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Russia in World War I

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Through World War I, Balkans and International trade

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian Empire was a great power in terms of its vast territory, population, and agricultural resources. Its rail network and industry were developing rapidly, but it had not yet caught up with the Western powers, particularly the German Empire. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, followed by the Revolution of 1905, revealed the weaknesses of Russia's military apparatus and exposed deep political and social divisions, adding to the question of national minorities.

Russia's rivalries with Germany and Austria-Hungary led to an Franco-Russian Alliance and involvement in Balkan affairs. The July Crisis opened a general conflict in which Russia was allied with France and the United Kingdom.

Tsar Nicholas II believed he could re-establish his autocratic power and reunite his people through a victorious war. However, the army, ill-equipped and ill-prepared for a long battle, suffered a series of defeats in 1914 and 1915: the Empire suffered heavy human and territorial losses. Despite restrictions on international trade, Russia set up a war economy and won partial victories in 1916.

However, the discrediting of the ruling class, inflation and shortages in the cities, and the unsatisfied demands of peasants and national minorities led to the break-up of the country: the revolution of February–March 1917 swept away the Tsar's regime. A provisional government with democratic aspirations attempted to revive the war effort, but the army, undermined by desertions and mutinies, fell apart.

The October–November 1917 revolution led to the dissolution of the army and the economic and social frameworks. The Bolshevik regime signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany on March 3, 1918, abandoning Ukraine, the Baltic countries, and the Caucasus. Torn Russia soon moved from international war to civil war.

Context

Great power and its limits

On the eve of the Great War, Russia was the most populous state in Europe: with 175 million inhabitants, it had almost 3 times the population of Germany, an army of 1.3 million men, and almost 5 million reservists. Its industrial growth, on the order of 5% per year between 1860 and 1913, and the vastness of its territory and natural resources made it a strategic giant. The Russian railway network grew from 50,000 km in 1900 to 75,000 in 1914. Coal production rose from 6 million tonnes in 1890 to 36 million in 1914. Oil production, thanks to the Baku deposits, was the second largest in the world after the United States. In Germany, Chief of Staff Moltke predicted that, as a result of Russia's rapid growth, German military power would be outclassed by that of its adversaries from 1916 to 1917, while France, strengthened by the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892, expected the "Russian steamroller" to crush Germany at the first hostile move.

However, this power rested on unstable foundations. Russian industrial production, ranked 4th in the world, surpassed that of France and Austria-Hungary, but lagged far behind that of the top three countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. The development of the army, railroads, and industries was largely dependent on government loans, notably from France, and on imports of foreign capital and technology. Interest on the debt, the highest in the world, tended to outstrip the trade surplus. In 1914, 90% of the mining sector, 100% of oil, 40% of metallurgy, and 50% of the chemical industry belonged to foreign firms. Despite high tariffs, the Russian industry was not very competitive, and the country had to import most of its machinery, while exports were mainly represented by agricultural products (63% in 1913) and wood (11%).

In 1914, the agricultural sector still employed 80% of the working population, and its growth rate of around 2% per year was barely enough to offset a population increase of 1.5% per year, especially as a large part of agricultural production was exported to cover industrial imports and debt. Productivity was low, around a third of that of England or Germany for wheat, and half for potatoes. The country suffered famines like the one in 1891, and even in normal years, the Russian settlement regions, with their harsh climate and poor soils, depended on the more fertile non-Russian regions.

Industry, with 3 million workers in 1914, represented only 1.75% of the population, but its rapid growth posed formidable social problems: workers, poorly housed in insalubrious towns, were susceptible to the revolutionary propaganda of Bolshevik or Menshevik socialists, populist socialist-revolutionaries, and anarchists. The peasantry was poorly fed and educated; while the per capita tax taken was higher than in the UK, in 1913 the state spent 970 million rubles on the army and only 154 on health and education. In 1913, 70% of the population was still illiterate. However, primary education progressed rapidly, especially around the big cities: the literacy rate reached 90% among young recruits in 1914 in the Moscow and Saint Petersburg governments. Educated young peasants, better acquainted with new techniques and procedures, became more assertive and sought to escape the grip of the peasant commune and the large landowners.

The intelligentsia also expanded rapidly: the number of students rose from 5,000 in 1860 to 79,000 (45% of them women) in 1914 but failed to close the cultural gap between the masses and the elite.

A divided country

The autocracy of the Romanov dynasty, which in the 19th century seemed to enjoy absolute authority, was increasingly called into question. The Russian famine of 1891–1892 in the Volga and Urals provinces, accompanied by epidemics of cholera and typhus, was badly managed by the authorities, who forbade the dissemination of "alarmist" information and focused on maintaining grain exports. The zemstvos (provincial unions) and intelligentsia mobilized in associations to help the peasants and, once the crisis was over, demanded political rights: it was at this time that many intellectuals, influenced by Tolstoy, converted to revolutionary ideas.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 laid bare the structural weaknesses of the Russian military machine and the incompetence of a large part of the high command. On the Manchurian front, army generals sent troops ill-equipped, poorly trained in modern weaponry, and poorly supplied by the interminable Trans-Siberian Railway, to be killed in bayonet charges, while the Baltic Sea fleet, sent to the Pacific, was annihilated by the Japanese at the Battle of Tsushima ( May 27–28, 1905). The liberal bourgeoisie of the zemstvos, which had supported the war effort, became indignant; the industrialist Alexander Guchkov led a campaign to denounce the negligence of the bureaucracy and the military leaders promoted by the favor of the Court.

The discrediting of power and the economic crisis caused by the war against Japan led to the Russian Revolution of 1905, which first broke out in Saint Petersburg in January before spreading to the countryside: around 3,000 manor houses of large landowners (15% of the total) were destroyed by peasants in 1905–1906. In many villages, peasants organized themselves into autonomous communes, demanding universal suffrage and agrarian reform through land distribution. From January to October 1905, the army was sent in no fewer than 2,700 times to put down the revolts; in some cases, the soldiers, themselves of peasant origin, refused to obey and mutinied. Rural unrest was endemic throughout the decade, and the army was sent in to quell it in 1901, 1902, 1903, 1909, and again in 1913.

To save his throne, Nicholas II had to sign the Manifesto of October 17, 1905 (October 30 in the Gregorian calendar), which established a parliament, the State Duma, and freedom of the press and assembly. Piotr Stolypin, appointed Minister of the Interior in April 1906 and Prime Minister in July 1907, promoted a series of reforms: compulsory education, civil rights for Jews and Old Believers, promotion of a class of small landowners through the dismantling of the peasant commune, reform of the administration and the status of workers. This program might have avoided revolution, but would have required, as Stolypin put it, "twenty years of peace". He himself was assassinated in 1911 by a socialist-revolutionary.

Peoples and nationalities

In a Europe where the principle of the Nation-state was gaining ground, the Russian Empire was increasingly seen as a "prison for the people", even if Lenin only coined the phrase in 1914. Although the Grand Duchy of Finland, annexed by Russia in 1809, retained relative autonomy, the imperial state did nothing to satisfy the autonomist and cultural demands of other peripheral peoples. With the development of the urban middle class, the feeling of identity asserted itself against the Russian state, but also against the former German-Baltic elites in Estonia and Latvia, and the Polish in Lithuania. In Russian Poland, national sentiment, which came from urban culture, spread among workers and peasants, whereas in Ukraine, under the influence of the Ruthenians of Austria-Hungary, whose cultural rights were much more assertive, it mainly affected the peasantry, the urban population being more Russian (or Russified), Polish, German or Jewish.

To counteract revolutionary currents, reactionary circles encouraged the creation of monarchist, anti-socialist, and anti-Semitic parties, the most important being the Union of the Russian People; these groups, known generically as the Black Hundreds, organized a series of pogroms from 1905 onwards. The Tsar himself supported them.

Panslavism and the German threat

The greater freedom of expression after 1905, in politics and the press, also allowed for the free expression of Grand-Russian nationalism, Panslavism, and anti-Germanism. The latter was fueled by the advantageous social position of the Germans in Russia, among whom were many wealthy landowners, high-ranking civil servants and court dignitaries (Empress Alexandra Fedorovna was German), and by the superiority of the German Empire's economy, which flooded Russia with its capital and industrial products. In 1914, an editorialist in the Novoye Vremya newspaper wrote: "In the last twenty years, our western neighbor [Germany] has held the vital sources of our prosperity firmly in her fangs and, like a vampire, has sucked the blood of the Russian peasant". On the eve of the war, Germany accounted for 47% of Russia's international trade. In 1915, a Russian officer explained to American journalist John Reed why Russian peasants were "full of patriotism" to fight the Germans: "They hate the Germans. You see, most agricultural machinery comes from Germany, and these machines have deprived many peasants of their work, sending them to factories in Petrograd, Moscow, Riga, and Odessa. Not to mention the fact that the Germans are flooding Russia with cheap products, causing our factories to close and putting thousands of workers out of work." Skeptical John Reed notes, however, that Russian peasants have even more reason to resent their overlords than the Germans.

However, Russia's educated circles were also concerned about Wilhelm II's global policy, which aimed to extend German military and colonial power around the world, and about that of Austria-Hungary, Germany's ally, with its ambitions in the Balkans. During the Bosnian Crisis of 1908, Alexander Guchkov, leader of the moderate Octobrist party, denounced the lack of Russian reaction to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the dual monarchy as a "diplomatic Tsushima". Moderate, liberal and right-wing parties called for firmness in the face of the Austro-German alliance. The threat of Pangermanism fueled Panslavism among some Russian elites. At the Panslav Congress in Prague in July 1908, delegates from the Russian Duma proposed that the Slavs of Austria-Hungary and the Balkans form a federation with Russia. Supporters of Panslavism formed societies to support Slavic "brother peoples" against the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. In 1912, Prince Grigori Trubetskoi, in charge of Ottoman and Balkan affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, favored the extension of Russian hegemony over the Balkans and Constantinople. Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolayevich, uncle of the Tsar and son-in-law of King Nicholas of Montenegro, was also won over to the Panslave cause.

Aleksandr Guchkov, who had become chairman of the Duma's Defense Committee, supported a massive rearmament program, but made it conditional on a reform of the high command: he demanded that the Imperial Russian Navy staff be placed under the control of the government rather than the Court, and that promotions be based on merit rather than favor. Nicholas II only reluctantly agreed to this reform, at the insistence of his Prime Minister Stolypin, and with parliamentary confirmation of his title as Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces.

However, Russian leaders were aware of the risk of war with Germany. The General Staff and Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov believed that the army would not be ready until 1917. In February 1914, Interior Minister Pyotr Durnovo wrote a memorandum to the Tsar stating that a war could only exacerbate political and social tensions in Russia and lead to a devastating revolution. Conversely, Lenin, then in exile, wrote to Maxim Gorki in 1913: "A war between Austria and Russia would be very favorable to the revolution, but it is unlikely that Franz Joseph and Nikolacha [Nicholas II] would give us this pleasure".

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