Illiberal democracy · Lablypedia

The rulers of an illiberal democracy may disregard, circumvent, or undermine constitutional limits on their power. Whereas liberal democracies safeguard individual rights and freedoms, illiberal democracies may fail to do so, or such rights may be significantly restricted or gradually eroded. Elections in an illiberal democracy are often manipulated, rigged, or lopsided, whether overtly or subtly, legitimising and consolidating the incumbent rather than genuinely choosing the country's leaders and policies. Illiberalism rejects rational discourse, instead promoting intolerance, fear of difference, the cult of force, discipline, and moral authority. Illiberal constitutions are generally anti-pluralist and anti-institutionalist.

Some scholars have challenged the view that illiberal democracies are genuine democracies, contending that liberal principles and democracy are inseparable and that elections cannot be considered free and fair without freedom of the press and speech. Other theorists contend that classifying illiberal democracy as democratic is overly sympathetic to such regimes, and therefore prefer terms such as electoral authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism, or soft authoritarianism.

Origin and usage of the term

Antiquity to the 20th century

Elements of illiberalism date back to Plato's embrace of an illiberal social order, with democracy viewed as inferior to monarchy and aristocracy. Since antiquity, the terms liberal and illiberal lacked any connection with democracy and political government until the French Revolution, and were instead used to describe the noble or ignoble personal qualities of individuals. In the eighteenth century, liberal came to be viewed as character traits of an enlightened gentleman, associated with reasonableness, politeness, open-mindedness, and tolerance; whereas illiberal was described as being ungenerous, mean, narrow-minded, bigoted, and offensive. For example, Lord Chesterfield wrote: "Whenever you write Latin, remember that every word or phrase which you make use of, but cannot find in Caesar, Cicero, Livy, Horace, Virgil; and Ovid, is bad, illiberal Latin." By the 20th century, liberalism was primary viewed in a European context, eventually becoming Americanized and associated with liberal democracy. While totalitarian regimes during the 1930s and 1940s criticized liberalism, they did not embrace the label of "illiberal democracy," partly due to its prior negative connotations, although anti-totalitarian critics soon came to use the term.

Modern usage

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to Francis Fukuyama's influential book The End of History and the Last Man, announcing that the last "beacon of illiberal forces" in the world had been extinguished and that Western-style liberalism was ascendant through Americanization, liberalization, and globalization. The modern term and concept of illiberal democracy derives from the 1995 book Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia. Challenging Fukuyama's thesis that political history was culminating in the global rule of capitalist liberal democracy, the book countered that Pacific Asia was not converging on liberal democracy but had instead taken an illiberal turn. Political philosopher Daniel A. Bell contributed a chapter on Confucianism as offering an alternative, illiberal approach to democracy.

The term illiberal democracy was used and popularized by in a 1997 article in the journal Foreign Affairs. According to its author, illiberal democracies were "democratically elected regimes often re-elected or reinforced by referendums that ignored the constitutional limits of their power and deprived their citizens of basic rights and liberties." He stated that in the West, electoral democracy and civil liberties (of speech, religion, etc.) go hand in hand, but that around the world, the two concepts were coming apart. According to this observation, democracy without constitutional liberalism was producing centralized regimes, the erosion of liberty, ethnic competition, conflict, and war. Recent scholarship has addressed why elections, institutions commonly associated with liberalism and freedom, have led to such negative outcomes in illiberal democracies. Hybrid regimes are political systems in which the mechanism for determining access to state office combines both democratic and autocratic practices. In hybrid regimes, freedoms exist, and the opposition is allowed to legally compete in elections, but the system of checks and balances becomes inoperative.

By the decade after the Cold War, a rise in right-wing nationalist and populist parties began openly declaring themselves against liberal democracy. Beginning in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe, political scientists Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes described the emergence of an "illiberal counter-revolution". Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, gave an often cited speech in 2014 where he proclaimed Hungary an illiberal democracy, stating that "a democracy does not necessarily have to be liberal" and that "the new state we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state." Modern advocates of illiberal democracy insist they are more democratic than others, and generally define themselves as being against liberal democracy, the West, and the United States. Vladimir Putin of Russia is an outspoken critic of liberalism, with him and Orban described as redefining it in ways that suit their agendas by equating it with multiculturalism, immigration, and LGBTQ rights. The election of Donald Trump saw a large increase in scholarly research about illiberalism, what it means, and heavy debates on whether or not America is on the road to fascism.

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Definition

Scholars have generally criticized the claim that illiberal democracies are democracies, arguing that liberal principles and democracy cannot be separated and that without freedom of the press and speech, elections cannot truly be free and fair. According to jurist András Sajó, illiberal democracy should be counted as a type of democracy because it is "democratic in a plebiscitarian sense". Other theorists say that classifying illiberal democracy as democratic is overly sympathetic to the illiberal regimes, and therefore prefer terms such as electoral authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism, or soft authoritarianism.

Contemporary usage of illberalism indicates an opposition to liberalism or liberal democracy. Fritz Stern, a historian of Germany, understood illiberalism as an anti-democratic mentality, and anti-democratic practices such as suffrage restrictions. Marlène Laruelle defines illiberalism as a backlash against modern liberalism. According to her, illiberalism is "majoritarian, nation-centric or sovereigntist, favouring traditional hierarchies and cultural homogeneity", calling for "a shift from politics to culture and is post-post-modern in its claims of rootedness in an age of globalization". Zsolt Enyedi defines illiberalism as opposition to the main principles of liberal democracy: limited government, open society, and state neutrality. He distinguishes between authoritarian, populist, traditionalist, religious, paternalist, libertarian, nativist-nationalist, materialist, and left-wing varieties.

Types

There is a spectrum of illiberal democracies: from those that are nearly liberal democracies to those that are almost openly dictatorships. One proposed method of determining whether a regime is an illiberal democracy is to determine whether "it has regular, free, fair, and competitive elections to fill the principal positions of power in the country, but it does not qualify as Free in Freedom House's annual ratings of civil liberties and political rights." A 2008 article by Rocha Menocal, Fritz and Rakner describes the emergence of illiberal democracies and discusses some of their shared characteristics. Rocha Menocal, Fritz, and Rakner try to draw the similarity between illiberal democracies and hybrid regimes. The authors make the case that the "democratic optimism" in the 1990s—following the collapse of the Soviet Union—has led to the emergence of hybrid regimes holding illiberal values. Initially, the Western powers assumed that democratic consolidation would occur automatically and disregarded the alternatives. In reality, the non-consolidation of democracy has led to the rise of hybrid regimes that possess "illiberal values".

Regime type is important for illiberal democracies. This is because illiberal democracies can rise from both consolidated liberal democracies and authoritarian states. Zakaria initially wrote his paper using the term illiberal democracy interchangeably with pseudo-autocracies but today they are used to describe countries that are potentially democratically backsliding as well.

According to Marlène Laruelle, there are "significant differences between illiberalism and conservatism" as it has been "traditionally understood".

The key element that dissociates illiberalism from conservatism is its relationship to political liberalism. Classical conservatives – such as the Christian Democrats in Europe or the Republican Party in the U.S. before Donald Trump – are/were fervent supporters of political rights and constitutionalism, while illiberalism challenges them. For classical conservatives, the political order is a reflection of the natural and family order, and therefore commands some submission to it. For illiberals, today’s political order is the enemy of the natural order and should be fought against.

Author Jennifer Gandhi says that many autocrats allow elections in their governance to stabilize and reinforce their regimes. She first says that elections help leaders resolve threats from elites and from the masses by appeasing those capable of usurping power with money and securing the cooperation of the general public with political concessions. Gandhi also claims that illiberal elections serve other useful purposes, such as providing autocrats with information about their citizens and establishing legitimacy both domestically and in the international community, and that these varied functions must be elucidated in future research. One example of the regime durability provided by illiberal democracy is illustrated in Mubarak's Egyptian regime. Lisa Blaydes shows that under Mubarak's lengthy rule, elections provided a mechanism through which elites bought votes to support the government (through distributing needed goods and resources to the public) to acquire regime-enforced parliamentary immunity. This enabled them to accumulate illicit wealth and draw from state resources without legal consequence. Such research suggests that, given the stability-providing function of illiberal elections, states governed under illiberal democracies may have low prospects for a transition to a democratic system protected by constitutional liberties.

In order to discourage this problem and promote the development of liberal democracies with free and fair elections, Zakaria proposes that the international community and the United States must promote gradual liberalization of societies. Zakaria advances institutions like the World Trade Organization, the Federal Reserve System, and a check on power in the form of the judiciary, to promote democracy and limit the power of the people, which can be destructive. Illiberal democratic governments may believe they have a mandate to act in any way they see fit as long as they hold regular elections. Lack of liberties, such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, makes opposition extremely difficult. The rulers may centralize power between the branches of the central government and the local government (exhibiting no separation of powers). Media are often controlled by the state and strongly support the regime. Non-governmental organizations may face onerous regulations or simply be prohibited. The regime may use red tape, economic pressure, imprisonment or violence against its critics. Zakaria believes that constitutional liberalism can bring democracy, but not vice versa.

Relationship with populism

With the different types and different examples of illustrations discussed, a key component in the rise of illiberal democracies today is populism. Current populist leaders—especially within Western states—have the tendency to promote illiberal values, a notable example being the exclusion of immigrants and openly xenophobic statements. This wave has been labeled as "xenophobic populism".

Authors Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser discuss the role of populism in deteriorating liberal democracies. In the article, Mudde and Kaltwasser argue that populism—although it is often associated with negative connotations—is democratic in nature, as it gives voice to the people and strongly upholds the principle of majoritarian rule. The problem arises within liberal democracies, as the authors say that liberal values and democracy internally contradict each other. Democracy promises majoritarian rule while liberal values promise the protection of minorities. Furthermore, it is said that populism is a product of democracy, but in general, populist leaders try to use the democratic aspect of liberal democracies to undermine liberalism. This is closely related to Zakaria's argument. The authors try to establish the idea that the rise of populism is undermining liberal values, as populism at its core rejects plurality and minority protection, often the evident liberal values.

Moreover, Sheri Berman supports the idea that democracy being unchecked by liberalism can lead to populist—and in some regards dangerous—rule, but further says that liberal values unchecked by democracy can be just as dangerous, as she says, through the use of historical examples, this can lead to oligarchic rule. Berman takes a different perspective on the role of populism, arguing that the weakening of democratic institutions, rather than populism itself, has led to its rise and the deterioration of liberal democracies. When discussing this matter, Berman through the example of Western states—United States and Europe—has attributed the cause of populist backlash to national government disregarding the interests of average citizens for business elites. In sum, Berman is trying to demonstrate that populism has led to the rise of illiberal democracies, while populism has gained traction as a result of democratic institutions being too elite-led.

While populism is closely associated with the rise of illiberal democracy, religious fundamentalism, radical nationalism, and communitarianism are also common paths.

Cases of illiberalism

Hungary

In a 2014 speech, after winning re-election for the first time, Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary described his views about the future of Hungary as an "illiberal state". In his interpretation the "illiberal state" does not reject the values of the liberal democracy, rather modern social liberalism, calling it corrupt and unfair and states that the country should work as a community. Orbán listed Singapore, Russia, Turkey, and China as examples of economically "successful" nations, "none of which is liberal and some of which aren’t even democracies."

Slovakia

In 1995 Slovak journalists coined the term "Democracy of the Carpathian type" to describe the illiberal democracy of Vladimír Mečiar's government in the 1990s. Today, the term is often used in connection with the policies of Robert Fico's government, which has been criticised for censorship of criticism of government politicians in media, abolition of the special prosecutor's office, politically motivated abolition of the Radio and Television of Slovakia by Slovak Television and Radio, unjustified exchanges in various expert positions, the cover-up of the accident of government politician Andrej Danko, etc. The previous cabinet of Robert Fico was accused of organised corruption and some politicians were directly or indirectly linked to the kidnapping of Vietnamese businessman Trịnh Xuân Thanh and to the assassination of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée.

India

Indian-American journalist Fareed Zakaria claimed that India was the largest illiberal democracy in the world, in his book The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.

Turkey

In a 2015 CNN reportage, Zakaria said that Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had become a textbook case of illiberal democracy. Erik Meyersson observed that using Freedom House’s measure of liberty, Turkey took the last place among electoral democracies in 2015, scoring worse on the liberty measure than some countries that are not even considered electoral democracies.

Philippines

Since 2016, the Philippines under presidents Rodrigo Duterte and Bongbong Marcos has been described as being in an illiberal democracy. It has been described as a worldwide capital and stronghold of illiberalism culturally and politically.

United States

In America, some academics have criticized American liberalism for not being liberal enough and living up to its professed values, with critics deriding this as "cancel culture" and a form of illiberalism. Other right-wing thinkers such as Patrick Deneen have openly criticized liberalism, instead arguing for replacing it with a new form of illiberal government. The Republican Party has in recent years faced criticism that it is becoming increasingly illiberal under the leadership of Donald Trump, who was elected president in 2016 and 2024. According to a 2020 study by the V-Dem Institute, the Republican Party has become more illiberal and populist in the last decade with a large increase under the leadership of Donald Trump. Trump's populist style of governance has been considered by some to be a dangerous risk to the heart of liberal democracy, as well as indifference towards traditional democratic allies and praising other "strongman rulers" in the world like Vladimir Putin.

South Korea

South Korea is often cited as a model case of successful democratization since 1987. According to indicators from Freedom House and the Electoral Integrity Project, it has established a procedurally sound and high-quality electoral democracy. However, many political scientists analyze that South Korea remains in a systematically 'defective' state, lacking core elements of constitutional liberalism such as the rule of law, civil liberties, and the separation of powers—particularly horizontal accountability. This 'deficit of liberalism' was highlighted in the V-Dem Institute’s 2024 Democracy Report, which classified South Korea as a country undergoing autocratization on a 'Bell-Turn' trajectory, with its democracy score peaking around 2018 and subsequently declining.

Scholars attribute this liberal deficit to both institutional and historical factors. Institutionally, the country's 'imperial presidency' is viewed as lacking horizontal accountability, while the winner-take-all electoral system is described by some analyses as reinforcing political polarization. Historically, it is argued by some scholars that the legacy of the Cold War and the anti-communist '1948 system' contributed to a political culture that often disregards liberal values such as freedom of speech and freedom of association, a tendency described as being observed across both conservative and progressive political camps. South Korea was ranked 62nd in the 2024 Press Freedom Index, and its ranking has stagnated in the World Bank’s Rule of Law indicator.

Within this structural context, scholars describe the Moon Jae-in administration (2017–2022) as a 'populist moment' that challenged liberal norms through 'fandom politics' and a weakening of institutional forbearance. Critics further argue that the subsequent Yoon Suk Yeol administration (2022–2025) has intensified democratic regression through a 'rule by law' approach—mobilizing state institutions such as the prosecution and police against critical media outlets including KBS, MBC, and JTBC.

Criticism

Writers such as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way reject the concept of an illiberal democracy, saying it only "muddies the waters" on the basis that if a country does not have opposition parties and an independent media, it is not democratic. They say that terms like "illiberal democracy" are inappropriate for some of these states because the term implies that these regimes are at their heart democracies that have gone wrong. Levitsky and Way say that states such as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milošević, Zimbabwe and post-Soviet Russia were never truly democratic and not developing toward democracy, but were rather tending toward authoritarian behavior despite having elections, which were sometimes sharply contested. Thus, Levitsky and Way coined a new term to remove the positive connotation of democracy from these states and distinguish them from flawed or developing democracies: competitive authoritarianism. However, the term competitive authoritarianism has been criticized for bluring the line between genuine and rigged elections and equating countries that actually operated as competitive and pluralistic systems (e.g. Hungary under Viktor Orbán or Turkey under Erdogan) with countries that retained the appearance of democracy but treated it as a fully fictional theatre (e.g. Belarus under Lukashenko)

According to Wojciech Sadurski, "illiberal democracy is largely an oxymoron" in Poland under Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, because "[b]y dismantling various checks and balances, and the many democratic institutions related to elections and judicial review, the ruling party greatly weakens the democratic character of the state". Sadurski prefers the term "plebiscitarian authoritarianism".

In 1998, author Marc Plattner said that democracy and liberalism have a turbulent relationship, where throughout history they constantly repel and attract one another. Plattner believes that the rise of illiberal democracies is merely part of a democratization cycle, where states democratizing will often shift from liberal to illiberal tendencies. From this, Plattner believes that through the careful assistance of consolidated democracies these 'illiberal democracies' can slowly push themselves out of this cycle.

According to a study by George Washington University political scientist Michael K. Miller, multiparty autocratic elections predict significantly better outcomes on health, education, gender equality, and basic freedoms relative to non-electoral autocracy. Effects on health and education are as strong as those of democracy and are significantly better than in non-electoral autocracy.