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Through Mixed economy, Privatization and COVID-19 pandemic

Indonesia depends on the domestic market and government budget spending and its ownership of state-owned enterprises. Indonesian state-owned companies have assets valued at more than 1 trillion USD as of 2024. Government price controls are applied to a range of basic goods (including rice and electricity) and play a significant role in Indonesia's market economy. However, a mix of micro, medium and small companies contribute around 61.7% of the economy and significant major private-owned companies and foreign companies are also present.

In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the government took custody of a significant portion of private sector assets through the acquisition of nonperforming bank loans and corporate assets through the debt restructuring process, and the companies in custody were sold for privatisation several years later. Since 1999, the economy has recovered, and growth accelerated to over 4–6% in the early 2000s. Indonesia faced a recession in 2020 when the economic growth collapsed to −2.07% due to the COVID-19 pandemic, its worst economic performance since the 1997 crisis. In recent years Indonesia's manufacturing sector, long its growth engine, has shedded hundreds of thousands of jobs, with an estimated loss of 300,000 since 2023.

History

Sukarno era

In the years immediately following the proclamation of Indonesian independence, both the Japanese occupation and the conflict between Dutch and Republican forces had crippled the country's production, with exports of commodities such as rubber and oil being reduced to 12 and 5% of their pre-WW2 levels, respectively. The first Republican government-controlled bank, the Indonesian State Bank (Bank Negara Indonesia, BNI) was founded on 5 July 1946. It initially acted as the manufacturer and distributor of ORI (Oeang Republik Indonesia/Money of the Republic of Indonesia), a currency issued by the Republican Government which was the predecessor of Rupiah. Despite this, currency issued during the Japanese occupation and by Dutch authorities was still in circulation, and the simplicity of the ORI made its counterfeiting relatively easy, worsening matters. Between 1949 and 1960, Indonesia experienced several economic disruptions. The country's independence recognised by the Netherlands, the dissolution of the United States of Indonesia in 1950, the subsequent liberal democracy period, the nationalisation of De Javasche Bank into the modern Bank Indonesia, and the takeover of Dutch corporate assets following the West New Guinea dispute, which all resulted in the devaluation of Dutch banknotes into half their value.

During the guided democracy era in the 1960s, the economy deteriorated drastically as a result of political instability. The government was inexperienced in implementing macroeconomic policies, which resulted in severe poverty and hunger. By the time of Sukarno's downfall in the mid-1960s, the economy was in chaos with 1,000% annual inflation, shrinking export revenues, crumbling infrastructure, factories operating at minimal capacity, and negligible investment. Nevertheless, Indonesia's post-1960 economic improvement was considered remarkable when taking into consideration how few indigenous Indonesians in the 1950s had received a formal education under Dutch colonial policies.

New Order

Following President Sukarno's downfall, the New Order administration brought a degree of discipline to economic policy that quickly brought inflation down, stabilised the currency, rescheduled foreign debt, and attracted foreign aid and investment. (See Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia and Berkeley Mafia). Indonesia was for many years Southeast Asia's only member of OPEC, and the 1970s oil price rise provided an export revenue windfall that contributed to sustained high economic growth rates, averaging over 7% from 1968 to 1981.

With high levels of state regulation and dependence on declining oil prices, growth slowed to an average of 4.5% per annum between 1981 and 1988. A range of economic reforms was introduced in the late 1980s, including a managed devaluation of the rupiah to improve export competitiveness, and deregulation of the financial sector. Foreign investment flowed into Indonesia, particularly into the rapidly developing export-oriented manufacturing sector, and from 1989 to 1997, the Indonesian economy grew by an average of over 7%. GDP per capita grew 545% from 1970 to 1980 as a result of the sudden increase in oil export revenues from 1973 to 1979. High levels of economic growth masked several structural weaknesses in the economy. It came at a high cost in terms of weak and corrupt governmental institutions, severe public indebtedness through mismanagement of the financial sector, rapid depletion of natural resources, and a culture of favours and corruption among politicians and the business elite.

Corruption particularly gained momentum in the 1990s, reaching the highest levels of the political hierarchy as Suharto became a highly corrupt leader according to Transparency International. As a result, the legal system was weak, and there was no effective way to enforce contracts, collect debts, or sue for bankruptcy. Banking practices were very unsophisticated, with collateral-based lending the norm and widespread violation of prudential regulations, including limits on connected lending. Non-tariff barriers, rent-seeking by state-owned enterprises, domestic subsidies, barriers to domestic trade and export restrictions all created economic distortions.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis that began to affect Indonesia became an economic and political crisis. The initial response was to float the rupiah, raise key domestic interest rates, and tighten fiscal policy. In October 1997, Indonesia and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reached an agreement on an economic reform program aimed at macroeconomic stabilisation and the elimination of some of the country's most damaging economic policies, such as the National Car Program and the clove monopoly, both involving family members of Suharto. The rupiah remained weak, however, and Suharto was forced to resign in May 1998 after massive riots erupted. In August 1998, Indonesia and the IMF agreed on an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) under President B. J. Habibie that included significant structural reform targets. President Abdurrahman Wahid took office in October 1999, and Indonesia and the IMF signed another EFF in January 2000. The new program also has a range of economic, structural reform, and governance targets.

The effects of the crisis were severe. By November 1997, rapid currency depreciation had seen public debt reach US$60 billion, imposing severe strains on the government's budget. In 1998, real GDP contracted by 13.1%, and the economy reached its low point in mid-1999 with 0.8% real GDP growth. Inflation reached 72% in 1998 but slowed to 2% in 1999. The rupiah, which had been in the RP 2,600/USD1 range at the start of August 1997 fell to 11,000/USD1 by January 1998, with spot rates around 15,000 for brief periods during the first half of 1998. It returned to the 8,000/USD1 range at the end of 1998 and has generally traded in the Rp 8,000–10,000/USD1 range ever since, with fluctuations that are relatively predictable and gradual. However, the rupiah began devaluing past 11,000 in 2013, and as of November 2016 is around 13,000 Rp/USD1.

Reform era

Since an inflation target was introduced in 2000, the GDP deflator and the CPI have grown at an average annual pace of 10¾% and 9%, respectively, similar to the pace recorded in the two decades prior to the 1997 crisis, but well below the pace in the 1960s and 1970s. Inflation has also generally trended lower through the 2000s, with some of the fluctuations in inflation reflecting government policy initiatives such as the changes in fiscal subsidies in 2005 and 2008, which caused large temporary spikes in CPI growth.

In late 2004, Indonesia faced a 'mini-crisis' due to international oil prices rises and imports. The currency exchange rate reached Rp 12,000/USD1 before stabilising. Under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the government was forced to cut its massive fuel subsidies, which were planned to cost $14 billion in October 2005.

As of February 2007, the unemployment rate was 9.75%. Despite a slowing global economy, Indonesia's economic growth accelerated to a ten-year high of 6.3% in 2007. This growth rate was sufficient to reduce poverty from 17.8% to 16.6% based on the government's poverty line and reversed the recent trend towards jobless growth, with unemployment falling to 8.46% in February 2008. Unlike many of its more export-dependent neighbours, Indonesia has managed to skirt the recession helped by strong domestic demand (which makes up about two-thirds of the economy) and a government fiscal stimulus package of about 1.4% of GDP. After India and China, Indonesia was the third-fastest growing economy in the G20. With the $512 billion economy expanded 4.4% in the first quarter from a year earlier and last month, the IMF revised its 2009 Indonesia forecast to 3–4% from 2.5%. Indonesia enjoyed stronger fundamentals with the authorities implemented wide-ranging economic and financial reforms, including a rapid reduction in public and external debt, strengthening of corporate and banking sector balance sheets and reducing bank vulnerabilities through higher capitalisation and better supervision.

In 2012, Indonesia's real GDP growth reached 6%, then it steadily decreased below 5% until 2015. After Joko Widodo succeeded SBY, the government took measures to ease regulations for foreign direct investments to stimulate the economy. Indonesia managed to increase their GDP growth slightly above 5% in 2016–2017. However, the government is currently still facing problems such as currency weakening, decreasing exports and stagnating consumer spending. The current unemployment rate for 2019 is at 5.3%.

Between 2019 and 2020, Indonesia's economy faced significant challenges due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The country's GDP contracted by 2.1% in 2020, marking its first annual decline in over two decades. This downturn was attributed to strict public health measures, including large-scale social restrictions (PSBB), which disrupted economic activities, particularly in major urban centres like Jakarta and West Java. Despite these challenges, the government implemented fiscal stimulus packages and social assistance programs to mitigate the pandemic's impact on vulnerable populations. By the third quarter of 2020, signs of recovery emerged, with the pace of economic contraction slowing to 3.5% year-over-year, driven by a partial rebound in consumption and investment.

In 2021, Indonesia's economy began to recover, recording a growth rate of 4.4%, supported by improved domestic demand and positive spillovers from a stronger global economy. The recovery was further bolstered by the government's efforts to accelerate the COVID-19 vaccination rollout and implement policies aimed at boosting economic activity. Growth accelerated to 5.0% in 2022, driven by reduced uncertainty and the assumption that the vaccine rollout would reach a critical mass of the population.

In October 2024, Prabowo Subianto assumed the presidency, inheriting an economy with steady growth but facing structural challenges. His administration introduced ambitious policies aimed at boosting economic growth to 8%, including a $28 billion annual free school meals program and plans to retire all fossil fuel power plants within 15 years. To fund these initiatives, the government implemented significant budget cuts totalling $18.8 billion, affecting various sectors such as public works, education, and health. These austerity measures led to public unrest and raised concerns about the potential impact on infrastructure projects and public services. Additionally, the presence of entrenched criminal networks, known as preman, along with certain mass organisations (ormas), posed significant challenges to foreign investment and economic reforms. These groups have been involved in activities such as extortion, intimidation, and obstruction of industrial operations, particularly in key economic zones like Bekasi, Karawang, and Batam. Such actions have led to financial losses estimated up to $137.8 billion and have deterred potential investors, undermining efforts to create a conducive investment climate.

Between 2019 and 2025, the IDR experienced significant fluctuations influenced by both domestic and global factors. In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the rupiah weakened sharply, reaching around Rp 16,500 per US dollar due to capital outflows and economic crash. As the economy began to recover in 2021 and 2022, the currency stabilised, trading between Rp 14,000 and Rp 15,000 per dollar. However, in 2023 and 2024, the rupiah faced renewed pressure, depreciating to levels around Rp 16,200 per dollar by April 2024. This depreciation was attributed to political uncertainties ahead of the presidential election and concerns over fiscal policies.

In 2025, the rupiah's performance remained volatile. Early in the year, it reached a five-year low, prompting Bank Indonesia to intervene in the foreign exchange market to stabilise the currency. The central bank maintained its benchmark interest rate at 5.75% in March to support the rupiah and control inflation. By May, with signs of stabilisation, Bank Indonesia cut the rate to 5.50% to stimulate economic growth, as the rupiah had appreciated over 3% from its April lows.

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