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Jain philosophy

Indian philosophical tradition within Jainism

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Through Jainism, Philosophy and Nirvana

Lab · Class 6–12Buddhist Art at Sanchi

Jain texts discuss numerous philosophical topics such as cosmology, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, ontology, the philosophy of time, and soteriology. Jain thought is primarily concerned with understanding the nature of living beings, how these beings are bound by the processes of karma (which are seen as fine material particles) and how living beings may be liberated (moksha) from the cycle of death and rebirth (saṃsāra). A peculiarity of Jainism is to essentially associate several renunciatory liberating practices with the imperative of non-violence (ahiṃsā). Jainism and its philosophical system are also notable for the belief in a beginning-less and cyclical universe, which posits a non-theistic understanding of the world and the complete rejection of a hypothetical creator deity. Jain philosophy is also noted for its "realist epistemology" of anekāntavāda ("many-sidedness"), a rejection of all simplistic and one-sided views of truth and reality.

From the Jain point of view, Jain philosophy is eternal and has been taught numerous times in the remote past by the great enlightened tirthankaras ("ford-makers"). Historians trace the developments of Jain thought to a few key historically verifiable figures in ancient India, Parshvanatha (c. 9th or 8th century BCE) and Mahāvīra (c. 6th century BCE, older contemporary of Gautama Buddha). According to Paul Dundas, Jain metaphysical doctrine has remained relatively stable throughout its long history and no major radical doctrinal shift has taken place at least since the 4th or 5th century CE. This is mainly because of the influence of Umaswati's Tattvārthasūtra, which has remained the central authoritative philosophical text among all Jains.

Knowledge

According to Ācārya Pujyapada's Sarvārthasiddhi, the ultimate good for a living being (jīva) is liberation from the cyclical world of reincarnation (saṃsāra). The attainment of liberation is also associated with omniscience, and it is believed that past Jain sages like Mahavira have achieved omniscience.

According to the Tattvārthasūtra, the means to achieve liberation is threefold (this is known as the three jewels):

Right vision, right knowledge, and right conduct (together) constitute the path to liberation.

— Tattvārthasūtra (1–1)

According to the Sarvārthasiddhi,

  • Right Vision (Samyak Darśana) is defined as "seeing based on true knowledge of the tattvas (substances, realities). A person with Samyak Darshan always identifies himself as a pure soul, separate from body" Right Vision is attained by right knowledge.
  • Right Knowledge (Samyak Jnāna) is defined as "knowing the tattvas such as the jīvas (living beings) as they truly are (artha)."

Jains believe that sentient beings can achieve perfect and complete knowledge of all things (omniscience). Those who have such knowledge are the enlightened kevalins. These are souls who have detached from all things, and are therefore able to perceive all things directly since their soul's knowledge is no longer blocked by anything. For most beings, the omniscience of their soul is blocked by the karmic particles stuck to their soul, like a thick cloud blocks out the light of the sun. Therefore, the only source of omniscient knowledge for lesser beings is the teachings of the kevalins. Since there are no longer any living kevalins, the Jain scriptures are the only source of such knowledge and are thus seen as the highest authority in Jain philosophy. Because of this, Jain philosophy considers the doctrines found in the scriptures as absolute truths and philosophy's role is mainly to summarize, explain and supplement these doctrines.

Ontology

According to Harry Oldmeadow, Jain ontology is both realist and dualist. Jeffery D. Long also affirms the realistic nature of Jain metaphysics, which is a kind of pluralism that asserts the existence of various realities.

The major metaphysical distinction, writes Helmuth von Glasenapp, is between the animate or sentient substances (jīva) and the inanimate substances (ajīva).

Jain philosophy postulates at least seven "tattvas" (truths, realities or fundamental principles):

  1. Jīva – The living being, sentient or soul which is said to have a separate existence from the body that houses it. The immaterial Jīvas are characterized by unlimited consciousness, knowledge, bliss and energy. Though they experience both birth and death, they are neither destroyed nor created. It is thus both eternal in one way and yet impermanent in another. Decay and origin refer respectively to the disappearing of one state of soul and appearance of another state, these being merely modifications of the jīva.
  2. Ajīva – refers to any insentient substance. There are five ontological categories of insentients: non-sentient substance or matter (pudgala), principle of motion (dharma), the principle of rest (adharma), space (ākāśa) and time (kāla). Along with jīvas, these form a set of six ontological substances (dravya). Substances are simple and indestructible elements which come together into impermanent bodies or objects.
  3. Āsrava (influx) – the process by which good and bad karmic substances flow into the living being
  4. Bandha (bondage) – mutual intermingling of the living being and the karmas, thereby causing its change, which cumulatively determines future rebirths
  5. Samvara – the stoppage of the inflow of karmic matter into the soul
  6. Nirjara (gradual dissociation) – separation or falling off of part of karmic matter from the soul.
  7. Mokṣha (liberation) – complete annihilation of all karmic matter (bound with any particular soul).

Śvētāmbara Jains also often add two more realities to the above list: good karma (punya, merits) and bad karma (papa, negatives).

Each entity can be analyzed in numerous different ways according to Jain thinkers. Umasvati outlines numerous "gateways" of investigation called nikshepas. These are: nāma (name), sthāpanā (symbol), dravya (potentiality), bhāvatā (actuality), nirdeśa (definition), svāmitva (possession), sādhana (cause), adhikarana (location), sthiti (duration), vidhānatā (variety), sat (existence), samkhyā (numerical determination), ksetra (field occupied), sparśana (field touched), kāla (continuity ), antara (time-lapse), bhāva (states), andalpabahutva (relative size).

Helmuth von Glasenapp pointed out that a central principle of Jain thought is its attempt to provide an ontology that includes both permanence and change. As such, every being contains something that is lasting and something which is inconstant. For example, in a pot, its material atoms are imperishable, but the form, color and other qualities are subject to change.

Epistemology

Jain philosophy accepts three reliable means of knowledge (pramana). It holds that correct knowledge is based on perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana) and testimony (sabda or the word of scriptures). These ideas are elaborated in Jain texts such as Tattvarthasūtra, Parvacanasara, Nandi and Anuyogadvarini. Some Jain texts add analogy (upamana) as the fourth reliable means, in a manner similar to epistemological theories found in other Indian religions.

In Jainism, jñāna (knowledge) is said to be of five kinds – Kevala jñāna (Omniscience), Śrutu jñāna (Scriptural Knowledge), mati jñāna (Sensory Knowledge), avadhi jñāna (Clairvoyance), and manah prayāya jñāna (Telepathy). The first two are described as being indirect means of knowledge (parokṣa), with the others furnishing direct knowledge (pratyakṣa), by which it is meant that the object is known directly by the soul.

Relativity and Pluralism

Jain epistemology includes three related doctrines which deal with the complex and manifold nature of knowledge: anekāntavāda (the theory of many-sidedness), syādvāda (the theory of conditioned predication) and nayavāda (the theory of partial standpoints). Long calls these three the "Jain doctrines of relativity".

Anekāntavāda

One of the most important and fundamental doctrines of Jainism is anēkāntavāda (literally the 'non-one-sided' view). It refers to a kind of ontological pluralism and to the idea that reality is complex and multi-faceted and therefore can only be understood from a multiplicity of perspectives. As Long notes, this is ultimately an ontological doctrine that holds that "all existent entities have infinite attributes." Jain thought generally affirms the reality of all of our perceptions, even those which contradict each other such as continuity and change, arising and perishing.

This doctrine is often illustrated through the parable of the "blind men and an elephant". In this story, each blind man felt a different part of an elephant and then claimed to understand the true appearance of the elephant, but could only partly succeed. This principle is based on the idea that objects are infinite in their qualities and modes of existence. Because of this, they cannot be completely grasped in all aspects and manifestations by finite human perception. According to the Jains, only the Kevalis—omniscient beings—can comprehend objects in all aspects and manifestations.

Indeed, the Jain texts depict Mahavira as answering certain metaphysical questions that were considered 'unanswerable' by the Buddha. Mahavira is depicted as answering these with both a qualified "yes" and a "no", depending on the perspective of the questioner. Thus, the soul is both eternal in its intrinsic nature and yet also changing (due to the karmas affecting it and the various states that arise and pass away within it) and the universe is both eternal (beginningless) and yet also non-eternal (since it goes through cycles). Thus, the Jains saw their metaphysics as a middle path, embracing both permanence and impermanence as metaphysically fundamental, against that of the Buddhists (who defended impermanence) and the Brahmins (who generally held a doctrine of permanence).

Anekāntavāda encourages its adherents to consider the views and beliefs of their rivals and opposing parties. Proponents of anekāntavāda apply this principle to religion and philosophy, reminding themselves that any religion or philosophy—even Jainism—which clings too dogmatically to its own tenets, is committing an error based on its limited point of view. The principle of anekāntavāda also influenced Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi to adopt principles of religious tolerance, ahiṃsā and satyagraha.

Nayavāda

A closely related theory is Nayavāda, which means "the theory of partial standpoints or viewpoints." Nayas are partially valid, philosophical perspectives from which anything can be seen. An object has infinite aspects to it, but when we describe an object in practice, we speak of only relevant aspects and ignore irrelevant ones. Jain philosophers use the theory of partial viewpoints in order to explain the complexity of reality, part by part.

This is how Jains can describe objects with seemingly contradictory statements (the soul is both permanent and impermanent etc.). Since it is only from certain perspectives that each statement is made, there is no contradiction. Nayavāda holds that all philosophical disputes arise out of confusion of standpoints, and the standpoints we adopt are, although we may not realise it, "the outcome of purposes that we may pursue".

According to Long, Umāsvāti lists seven partial viewpoints:

naigamanaya (common view), samgrahanaya (generic view), vyavahāranaya (pragmatic view), rjusūtranaya (linear view), śabdanaya (verbal view), samabhirūdha naya (etymological view), andevambhūtanaya (actuality view). The common view is how an entity is generally perceived– what one might call a 'common sense' or unrefined perspective. A generic view seeks to classify the entity. A pragmatic view assesses the entity in terms of its possible uses. A linear view looks at the entity as it is in the present moment. A verbal view seeks to name the entity. An etymological view uses this name and its relations with other words to discern its nature. And an actuality view is concerned with the concrete particulars of the entity.

Jain thinkers also use the doctrine of standpoints in order to provide a doxography of non-Jain philosophical systems. According to Jain philosophers, other philosophical systems rely on only one of the seven standpoints, while excluding the others. This is explains why they have reached false conclusions. For example, Nyaya-Vaisesika is often associated with the first naya (the common view), Vedanta with the second naya (generic view), Materialism with the third naya (pragmatic view) and Buddhism with the fourth (the linear view). Meanwhile, Jainism is seen as the only philosophy able to combine all seven nayas.

One influential theory of Nayavāda is the dual-perspective model of Kundakunda. Kundakunda held that the perspective of the soul is the only 'certain' (niscaya), 'supreme' (paramārtha) or 'pure' (suddha) perspective. Because of the adherence of karmic particles, the soul loses knowledge of itself as being pure, however, it is never truly modified. All other things in the universe are worldly and are to be viewed as having merely transactional and provisional value.

As such, the worldly perspective is ultimately false, while the supreme perspective is the ultimate truth and according to Long, corresponds to the kevalajñāna of a Jina. Kundakunda's philosophy is especially influential in Digambara thought, though it has also influenced some Śvetāmbara scholars. However, other Śvetāmbara thinkers like Yashovijaya famously criticized Kundakunda for his reliance on one single standpoint, i.e. for ekāntavāda (absolutism).

Another influential theory of nayas was that of Siddhasena Divākara, who in his Sanmatitarka ('The Logic of the True Doctrine), divided the traditional nayas into two main categories: those which affirm the substantiality of existence (dravyāstikanayas) and those which affirm impermanence (paryāyāstikanayas). Siddhasena also identified the various nayas with the different Indian philosophies, all of which are seen as one-sided and extreme views, while the Jain view is seen as being in the middle and as embracing all the various points of views, which, while seemingly contradictory, are just partial perspectives of the whole truth.

Syādvāda

Syādvāda is the theory of conditioned predication, which provides an expression to anekānta by recommending that the indeclinable "syād" or "syāt" ("in a certain sense") be prefixed to every phrase or expression. In the context of Jain thought, syād (often paired with eva, "surely" or "certainly") means "in some specific sense, or from some specific perspective, it is certainly the case that...". As reality is complex, no single proposition can express the nature of reality fully. Thus the term "syād" should be prefixed before each proposition giving it a conditional point of view and thus removing any dogmatism in the statement as well as indicating that the sentence is true only from a specific point of view.

Since it ensures that each statement is expressed from seven different conditional and relative viewpoints or propositions, syādvāda is known as saptibhaṅgīnāya or the theory of seven conditioned predications. These seven propositions, also known as saptibhaṅgī, are:

  1. syād-asti—from a certain perspective, it is,
  2. syād-nāsti—from a certain perspective, it is not,
  3. syād-asti-nāsti—from a certain perspective, it is, and it is not,
  4. syād-asti-avaktavyaḥ—from a certain perspective, it is, and it is indescribable,
  5. syād-nāsti-avaktavyaḥ—from a certain perspective, it is not, and it is indescribable,
  6. syād-asti-nāsti-avaktavyaḥ—from a certain perspective, it is, it is not, and it is indescribable,
  7. syād-avaktavyaḥ—from a certain perspective, it is indescribable.

Each of these seven propositions examines the complex and multifaceted nature of reality from a relative point of view of time, space, substance and mode. To ignore the complexity of reality is to commit the fallacy of dogmatism. According to Long, this sevenfold analysis is seen by Jain philosophers as being universally applicable and "to be exhaustive of the possible truth-values that a given proposition can convey."

However, as Long notes, there is a limitation to the theories of relativity applied by Jain philosophers. This limitation is the idea that the conclusions of the doctrines of relativity must be consistent with the Jain worldview. This is summarized by Siddhasena as follows: "A well presented view of the form of naya only lends support to the Āgamic doctrines while the same, if ill presented, destroys both (i.e. itself as well as its rival)." Thus, the relativity doctrines are seen by Jains as being limited by the normative claims of the Jain tradition, since these are seen as being founded on the omniscient perspective of the enlightened ones.

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