  2. Build public opinion among the Muslim masses for the caliphate and the other Islamic concepts that will lead to a revival of Islamic thought. (This process of what the party calls "intellectual transformation through political and cultural interaction", attempts to imitate Muhmmad's using his core of supporters to win over the population of Mecca and later Medina.) "Stage two involves penetration into government positions and military special forces", according to HT critic Zeyno Baran. For some members this will involve "drink[ing] alcohol and chang[ing] their behavior in other ways to blend in with secular elites".
  3. The government would be replaced by one that implements Islam "generally and comprehensively", carrying Islamic thought to people throughout the world.

HT has for many years made use of the Internet to propagate its message. It changes messages frequently, and uses a number of languages. As of 2004, there were at least seven websites related directly to HT.

HT talks about a "bloodless" coup, or nussrah, for the facilitation of "a change of the government". In one document ('Our Method'), it states, "we consider that Islamic law forbids violence or armed struggle against the regime as a method to reestablish the Islamic State." A 2004 report by the Nixon Center states that "credible reports" indicate that HT members have been "involved in coup attempts in Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia and Iraq". According to HT, once one or more Muslim countries come under the organization's control (such as Pakistan, Indonesia or a country in Central Asia) this will create a base; subsequently, other Muslim countries will be convinced to join and a "domino effect" will be created to establish a new caliphate.

Researchers and scholars have described HT as a vanguard party (David Commins and Zeyno Baran) or as seeming to be "less interested in a broad mass following than a smaller more committed core of members" (BBC). The "About Us" section of the Hizb ut-Tahrir official website states "Hizb ut-Tahrir is determined to work within the Ummah in order to implement Islam and achieve its objective by endeavouring to gain the leadership of the Islamic Ummah so that she could accept it as her leader, to implement Islam upon her and proceed with it in her struggle against the Kuffar". But according to a former leader in the UK, Jalaluddin Patel, once the caliphate has been established, HT "will never assume the role of a vanguard party".

In countries where the party is outlawed, Hizb ut-Tahrir's organization is said to be strongly centralized, with its central leadership based in the Palestinian Territories. To avoid infiltration by security agents and maintain ideological coherence in a pyramid-like group, the party enforces internal discipline and obedience to the central leadership. The party "tolerates no internal dissent". A range of disciplinary measures are applied to members who break the rules, with expulsion being the most severe. The network of underground cells resembles that of the successful Bolshevik revolutionaries in Russia. At the top is the central committee (lajnat al-qiyada) of the international party, and the supreme leader (Amir). The main committee or agency is tasked with taking power to re-establish the caliphate by establishing contacts with "the centers of power such as the army and the political leaders". This agency is "the most secretive", and "reports directly" to the "Amir".

Organizationally below its center are national organizations or wilayas (which actually means "province" since HT believes that nation states are un-Islamic; the only "nation" is the Islamic community), "usually headed by a group of 12, control networks of local committees and cells". Wilayas have an executive committee charged with managing administrative affairs which is elected every two years by the membership of the party in the wilaya. At the provincial level, there is a committee headed by a provincial representative (Mu'tamad) who oversees group activities. The Mu'tamad is appointed by the central committee.

The basic unit of the party is a cell of five members, the leader of which is the mushrif. The mushrif leads a study-circle, teaches HT ideology, and organizes readings from books by Nabhani, particularly Nidham al-Islam, or the System of Islam, which lay out his vision of an 'Islamic' state" and refutes other Arab political ideologies. Where the party is not legal, only the mushrif knows the names of members of other cells. A candidate for membership swears an oath of loyalty (qasam)

In the name of Allah, I swear to protect Islam and to maintain fidelity to it; I swear to accept and follow goals, ideas and principles of HT in words and deeds; I swear to recognize the rightness of the party leadership's actions; I swear to carry out even those decisions of the party leaders that I find objectionable; I swear to direct all my energies for the realization of the party program. Allah is the Witness of my words.

According to one study, little is known of how HT funds its activities thanks to the party's "clandestine modus operandi". In Western countries, members who have jobs contribute part of their income, possibly as much as 10 percent. In Muslim countries funding may or may not come from Iran, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia.

Because it is banned in most Muslim-majority countries but legal throughout Western countries, the group differs from most Salafi organizations in being "more self-conscious, adaptive and sensitive to Western culture" despite its resolute opposition to that culture.

HT has been called "secretive and hierarchical" by a former member. It uses "cover names for reserving venues, publishing propaganda and even carrying out political activity" even where it is legal. At least one former member has complained that the HT "party philosophy" and practice of referring to its study groups as halaqa—despite the fact they are studying leader Nabhani's writings and not the Quran—makes Nabhani's work "synonymous with the Quran", and that "the cult-like structure of the organisation [makes] this difficult" for young recruits to see. While one media pack published by HT emphasizes that membership "is open to all Muslim men and women regardless of their nationality, race or school of thought", critics complain of the party's need for "absolute, unequivocal acceptance of the Movement's dogma", its ignoring of spiritual aspects of Islam, and discouraging of free airing of views or "challenging statements".

The party principle of overthrowing existing Muslim governments has been questioned as a violation of the ayah:

Obey God, obey His prophet, and obey those in authority over you.

— Quran 4:59

This is supported by "several notable scholars"—according to Mateen Siddiqui—such as Ibn Nujaym, Al-Bahjouri, and Abu Hanifa. Critics also note a pattern of "a brief spell of support" followed by "failure to take power" in HT's more than 50 years of agitation.

Sign in to keep reading

5 more chapters are free with a Lably account.

More in Politics and economics