Workers' Party of Korea

Ideology

The WPK maintains a leftist image. It normally sends a delegation to the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, where it has some support. Its 2011 resolution, "Let us jointly commemorate the Birth Centenary of the Great Leader comrade President Kim Il Sung as a Grand Political Festival of the World's Humankind", was signed by 30 of the 79 attending parties. The WPK also sees itself as part of the worldwide leftist and socialist movements; during the Cold War, the WPK and North Korea had a policy of "exporting revolution", aiding leftist guerrillas worldwide. Additionally, its party rules say its ultimate aim is to "realize a communist society in which the people's ideals are fully realized" and further state it upholds "the revolutionary principles of Marxism–Leninism". Brian Reynolds Myers, Jasper Becker, and Dae-Sook Suh argue that the WPK's ideology is xenophobic, racist, and nationalist.

Juche

Relationship to Marxism–Leninism

Although the term "Juche" was first used in Kim Il Sung's speech (given in 1955), "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work", Juche as a coherent ideology did not develop until the 1960s. Similar to Stalinism, it led to the development of an unofficial (later formalized) ideological system defending the central party leadership. Until about 1972, Juche was called a "creative application" of Marxism–Leninism and "the Marxism–Leninism of today", and Kim Il Sung was hailed as "the greatest Marxist–Leninist of our time". However, by 1976 Juche had become a separate ideology; Kim Jong Il called it "a unique ideology, the contents and structures which cannot simply be described as Marxist–Leninist."

At the 5th Congress, Juche was elevated to the same level as Marxism–Leninism. It gained prominence during the 1970s, and at the 6th Congress in 1980, it was recognized as the WPK's sole ideology. During the following decade, Juche transformed from practical to pure ideology. On the Juche Idea, the primary text on Juche, was published in Kim Jong Il's name in 1982. Juche is, according to this study, inexorably linked with Kim Il Sung and "represents the guiding idea of the Korean Revolution ... we are confronted with the honourable task of modelling the whole society on the Juche idea". In the work, Kim Jong Il says that Juche is not simply a creative application of Marxism–Leninism but "a new era in the development of human history". The WPK's break with basic Marxist–Leninist premises is spelt out clearly in the article, "Let Us March Under the Banner of Marxism–Leninism and the Juche Idea".

Despite Juche's conception as a creative application of Marxism and Leninism, some scholars argue it has little direct connection to them. Policies may be explained without a Marxist or Leninist rationale, making the identification of specific influences from these ideologies difficult. Some analysts say it is easier to connect Juche with nationalism, but not a unique form of nationalism. Although the WPK claims to be socialist-patriotic, some analysts argue that its socialist patriotism is more similar to bourgeois nationalism; the chief difference is that socialist patriotism is nationalism within a socialist state. Juche developed as a reaction to foreign occupation, involvement and influence (primarily by the Chinese and Soviets) in North Korean affairs, and may be described "as a normal and healthy reaction of the Korean people to the deprivation they suffered under foreign domination." However, there is nothing uniquely Marxist or Leninist in this reaction; the primary reason for its description as "communist" is that it occurred in a self-proclaimed socialist state. The WPK (and the North Korean leadership in general) have not explained in detail how their policies are Marxist, Leninist or communist; Juche is defined as "Korean", and the others as "foreign".

Basic tenets

Juche's primary objective for North Korea is political, economic and military independence. Kim Il Sung, in his "Let Us Defend the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-reliance, and Self-defense More Thoroughly in All Fields of State Activities" speech to the Supreme People's Assembly in 1967, summarized Juche:

The government of the republic will implement with all consistency the line of independence, self-sustenance, and self-defence to consolidate the political independence of the country (chaju), build up more solidly the foundations of an independent national economy capable of insuring the complete unification, independence, and prosperity of our nation (charip) and increasing the country's defence capabilities, to safeguard the security of the fatherland reliably by our own force (chawi), by splendidly embodying our Party's idea of Juche in all fields."

The principle of political independence known as chaju is one of Juche's central tenets. Juche stresses equality and mutual respect among nations, asserting that every state has the right to self-determination. In practice, the beliefs in self-determination and equal sovereignty have turned North Korea into a perceived "hermit kingdom". As interpreted by the WPK, yielding to foreign pressure or intervention would violate chaju and threaten the country's ability to defend its sovereignty. This may explain why Kim Jong Il believed that the Korean revolution would fail if North Korea became dependent on a foreign entity.

Regarding China and the Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung advocated for cooperation and mutual support, acknowledging that it was essential for North Korea to learn from the experiences of other countries. Despite this, he abhorred the idea that North Korea should depend on the two nations and did not want to follow their example dogmatically. Kim Il Sung said that the WPK needed to "resolutely repudiate the tendency to swallow things of others undigested or imitate them mechanically", attributing the success of North Korea to the WPK's independence in implementing policies. To ensure North Korean independence, official pronouncements stressed the need for the people to unite under the WPK and the Great Leader.

Economic independence (charip) is seen as the material basis of chaju. One of Kim Il Sung's greatest fears was North Korea's dependence on foreign aid; he believed it would threaten the country's ability to develop socialism, which could only be achieved by a state with a strong, independent economy. Charip emphasizes an independent national economy based on heavy industry; this sector, in theory, would then drive the rest of the economy. Kim Jong Il said:

Building an independent national economy means building an economy which is free from dependence on others and which stands on its own feet, an economy which serves one's own people and develops on the strength of the resources of one's own country and by the efforts of one's people.

Kim Il Sung considered military independence (chawi) crucial. Acknowledging that North Korea might need military support in a war against imperialist enemies, he emphasized a domestic response and summed up the party's (and state's) attitude towards military confrontation: "We do not want war, nor are we afraid of it, nor do we beg peace from the imperialists."

According to Juche, because of his consciousness, man has ultimate control over himself and the ability to change the world. This differs from classical Marxism, which believes that humans depend on their relationship to the means of production more than on themselves. The Juche view of a revolution led by a Great Leader, rather than a group of knowledgeable revolutionaries, is a break from Lenin's concept of a vanguard party.

Nationalism

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels did not clarify the difference between the state and law, focusing on class divisions within nations. They argued that nation and law (as it existed then) would be overthrown and replaced by proletarian rule. This was the mainstream view of Soviet theoreticians during the 1920s; however, with Stalin at the helm in 1929, it was under attack. He criticized Nikolai Bukharin's position that the proletariat was hostile to the inclinations of the state, arguing that since the state (the Soviet Union) was in transition from capitalism to socialism the relationship between the state and the proletariat was harmonious. By 1936, Stalin argued that the state would still exist if the Soviet Union reached the communist mode of production but the socialist world was encircled by capitalist forces. Kim Il Sung took this position to its logical conclusion, arguing that the state would exist after North Korea reached the communist mode of production until a future world revolution. As long as capitalism survived, even if the socialist world predominated, North Korea could still be threatened by the restoration of capitalism.

The revival of the term "state" in the Soviet Union under Stalin led to the revival of the term "nation" in North Korea under Kim Il Sung. Despite official assertions that the Soviet Union was based on "class" rather than "state", the latter was revived during the 1930s. In 1955, Kim Il Sung expressed a similar view in his speech, "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work":

What we are doing now is not a revolution in some foreign country but our Korean revolution. Therefore, every ideological action must benefit the Korean revolution. To fulfil the Korean revolution, one should be perfectly cognizant of the history of our national struggle, of Korea's geography, and our customs.

From then on, he and the WPK stressed the roles of "revolutionary tradition" and Korea's cultural tradition in its revolution. At party meetings, members and cadres learned about North Korea's national prestige and its coming rejuvenation. Traditional customs were revived, to showcase Korean-ness. By 1965, Kim Il Sung stated that if communists continued opposing individuality and sovereignty, the movement would be threatened by dogmatism and revisionism. He criticized those communists who, he believed, subscribed to "national nihilism by praising all things foreign and vilifying all things national" and tried to impose foreign models on their own country. By the 1960s, Juche was a full-fledged ideology calling for a distinct path for North Korean socialist construction and non-interference in its affairs; however, a decade later it was defined as a system whose "fundamental principle was the realization of sovereignty".

Although WPK theoreticians were initially hostile towards the terms "nation" and "nationalism" because of the influence of the Stalinist definition of "state", by the mid-1960s their definition that a nation was a "a stable, historically formed community of people based on common language, territory, economic life, and culture" was revised and the characteristic of a "shared bloodline" was added to the definition. During the 1980s a common economic life was removed from the definition, with shared bloodline receiving increased emphasis. The WPK revised the meaning of nationalism in response to the democratic transition in South Korea and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Previously defined in Stalinist terms as a bourgeois weapon to exploit the workers, nationalism changed from a reactionary to a progressive idea. Kim Il Sung differentiated "nationalism" from what he called "genuine nationalism"; while genuine nationalism was a progressive idea, nationalism remained reactionary:

True nationalism (genuine nationalism) is similar to patriotism. Only a genuine patriot can become a devoted and true internationalist. In this sense, when I say communist, at the same time, I mean nationalist and internationalist.

The WPK historically promoted Korean nationalism and eventual reunification of the two Koreas. In 2023, Kim Jong Un officially declared that North Korea was abandoning reunification as a goal and declared the relationship between North as South Korea as one of "two hostile states". He stated "the party's comprehensive conclusion after reviewing inter-Korean relations is that reunification can never be achieved with those Republic of Korea riffraffs that defined the 'unification by absorption' and 'unification under liberal democracy' as their state policy", which he said is in "sharp contradiction with what our line of national reunification was: one nation, one state with two systems".

Allegations of xenophobia and racism

During the 1960s the WPK began forcing ethnic Koreans to divorce their European spouses (who were primarily from the Eastern Bloc), with a high-ranking WPK official calling the marriages "a crime against the Korean race" and Eastern Bloc embassies in the country beginning to accuse the regime of fascism. In May 1963, a Soviet diplomat described Kim Il Sung's political circle as a "political Gestapo". Similar remarks were made by other Eastern Bloc officials in North Korea, with the East German ambassador calling the policy "Goebbelsian". Although this was said during a low point in relations between North Korea and the Eastern Bloc, it illustrated a perception of racism in Kim Il Sung's policies. North Korea's position on mixed marriages was inconsistent, however; it took a more permissive attitude towards Japanese spouses of Koreans repatriated from Japan as well as Chinese people in North Korea.

In his book The Cleanest Race (2010), Brian Reynolds Myers dismisses the idea that Juche is North Korea's leading ideology. He views its public exaltation as being designed to deceive foreigners; it exists to be praised rather than followed. Myers writes that Juche is a sham ideology, developed to extol Kim Il Sung as a political thinker comparable to Mao Zedong. According to Myers, North Korean military-first policy, racism and xenophobia (exemplified by race-based incidents such as the attempted lynching of black Cuban diplomats and forced abortions for North Korean women who got pregnant with Chinese men) indicate a base in far-right politics (inherited from Imperial Japan during its colonial occupation of Korea) rather than the far-left.

According to North Korea analyst Fyodor Tertitskiy, North Korean propaganda has "never asserted that Koreans are biologically superior" and that in fact, "such a statement was always directly condemned by Kim Jong Il". Instead, "the greatness of the Korean people lies solely in their leader. Koreans are great because they are led by Kim Il Sung, not for any other reason". He adds that while those in academia often try to create a logical worldview, having not received proper education, someone like Kim Il Sung's worldview would be "full of contradictions and logical holes", and that "Trying to explain his pattern of thinking and ruling the country with a simple theory – “the DPRK is a racist state,” “the DPRK is a traditional monarchy,” “the DPRK is a carbon copy of the USSR” – would be a distortion of the facts", especially since researchers who come to such conclusions would start to dismiss facts contradicting that conclusion. Tertitskiy also notes that North Korea gives very little weight to racial and nationalist element in its propaganda compared to the cult of personality around its leaders.

Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism

Kimilsungism (김일성주의) and the Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System were formally introduced by Kim Jong Il in 1974. Kim Jong Il reportedly did so to strengthen his position within the WPK, taking advantage of his father's political supremacy. Kimilsungism refers to the ideas of Kim Il Sung, while the Ten Principles serve as a guide for North Korean political and social life. Kim Jong Il argued that his father's ideas had evolved and they therefore deserved their own distinct name. North Korean state media had previously described Kim Il Sung's ideas as "contemporary Marxism–Leninism"; by calling them "Kimilsungism", Kim Jong Il sought to elevate the ideas of his father to the same level of prestige as Stalinism and Maoism. Not long after the introduction of "Kimilsungism" into the North Korean lexicon, Kim Jong Il began calling for a "Kimilsungist transformation" of North Korean society.

Political analyst Lim Jae-cheon argues that there is no discernible difference between Kimilsungism and Juche, and that the two terms are interchangeable. However, in his 1976 speech "On Correctly Understanding the Originality of Kimilsungism", Kim Jong Il said that Kimilsungism comprises the "Juche idea and a far-reaching revolutionary theory and leadership method evolved from this idea". He further added, "Kimilsungism is an original idea that cannot be explained within the frameworks of Marxism–Leninism. The Juche idea, which constitutes the quintessence of Kimilsungism, is an idea newly discovered in the history of mankind". He also stated that Marxism–Leninism had become obsolete and needed to be replaced by Kimilsungism:

The revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a revolutionary theory which has provided solutions to problems arising in the revolutionary practice in a new age different from the era that gave rise to Marxism–Leninism. On the basis of Juche idea, the leader gave a profound explanation of the theories, strategies and tactics of national liberation, class emancipation and human liberations in our era. Thus, it can be said that the revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a perfect revolutionary theory of Communism in the era of Juche.

According to analyst Shin Gi-wook, the ideas of Juche and Kimilsungism are in essence the "expressions of North Korean particularism over supposedly more universalistic Marxism–Leninism". The new terminology signalled a move from socialism to nationalism. This was evident in a speech presented by Kim Jong Il in 1982, during celebrations of his father's 70th birthday, in which he stated that love for the nation came before love for socialism. This particularism gave birth to concepts such as "A Theory of the Korean Nation as Number One" (조선민족제일주의) and "Socialism of Our Style" (우리식사회주의).

Following the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, Kimilsungism became Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism (김일성-김정일주의) at the 4th Conference of the Workers' Party of Korea in April 2012. Party members at the conference stated that the WPK was "the party of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il" and declared Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism "the only guiding idea of the party". Afterwards, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) stated that "the Korean people have long called the revolutionary policies ideas of the President [Kim Il Sung] and Kim Jong Il as Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism and recognized it as the guiding of the nation". Kim Jong Un, the son of Kim Jong Il who succeeded him as leader of the WPK, said:

Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism is an integral system of the idea, theory and method of Juche and a great revolutionary ideology representative of the Juche era. Guided by Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism, we should conduct Party building and Party activities, so as to sustain the revolutionary character of our Party and advance the revolution and construction in line with the ideas and intentions of the President [Kim Il Sung] and the General [Kim Jong Il].

Naenara, the official web portal of the North Korean government, declares: "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is an independent socialist state guided by the great Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism in its activities."

All references to Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism were officially removed from the Rules of the Workers' Party of Korea as amended at the 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in 2026.

Governance

Great Leader

North Korea considers humanity the driving force of history. "Popular masses are placed in the centre of everything, and the leader in the centre of the masses". Traditional Marxism considers class struggle the driving force of historical progress. However, Marxism also sees class struggle as eventually coming to an end, when class distinctions begin to disappear in a communist society. From this point on, humanity can begin to "more and more consciously, make his own history" as human society ceases to be driven by social forces such as class struggle, but instead becomes "the result of his own free actions."

Juche is an anthropocentric ideology in which "man is the master of everything and decides everything". Similar to Marxist–Leninist thought, Juche believes that history is law-governed but only man drives progress: "the popular masses are the drivers of history". From the perspective of Juche, the struggle for humanity as a whole to make their own history is restrained by the ruling classes in class society. Additionally, only the working class can overcome these restraints and achieve a society where humanity can independently and creatively make their own history. Juche is in line with historical materialism, viewing mankind's ability to drive their own history as the culmination of a long-term historical process, whose foundations were laid by capitalism's ushering in of the working class, and thus Juche is unique to the socialist era. However, for the masses to succeed, they need a Great Leader. Marxism–Leninism argues that the people will lead, on the basis of their relationship to production. In North Korea, a singular Great Leader is considered essential, and this helped Kim Il Sung establish a one-person autocracy.

This theory makes the Great Leader an absolute, supreme leader. The working class thinks not for itself, but through the Great Leader; he is the mastermind of the working class and its only legitimate representative. Class struggle can only be realized through the Great Leader; difficult tasks in general (and revolutionary changes in particular) can only be introduced through—and by—him. Thus, in historical development the Great Leader is the leading force of the working class; he is a flawless, incorruptible human being who never makes mistakes, is always benevolent and rules for the benefit of the masses (working class). For the Great Leader system to function, a unitary ideology must be in place; in North Korea, this is known as the Monolithic Ideological System.

Kim family

The Kim family began with Kim Il Sung, the first leader of the WPK and North Korea. The official ideology is that the North Korean system functions "well" because it was established by Kim Il Sung, whose successors follow his bloodline. Every child is educated in "the revolutionary history of the Great Leader" and "the revolutionary history of the Dear Leader" (Kim Jong Il). Kim Il Sung's first choice as successor was Kim Yong-ju, his brother, but he later decided to appoint his son Kim Jong Il instead; this decision was formalized at the 6th Congress. Kim Jong Il appointed his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, as his successor at the 3rd WPK Conference in 2010, and his son succeeded him in early 2011. Because of the familial succession and the appointment of family members to high office, the Kim family has been called a dynasty and a royal family. Dae-Sook Suh, the author of Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, notes that "What he [Kim Il Sung] has built in the North, however, resembles more a political system to accommodate his personal rule than a communist or socialist state in Korea. It is not the political system he built that will survive him; it is his son [Kim Jong Il], whom he has designated heir, who will succeed his reign." The ruling Kim family has been described as the head of a de facto absolute monarchy or "hereditary dictatorship".

Monolithic Ideological System

The Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System are a set of ten principles and 65 clauses which establish standards for governance and guide the behaviours of the people of North Korea. The Ten Principles have come to supersede the national constitution or edicts by the Workers' Party, and in practice serve as the supreme law of the country.

Songbun

Songbun is the name given to the caste system established on 30 May 1957 by the WPK Politburo when it adopted the resolution, "On the Transformation of the Struggle with Counter-Revolutionary Elements into an All-People All-Party Movement" (also known as the 30 May Resolution). This led to a purge in North Korean society in which every individual was checked for his or her allegiance to the party and its leader. The purge began in earnest in 1959, when the WPK established a new supervisory body headed by Kim Il Sung's brother, Kim Yong-ju.

The people of North Korea were divided into three "forces" (hostile, neutral or friendly), and the force in which a person was classified was hereditary. Hostile forces cannot live near Pyongyang (the country's capital) or other major cities, or near North Korea's border with other countries. Songbun affects access to educational and employment opportunities and, particularly, eligibility to join the WPK. However, its importance has diminished with the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the North Korean economy (and the Public Distribution System) during the 1990s.

The North Korean government, on the contrary, proclaims that all citizens are equal and denies any discrimination based on family background.

Organization

Central organization

The Congress is the party's highest body and convenes on an irregular basis. According to the party rules, the Central Committee can convene a congress if it gives the rest of the party at least a six-month notice. The party rules give the Congress seven responsibilities:

1. Electing the Central Committee
2. Electing the Central Auditing Commission
3. Electing the General Secretary
4. Examining the report of the outgoing Central Committee
5. Examining the report of the outgoing Central Auditing Commission
6. Discussing and enacting party policies
7. Revising the party rules and making amendments to these

In between WPK national meetings, the Central Committee is the highest decision-making institution. The Central Auditing Commission is responsible for supervising the party's finances and works separately from the Central Committee. The Central Committee elects the composition of several bodies to carry out its work. The 1st Plenary Session of a newly elected central committee elects the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Secretariat, the Politburo, the Presidium, and the Central Auditing Commission. The Politburo exercises the functions and powers of the Central Committee when a plenum is not in session. The Presidium is the party's highest decision-making organ when the Politburo, the Central Committee, the Conference of Representatives and the Congress are not in session. It was established at the 6th National Congress in 1980.

The CMC is the highest decision-making institution on military affairs within the party and controls the operations of the Korean People's Army. The WPK General Secretary is by right Chairman of the CMC. Meanwhile, the Secretariat is the top implementation body and is headed by the WPK General Secretary and consists of several secretaries who normally head Central Committee departments, commissions, publications, and other organizations under it. The Central Auditing Commission resolves disciplinary issues involving party members. Investigative subjects range from graft to anti-party and counter-revolutionary activities, generally encompassing all party rules violations.

A first plenum of the Central Committee also elects the heads of departments, bureaus, and other institutions to pursue its work. The WPK currently has more than 15 Central Committee departments. Through these departments it controls several mass organisations and newspapers, such as Rodong Sinmun for instance. The Korean People's Army (KPA) is, according to the WPK rules, the "revolutionary armed power of the Workers' Party of Korea which inherited revolutionary traditions." The leading organ within the KPA is the General Political Bureau (GPB), which according to the WPK rules is defined "as an executive organ of the KPA Party Committee and is therefore entitled to the same authority as that of the Central Committee in conducting its activities." The GPB controls the party apparatus and every political officer within the KPA.

Lower-level organization

The WPK has local organizations for the three levels of local North Korean government: (1) provinces and province-level municipalities, (2) special city, ordinary cities and urban districts, and (3) rural counties and villages. North Korea has nine provinces, each with a provincial party committee; their composition is decided by the WPK.

The WPK has two types of membership: regular and probationary. Membership is open to those 20 years of age and older and is granted after the submission of an application (endorsed by two parties' members with at least two years in good standing) to a cell. The application is acted on by the cell's plenary session, and an affirmative decision is subject to ratification by a county-level party committee. After an application is approved a mandatory one-year probationary period may be waived under unspecified "special circumstances", allowing the candidate to become a full member. Recruitment is under the direction of the Organization and Guidance Department and its local branches. The general secretary has the authority to directly admit citizens who have "rendered outstanding service to the Party and the revolution, the country and the people, or who are politically and ideologically prepared" as members or candidate members.

The WPK claimed a membership of more than three million in 1988, a significant increase from the two million members announced in 1976; the increase may have resulted from the Three Revolutions Team Movement mobilization drive. At the time, 12 percent of the population held party membership, an abnormally large number for a communist country and a figure only comparable to Romania. Later figures have not been made publicly available, but membership today is estimated at 6.5 million. The WPK is the largest party represented in the Supreme People's Assembly and coexists with two other legal parties that are completely subservient to the WPK and must accept the WPK's "leading role" as a condition of their existence.

North Korean society is divided into three classes: industrial workers, peasants, and samuwon (intelligentsia and petite bourgeoisie). Since 1948, industrial workers have constituted the largest percentage of party members, followed by peasants and samuwon. Beginning in the 1970s, when North Korea's population reached the 50-per cent-urban mark, the composition of the party's groups changed; more people working in state-owned enterprises were party members, and the number of members in agricultural cooperatives decreased.

Symbols

The emblem of the WPK is an adaptation of the communist hammer and sickle, with a traditional Korean calligraphy brush. The symbols represent the three classes in Korean society, as described by the WPK: the industrial workers (hammer), the peasants (sickle), and the samuwon (ink brush). The samuwon class consists of clerks, small traders, bureaucrats, professors, and writers. This class is unique to North Korean class analysis and was conceptualized to increase education and literacy among the country's population.

The party's official anthem is titled "Long Live the Workers' Party of Korea" (조선로동당 만세) and was composed in 1980.

Election results

The following data are the seat numbers submitted by North Korea to the United Nations. According to North Korea historian Fyodor Tertitskiy, this data is likely falsified as deputies are simply described as WPK members inside North Korea, without mentions of the smaller parties.