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Radical right (Europe)

Right-wing groups in Europe since 1970

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Through Political science, Nationalism and Liberal democracy

The ideological spectrum of the radical right extends from staunchly national conservatism and right-wing populism, to far-right Third Positionism and other neo-fascist ideologies.

Terminology

Since the 2020s, scholars have described the radical right as belonging to a subset of far-right politics, distinguished from the extreme right. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, in a 2011 book, categorised radical right as being either "right-wing extremist" or "right-wing populist".

Origins

In the late 20th century, within the context of European politics, the term 'extreme right' was frequently used as a synonym for fascism, neo-fascism or neo-Nazism. In the 1990s, with the growth of populist anti-immigration parties which distanced themselves from their extremely pro-immigration counterparts, the number of scholars who attempted to distinguish the extreme right from the radical right greatly increased. This trend included the use of populism as another descriptive term, either as the populist radical right or radical-right populism.

In 1996, the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde noted that in most European countries, the terms "radical right" and "extreme right" were used interchangeably. He cited Germany as an exception, noting that among political scientists in that nation, the term "radical right" (Rechsradikalismus) was used in reference to those right-wing groups which were outside the political mainstream but which did not threaten "the free democratic order"; the term was thus used in contrast to the "extreme right" (Rechsextremen), which referred to groups which did threaten the constitutionality of the state and could therefore be banned under German law. According to the German scientist Klaus Wahl "the radical right can be scaled by using different degrees of militancy and aggressiveness from right-wing populism to racism, terrorism, and totalitarianism".

The term "radical right" originated in U.S. political discourse, where it was applied to various anti-communist groups which were active in the 1950s, during the era of McCarthyism. The term and accompanying concept then entered Western Europe through the social sciences. Conversely, the term "right-wing extremism" developed among European scholars, particularly those in Germany, to describe right-wing groups that developed in the decades following the Second World War, such as the West German National Democratic Party and the French Poujadists. This term then came to be adopted by some scholars in the U.S.

Europe's populist right

In his study of the movement in Europe, David Art defined the term "radical right" as referring to "a specific type of far right party that began to emerge in the late 1970s"; as Art used it, "far right" was "an umbrella term for any political party, voluntary association, or extra-parliamentary movement that differentiates itself from the mainstream right". Most commentators have agreed that these varied radical right parties have a number of common characteristics. Givens stated that the two characteristics shared by these radical rights groups were:

  • "They take an anti-immigrant stance by proposing stronger immigrant controls and the repatriation of unemployed immigrants, and they call for a national (i.e., citizens only) preference in social benefits and employment ('welfare chauvinism').
  • "In contrast to earlier extreme right or fascist parties, they work within a country's political and electoral system. Although they do not have the goal of tearing down the current political system, they are anti-establishment. They consider themselves "outsiders" in the party system, and therefore not tainted by government or mainstream parties' scandals."

In 2000, Minkenberg characterised the "radical right" as "a political ideology, the core element of which is a myth of a homogeneous nation, a romantic and populist ultranationalism which is directed against the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and universalism. The contemporary radical right does not want to return to pre-democratic regimes such as monarchy or feudalism. It wants government by the people, but in terms of ethnocracy instead of democracy." In 2020, Wahl summarized that "ideologies of the radical right emphasize social and economic threats in the modern and postmodern world (e.g., globalization, immigration). The radical right also promises protection against such threats by an emphatic ethnic construction of 'we', the people, as a familiar, homogeneous in-group, anti-modern, or reactionary structures of family, society, an authoritarian state, nationalism, the discrimination, or exclusion of immigrants and other minorities ... While favoring traditional social and cultural structures (traditional family and gender roles, religion, etc.) the radical right uses modern technologies and does not ascribe to a specific economic policy; some parties tend toward a liberal, free-market policy, and others more to a welfare state policy."

Journalist Nick Robins-Early characterised the European radical right as focusing on "sometimes vitriolic anti-Euro, anti-immigrant sentiment, as well as renewed security fears" within European nations. According to political scientist Andrej Zaslove, populist radical right parties "employ an anti‐state, anti‐bureaucratic, anti‐elite, anti‐European Union political message."

Base of support

The 2005 paper in the European Journal of Political Research argues that the two groups most likely to vote for populist right parties are "blue-collar workers – who support extensive state intervention in the economy – and owners of small businesses – who are against such state intervention".

A 2014 article by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation argued that economic inequality is growing the gap "between the winners of globalisation and its losers. The first group live in urban areas, have relatively stable jobs and access to modern communications and transport, but fears nevertheless that it will soon share the fate of the second group. The second group, meanwhile, are threatened by unemployment or stuck in poorly paid and precarious jobs. They belong to the working class or consider themselves part of the lower middle class and fear – for themselves or their children – (further) social decline. Such people live in de-industrialised areas, or rural or semi-urban areas, on the periphery of globalised metropolises to which they have no access."

Scholars have argued that neoliberalism has led to European "social and economic insecurity" in the working and middle classes, leading to the growth of right wing populism.

Minkenberg termed the supporters of the radical right "modernization losers", in that they are from the sectors of society whose "social and cultural capital is shrinking and they are intent on defending it against encroachments on their traditional entitlements." He described this base as those who exhibit "unease, rigid thinking, authoritarian attitudes and traditional values – all of which reinforce each other."

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