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Qatar diplomatic crisis

Diplomatic crisis between several Arab countries and Qatar from 2017 to 2021

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Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt (Orange) cut diplomatic ties with Qatar (Green) simultaneously in 2017.
Ivebeenhacked · CC BY-SA 4.0

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Through De facto and de jure

The Saudi-led coalition cited Qatar's alleged support for terrorism as the main reason for their actions, alleging that Qatar had violated a 2014 agreement with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which Qatar is a member. Saudi Arabia and other countries have criticized Al Jazeera and Qatar's relations with Iran. Qatar explained that it had provided assistance to some opposition groups, including Islamist groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood), but consistently denied aiding militant groups linked to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Qatar also emphasized that it had long assisted the United States in the war on terror, especially via the Qatar-based Al Udeid US military base, and through the ongoing military intervention against ISIL.

One day into the crisis, the Saudi-led coalition was joined by Jordan, and was further supported thereafter by the Maldives, Mauritania, Senegal, Djibouti, the Comoros, and the Tobruk-based government in Libya, all of which severed relations with Qatar. The demands against Qatar included reducing diplomatic relations with Iran, stopping military coordination with Turkey, and closing Al Jazeera; Qatar refused to agree to any of the Saudi-led coalition's demands. Initial supply disruptions were minimised by additional imports from Iran, with which Qatar restored full diplomatic relations in August 2017, and Turkey.

On 4 January 2021, Qatar and Saudi Arabia agreed to a resolution of the crisis, brokered by Kuwait and the United States, which stated that Saudi Arabia would reopen its border with Qatar and begin the process of reconciliation. An agreement and final communiqué signed on 5 January 2021 following a GCC summit at al-Ula marked the resolution of the crisis. According to Middle East analyst Samuel Ramani in an article published in Foreign Policy, the crisis was a failure for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, because Qatar ended up forging closer ties with Iran and Turkey, and became economically and militarily stronger and more autonomous.

Background

After taking power as emir of Qatar in 1995, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani believed Qatar could find security by transforming itself from a Saudi satellite state into a fully sovereign state, on an equal standing with Saudi Arabia. This included maintaining diplomatic relations with a range of actors, such as Iran, and supporting political movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, which placed it at odds with several neighboring states. Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador to Doha from 2002 to 2008 to try to pressure Qatar to change its policies. This approach broadly failed. Since both states were allies of the United States, they tried to avoid direct conflict with one another.

Tension escalated during and after the Arab spring, as both Saudi Arabia and Qatar sought to fill the power vacuum left in the wake of the spring, with Qatar being supportive of the revolutionary wave and Saudi Arabia and even the United Arab Emirates opposing it. These differences have been described as reflecting broader disagreements over regional governance, political Islam, and security priorities.

In March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar. This severing of relations was the first of its kind since the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The crisis affected the GCC negatively at first – raising questions among member states, revealing shifts in their political agendas, and changing the balance of power in the region to some extent.

Hostage negotiations

In April 2017, Qatar was involved in a deal with both Sunni and Shi'ite militants in Iraq and Syria. The deal had two primary objectives. The immediate goal was to secure the return of 26 Qatari hostages (including Qatari royals) who had been kidnapped by Shi'ite militants while on a falconry expedition in southern Iraq, and kept in captivity for more than 16 months. The second goal was to get both Sunni and Shi'ite militants in Syria to facilitate the passage of humanitarian aid and allow the safe evacuation of civilians. According to The New York Times, this deal allowed the evacuation of at least 2,000 civilians from the Syrian village of Madaya alone. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were specifically outraged by the amount of money Qatar paid to secure the deal. According to the Financial Times, Qatar paid $700 million to multiple Iranian-backed Shi'ite militias in Iraq, $120–140 million to Tahrir al-Sham, and $80 million to Ahrar al-Sham.

Riyadh Summit 2017

As part of the Riyadh Summit in late May 2017, many world leaders, including then-US President Donald Trump, visited the region. Trump gave strong support for Saudi Arabia's efforts in combating states and groups allied with Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, leading to an arms deal between the countries. Business Insider reported that "Elliott Broidy, a top fundraiser for President Donald Trump, and George Nader, Broidy's business partner ... pushed for anti-Qatar policies at the highest levels of government, and expected large consulting contracts from Saudi Arabia and the UAE." Trump's support may have prompted other Sunni states to fall in line with Saudi Arabia and stand against Qatar. Trump's public support for Saudi Arabia, according to The New York Times, emboldened the kingdom and sent a chill through other Gulf states, including Oman and Kuwait, which might have feared that any country that defies the Saudis or the United Arab Emirates could face ostracism as Qatar did. The Saudi-led move was at once an opportunity for the GCC partners and Egypt to punish their adversaries in Doha, to please their allies in Washington, and to divert attention from their own shortcomings and challenges.

Hacking operations against Qatar

According to Qatar-based Al Jazeera and the American FBI, the Qatar News Agency website and other government media platforms were hacked in May 2017, resulting in postings on the official Qatar News Agency website containing faked remarks attributed to the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, expressing support for Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Israel. The emir was quoted as saying: "Iran represents a regional and Islamic power that cannot be ignored and it is unwise to face up against it. It is a big power in the stabilization of the region." Qatar reported that the statements were false, and officials stated that they did not know their origin. Despite this, the remarks were widely publicized on non-Qatari Arab news media, including UAE-based Sky News Arabia and Saudi-owned Al Arabiya. On 3 June 2017, the Twitter account of Bahraini foreign minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa was hacked.

Initially, alleged intelligence gathered by US security agencies indicated that Russian hackers were behind the intrusion first reported by the Qataris. However, a US official briefed on the inquiry told The New York Times that it "was unclear whether the hackers were state-sponsored", and The Guardian diplomatic editor Patrick Wintour reported that "it is believed that the Russian government was not involved in the hacks; instead, freelance hackers were paid to undertake the work on behalf of some other state or individual." A US diplomat said that Russia and its ally Iran stood to benefit from sowing discord among US allies in the region, "particularly if they made it more difficult for the United States to use Qatar as a major base." The FBI sent a team of investigators to Doha to help the Qatari government investigate the hacking incident. The New York Times later reported that the hacking incidents may have been part of a long-running cyberwar between Qatar and other Gulf countries, that was only revealed to the public during the recent incidents. They noted how Saudi and UAE media picked up the statement made by the hacked media in less than 20 minutes, and began interviewing many well-prepared commentators who are opposed to Qatar.

According to a Washington Post report published on 16 July, US intelligence agencies believed that the hacking was done by the United Arab Emirates. The intelligence officials stated that the hacking was discussed among Emirati officials on 23 May, one day before the operation took place. The UAE denied any involvement. On 26 August 2017, it was announced that five individuals allegedly involved in the hacking were arrested in Turkey.

A former employee of the US National Security Agency (NSA), David Evenden, was hired by the UAE to work at the cyberespionage firm CyberPoint. The Emirates signaled a green flag to Evenden and his team to run hacking operations against Qatar, in order to scavenge substance that Qatar has been involved in funding the Muslim Brotherhood at some point in time. In its major stratagem against Qatar, the UAE allowed Evenden and the network of other former NSA employees to neglect rationalizations and fetch confidential data. This team at CyberPoint carried out several global hacking attempts, including against Qatari royals, officials at FIFA, and even internet critics of the UAE. In 2015, the Emirates, using these former NSA employees, hacked emails between Michelle Obama and Moza bint Nasser, mother of Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. Mrs. Obama was scheduled visit an event in Qatar as a guest of bint Nasser. The email hack provided the UAE with every piece of information exchanged between the two women and their staff.

Hacking of UAE ambassador's email

In May 2017, the email account of the UAE ambassador to the US, Yousef Al-Otaiba, was hacked. The emails were seen by the Huffington Post as an attempt "to embarrass" Al Otaiba because they showed links between the UAE and the US-based pro-Israel Foundation for Defense of Democracies. The hack was seen as a move benefitting Qatar, which further deepened the rift between the two sides. The Intercept reported that Yousef al-Otaiba had been linked to buying influence for UAE-led campaigns in the White House.

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