Quranism

History

Early Islam

Quranists date their beliefs back to the time of Muhammad, who they claim prohibited the writing of Hadiths. As they believe that Hadiths, while not being reliable sources of religion, can be used as a reference to get an idea on historical events, they point out several narrations about early Islam to support their beliefs.

They first point to reports concerning the first caliph, Abu Bakr (r. 632–634). According to a report attributed to Aisha, Abu Bakr gathered around 500 narrations attributed to Muhammad and subsequently burned them, reportedly out of concern that some might not correspond exactly to what the Prophet had said. In the report, Abu Bakr is said to have explained his actions to his daughter, stating:

"I feared that I might die while leaving these with you, and among them would be narrations from a man whom I trusted and relied upon, but it turns out it was not as he narrated to me, so I would have [unintentionally] transmitted that incorrectly." — Abu Bakr as reported in Kanz al-Ummal, vol. 5, p. 237, no. 12727

While numerous chroniclers recorded this narrative in their historical and biographical compilations, hadith critics generally classify the account as inauthentic due to critical gaps and unverified transmitters in its chain of narration.

Quranists also cite reports about the second caliph, ʿUmar (r. 634–644), who likewise prohibited the writing of Hadiths and destroyed existing collections during his reign. Similar reports claim that when Umar appointed a governor to Kufa, he told him:

"You are going to a people whose recitation of the Qur'an is like the buzzing of bees. Do not distract them with hadith and thus occupy them. Devote yourselves to the Qur'an and reduce narration from the Messenger of God." — Umar as reported in Ibn Sa'd, al-Tabaqat al-Kubra, vol. 6, p. 7

Quranists further trace this position to a report attributed to Abu Sa'id al-Khudri, in which Muhammad is said to have instructed that nothing but the Qur'an be written down from him.

Kharijites

A categorical rejection of Hadiths, as can be found today among the Quranists, is already known in the early days of Islam by the Kharijites. For example, Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī (d. 931) in his Kitāb al-Maqālāt speaks of the Kharijites as "those who declare the tradition completely null and void and claim that one only needs to know what the Book literally speaks of". The Muʿtazilite thinker Dirār ibn ʿAmr (d. ca. 815) reports that, according to the teachings of the two Kharijite sects the Azraqites and Bazighites, "knowledge of religion can only be acquired from the Qur'an and they rejected the Ijmāʿ and the traditions". A letter that the early Khārijī ʿAbdallāh ibn Ibād is said to have sent to the Umayyad caliph ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān in the year 76 of the Hijra (695) rejects Hadiths as the basis for the imposition of duties and prohibitions and admonishes people to adhere only to the Qur'an. The Bidʿīya, a subgroup of the Azraqites, is said to have recognised only two daily obligatory prayers with reference to Sura 11:114.

Some of the Kharijites rejected the punishment of adultery with stoning. Although the Qur'an does not prescribe this penalty, Sunnis hold that such a verse existed in the Qur'an, which was then abrogated. A Hadith is ascribed to Umar, asserting the existence of this verse in the Qur'an. These Kharijites rejected the authenticity of such a verse. The Islamic scholar Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī attributed this position to the Kharijite sect, the Azariqa, who held a strict scripturalist position in legal matters (i.e. following only the Qur'an and rejecting commonly held views if they had no Quranic basis), and thus also refused to enforce legal punishment on slanderers when the slander was targeted at a male.

Muhammad ibn Idrīs ash-Shafiʿī (d. 820) also reports in his tractate Jimāʿ al-ʿIlm of a group of scholars who completely rejected the authority of the Hadiths. He summarises their reasoning as follows: The Qur'anic text in Sura 16:89, which states that the Qur'an is a "clarification for every thing" (tibyān li-kull shaiʾ), shows that the Qur'an contains all the necessary information for the derivation of legal rules; therefore, there is no need for Hadith reports to interpret the normative content of Qur'anic verses. Since the Qur'an does not specify a specific number or time for ritual prayer, nor a specific amount for Zakah, a person fulfills his duties if he prays only once a day or every few days, or gives the smallest amount that can be considered alms. At no point in his text does ash-Shafiʿī mention the names of individual persons or the school of thought that held these positions. Joseph Schacht was of the opinion that this group were Muʿtazilites. On the other hand, due to the similarity of these teachings to what is reported about the Kharijites, Hüseyin Hansu suspects that the group of scholars described by ash-Shafiʿī consisted of Kharijites.

Although there were also various critical positions among the Muʿtazilites regarding Hadiths, they did not completely reject extra-Qur'anic prophetic authority, but demanded that only what could be known with certainty could serve as the basis for Islamic legal norms. They therefore did not accept isolated Hadiths, but only those that were so widely accepted that their untruthfulness seemed unthinkable. After the 9th century, however, the Muʿtazilites abandoned this strict position and swung to the line of ash-Shafiʿī by accepting Hadiths handed down only by individuals as sources of certainty.

Umayyad period

The centrality of the Qur'an in the religious life of the Kufans that Umar described was quickly changing, however. A few decades later, a letter was sent to the Umayyad caliph ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān (r. 685–705) regarding the Kufans:

"They abandoned the judgement of their Lord and took Hadiths for their religion; and they claim that they have obtained knowledge other than from the Qur'an... They believed in a book which was not from God, written by the hands of men; they then attributed it to the Messenger of God."

In the following years, the taboo against the writing and following of Hadiths had receded to such an extent that the eighth Umayyad caliph ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (r. 717–720) ordered the first official collection of Hadith. ʾAbū Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn ʿAmr ibn Ḥazm and ʾAbū Bakr Muḥammad az-Zuhrī, were among those who wrote Hadiths at ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz's behest.

Abbasid period

Despite the trend towards Hadiths, the questioning of their authority continued during the Abbasid period and existed during the time of ash-Shafiʿī, when a group known as Ahl al-Kalam argued that the prophetic example of Muhammad "is found in following the Qur'an alone", rather than Hadith. The majority of Hadiths, according to them, was mere guesswork, conjecture, and bid'a, while the Book of God was complete and perfect, and did not require the Hadith to supplement or complement it. There were prominent scholars who rejected traditional Hadiths like Dirar ibn Amr. He wrote a book titled The Contradiction Within Hadith. However, the tide had changed from the earlier centuries to such an extent that Dirar was assaulted and had to remain in hiding until his death. Like Dirar ibn Amr, the scholar ʾAbū Bakr al-Aṣamm also had little use for Hadiths.

Under the Abbasid caliph al-Maʾmūn (r. 813–833), the adherents of Kalam were favoured and the supporters of Hadiths were dealt harshly. Al-Maʾmūn was inclined towards rational inquiry in religious matters, supported the proponents of Kalam and persecuted the adherents of Hadiths. His two immediate successors, al-Muʿtaṣim (r. 833–842) and al-Wāthiq (r. 842–847), followed his policies. Unlike his three predecessors, al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861) was not inclined to rational inquiry in religious matters, and strove to bolster the Hadiths as a necessary source of the Sunnah.

The emergence of Quranism in modern India and Egypt

In the 18th and 19th centuries, Muslim reform thinkers began to deal again with the authority of Islamic sources of law, rejected the taqlīd and demanded a return to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In addition, there was the confrontation with the superiority of the Western great powers. Muslim scholars now had to deal with new questions and problems that arose from the influence of Western ideas, which were spread by missionaries and Orientalists, among others. They also tried to find an explanation for the backwardness of Muslims compared to the progress made in Western countries. In order to provide an answer to these questions, to defend Islam against accusations, and to interpret it in such a way that it is compatible with rational and scientific ideas, some modernist scholars have sought to separate the foundations of religion from historical influences and tradition. To this end, they critically examined the four traditional sources of Islamic law (Qur'an, Sunnah, Ijmāʿ, Qiyās).

In this context, especially in British India at the time, a number of thinkers and scholars emerged who rejected Hadiths and wanted to establish the Qur'an as the main source. Syed Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), founder of the Aligarh Movement, argued that the Qur'an is the only authoritative source of Islam. The Hadith corpus is unreliable, since in traditional Hadith criticism only the trustworthiness of the narrators was used as evidence for the authenticity of the Hadiths. However, one should also critically analyse the Hadith text (matn) and check its compatibility with the Qur'an and reason. On the basis of this foundation, some theological dogmas and legal regulations would have to be rationally justified and interpreted according to criteria of reason, independent of tradition. Another important point in Syed Ahmad Khan's thinking was his definition of nature. He equated the laws of nature, the "Work of God," with revelation, the "Word of God." Among other things, this led to him being dismissed by other scholars as a "naturalist" (Naychirī) and his ideas were criticised by numerous contemporary scholars.

Chiragh Ali (d. 1895) further developed the ideas of Syed Ahmad Khan and took a stricter view of the use of Hadiths as an authoritative source. He also criticised the focus of Muslim scholars on the criticism of isnād and pointed that the Hadiths were not collected until decades after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, and concluded that almost all Hadiths were inauthentic. This assumption made it possible for him to invalidate and reform all regulations and institutions based on the Hadiths. Ali's starting point, however, was not the criticism of the Hadith per se, but the defense of the feasibility of Islam in the modern age and the search for the "True Islam" far from the ideas of traditional Muslims and the accusations of Western Orientalists.

At the same time as Syed Ahmad Khan, Muhammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905) began to cautiously criticise Hadiths in Egypt. He considered only mutawātir Hadiths to be ultimately binding, i.e. those handed down by a large number of people. However, aḥād Hadiths, i.e. those that have been handed down by only one person, are only to be followed if they convince the reader. In doing so, he opened the door to a personal assessment of the binding nature of the Hadiths without rejecting them as a whole. His focus was on rejecting the imitation of earlier schools of law and scholars, which in his opinion had contributed greatly to the retrogression of Muslims in his country.

In 1906, the Egyptian physician Muhammad Tawfiq Sidqi (d. 1920) published an article entitled "Islam is the Qur'an Alone" (Al-Islām huwa l-Qurʾān Waḥda-hū) in Rashīd Rida's magazine Al-Manār. As the name of the article suggests, Sidqi accepted the Qur'an alone as an authoritative religious source and was convinced that it contained all the necessary information. The Sunnah of the Prophet was only a model for his contemporaries. If the Prophet had wanted Hadiths to reach future generations, he would have had them written down – just like the Qur'an. Muslims today are therefore free to decide whether or not to follow something that is narrated by the Prophet and is not contained in the Qur'an. Sidqi's article drew a long discussion and several refutations, which were published in the journal along with his response.

"What is obligatory for man does not go beyond God's Book. If anything other than the Qur'an had been necessary for religion, the Prophet would have commanded its registration in writing, and God would have guaranteed its preservation." — Muhammad Tawfiq Sidqi

Quranism in early 20th-century India

At the beginning of the 20th century, Abdullah Chakralawi (d. 1916) founded the community of the Ahl aḏ-Ḏhikr wa-l-Qurʾān (Ahl al-Qurʾān for short) in Lahore. He was convinced that the Qur'an was so comprehensive that it was sufficient as a divine source for the guidance of Muslims, and therefore the rest of the written tradition, including the Hadiths and earlier Quranic commentaries, could be excluded. Thus, Chakralawi and his followers, in contrast to their predecessors, rejected the Hadiths as a whole recognising only the Qur'an as an authoritative and valid source on theological and ritual issues, and breaking away from classical exegetical methods. Between 1903 and 1932, they also published the journal Ishāʿat al-Qurʾān.

A few years after Chakralawi's death, Khwaja Ahmad ad-Din Amritsari (d. 1936) founded another Quranist movement in Amritsar, the Anjuman-i Ummat-i Muslimah, with the magazines al-Balāḡ and al-Bayān. The return to the Qur'an as the only authoritative source, in his opinion, should cleanse Islam of previous theological conclusions and jurisprudences, as well as of Arab-dominated thinking, thus making it a universal faith that can create harmony between the different religions.

The historian and Islamic scholar Aslam Jairajpuri (d. 1955) developed a Quranic history of the Hadith and saw the Hadiths not as a religiously binding, but very important historical source. With regard to ritual questions, he considered the actions of the Prophet (Sunnah al-Mutawātir), which had been handed down over many strands, to be trustworthy.

His student Ghulam Ahmed Perwez (d. 1985) became one of the most influential and productive personalities of the Quranist movement. In 1938, he founded the organisation Tolu-e-Islam in Delhi, which was later relocated to Lahore and published the journal Tolu-e-Islam, which had previously been edited by Syed Nazeer Niazi. Like his teacher, Perwez regarded the Hadiths as a purely historical source and attributed authority to the Prophet's interpretation mainly in his time. However, the Hadiths would have to be compared with the Qur'an, selected and thus cleansed. Similar to Amritsari, he ascribed to Islam a universal character, which could be achieved on the basis of the Qur'an. As far as the details of interpretation and implementation are concerned, these would have to be determined by a central Muslim authority – also in the form of a state – in a contemporary manner. In this context, Perwez also developed a theory of the state and later supported the partition of India and the founding of Pakistan. In particular, his views on Hadiths brought him much criticism. It even got to the point that 1,000 traditionalist scholars declared him an infidel in a Takfīr-Fatwa. However, the movement he founded is still active today and has followers in Pakistan and Europe, among other places.

The Yan Tatsine movement in Nigeria

A militant extremist current with a Quran-centric orientation emerged in the 1960s with the Yan Tatsine movement in Nigeria under Mohammed Marwa, better known by his nickname Maitatsine (d. 1980), which later led to an armed uprising. Muhammad Marwa came from Maroua in northern Cameroon and arrived in Kano in 1945. In the early 1960s, he began preaching a particular form of Quranic exegesis that was radically different from the commonly used Sunni Quranic commentaries in Kano and Northeastern Nigeria. Marwa rejected all Western inventions such as wristwatches, bicycles, cars and televisions. He also rejected the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and recognised only the Qur'an as an authoritative religious source. Marwa and his followers derived their specific prohibitions directly from the Qur'an, excluding traditional literature and using the Hausa language. Those who did not obey these precepts were labelled as polytheists. In December 1980, they finally stormed the Friday Mosque of Kano. The uprising was crushed by the Nigerian Army. Several thousand people died in the fighting, including Marwa himself. However, the movement lived on and led to uprisings in other parts of northern Nigeria for some time.

Libya under Gaddafi

The military coup in Libya in 1969 brought Muammar Gaddafi (d. 2011) to power, who initially gave the country a pan-Arabist, socialist and later increasingly clear Islamic orientation. Gaddafi ascribed a universal claim to Islam and called for a return to the "essence of Islam" and its fundamental source, the Qur'an, which was interpreted in a progressive way. In the Declaration on the Authority of the People of 1977 the Qur'an was declared the "constitution" of the People's Republic of Libya. Gaddafi asserted the Qur'an as the sole guide to Islamic governance and the unimpeded ability of every Muslim to read and interpret it. The Islamic tradition, including the Hadiths, the schools of law and jurisprudence of earlier scholars, was rejected by Gaddafi, on the grounds that it distracted Muslims from the "primordial source of divine truth". In contrast, the religious acts of the Prophet Muhammad such as ritual prayer were recognised as Sunnah. In 1978, the year zero of the Islamic calendar was also changed from the Hijrah to the anniversary of the Prophet's death. Gaddafi was also critical of the various schools of jurisprudence, such as the Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali, charging that they are the product of a struggle for political power and unconnected with either Islam or the Qur'an.

Rashad Khalifa and his international impact

In the United States, the Egyptian Rashad Khalifa developed a new theological doctrine at the end of the 20th century, which had an influence on Quranists in many other countries. With the help of computers, he carried out a numerical analysis of the Qur'an, which was supposed to prove unequivocally that it was of divine origin. The fundamental role was played by the number 19, which is mentioned in a verse and which Khalifa sought to find everywhere in the structure of the Qur'an as the "Qur'an code" or "Code 19". This "scientific" approach was initially welcomed by many Muslims. However, Khalifa's subsequent conclusions led to strong criticism from Muslims and scholars around the world. Khalifa claimed that the Sunnah and the Hadith were pure speculation and satanic traps for the people, and their observance was tantamount to associating partners with God (shirk). He also excluded two verses from the Qur'an (Q 9:128–129) as "satanic" because they were incompatible with his theory based on the number 19. Rashad Khalifa also founded an organisation called United Submitters International, which published a monthly newsletter entitled Submitter's Perspective from 1985 onwards. Like Muhammad Marwa before him, Rashad Khalifa declared himself God's Messenger of the Covenant in 1989, causing a great stir and outrage.

With his teachings, Rashad Khalifa developed a strong international reputation as early as the 1980s. It is worth mentioning, for example, the Egyptian activist Ahmad Subhy Mansour, who was relieved of his professorship of Islamic history at Al-Azhar University in 1985 because of his Quranist ideas and imprisoned two years later. In January 1988, he traveled to the United States and joined Rashad Khalifa, but soon left his circle. In 2002, he was granted asylum in the United States and founded the "International Quranic Center" there, which is mainly active online. In addition to a return to the Qur'an alone, the goals of the organisation include the promotion of democracy and human rights.

The circle of Quranists around Rashad Khalifa also includes Edip Yüksel, a Kurdish activist from Turkey who initially campaigned for an Islamic revolution in Turkey, which is why he was imprisoned. Through the works of Rashad Khalifa, he became acquainted with the ideas of Quranism and began to propagate them. In 1989, he had to leave the country and joined the Submitters in Tucson, but left them some time later. Yüksel and two other authors produced their own translation of the Qur'an and disseminated their own and Khalifa's ideas in numerous Turkish and English books as well as online – above all the doctrine of the number 19. In some respects, however, his views differ from those of the Submitters. In his opinion, for example, one only has to pray three times a day, because only three prayer times are mentioned in the Qur'an, and there are no fixed dress codes during prayer.

Rashad Khalifa himself was murdered in 1990 in the Tucson Mosque, where he had previously worked as an Imam for eleven years. However, the organisation he founded, called United Submitters International, continues to exist. Followers, albeit few in number, can also be found in other regions of America and Canada and are mainly active online. They see themselves as a "moderate reformist religious community" and are not associated with other Muslim communities, as they believe that they do not really follow the Qur'an. The Submitters practise the Five Pillars of Islam with deviations from the practice of the majority of Muslims, which in their opinion is not found in the Qur'an. The women do not wear headscarves and take an active part in community life.

Rashad Khalifa also had some long-distance effect with his teachings. In Malaysia, for example, under his influence, Kassim Ahmad (d. 2017) wrote the book Hadith: A Re-evaluation in 1997, in which he called for a scientific evaluation of Hadiths and the entire Islamic tradition, as they were responsible for the retrogression of Muslims. He saw the Qur'an as the only Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad and criticised the classical Sunni view of the Sunnah and Hadiths since ash-Shafiʿī. Although his ideas are largely in line with those of Rashad Khalifa, Ahmad uses a milder tone, calling on people to think rationally and for social reform at the same time. His book was banned in Malaysia and Ahmad was declared a heretic.

The South African preacher Ahmed Deedat also contributed to the dissemination of Khalifa's ideas with his book Al-Qurʾān – The Ultimate Miracle, which was strongly based on Khalifa's early writings. This book fell on particularly fertile ground with the former followers of the Maitatsine movement in Kano. There, in the late 1990s, Quranist movement formed among well-off civil servants and freelancers who called themselves Qurʾānawa. They accept the prophethood of Muhammad, but reject Hadiths. They do not see Rashad Khalifa as a prophet or a messenger of God, but they adhere to his teachings. To spread their teachings of the "mathematical miracle of the Qur'an" and the lack of authenticity of Hadiths, they rely heavily on the Internet. From Kano, the Quranist movement has also spread to other cities in northern Nigeria. Well-known Quranists who have been influenced by the teachings of Rashad include Isa Othman, a Supreme Court of Nigeria Judge from Maiduguri, and Uthman Muhammad Dangungu, a former leading preacher of the Izala Society. In Nigeria, the Quranists will also call Sunnis Qāla Qato (lit. "Man said"), after their statement that what man says is not accepted as authoritative, unlike the Qur'anic Qāla Allāhu ("God said").

Distinction between Submitters and other Quranist movements

Since Rashad Khalifa declared himself "God's Messenger of the Covenant" in 1989 and established United Submitters International, certain observers have conflated the Submitters with the broader Quranist movement. Submitters share with other Quranists a rejection of Hadith as a binding source of religious authority, but Khalifa's movement developed additional doctrines that distinguish it from other Quranist currents:

• Textual integrity of the Qur'an: Submitters exclude two verses from the Qur'an (Q 9:128–129), on the grounds that their inclusion conflicts with Khalifa's "Code 19" mathematical pattern. Other Quranist writers have rejected this exclusion as tahrif (alteration of scripture), maintaining the integrity of the received Qur'anic text.
• Religious authority: Submitters accept Khalifa's claim to a divinely appointed role and give particular authority to his commentary and interpretations. Other Quranist writers reject the attribution of binding religious authority to post-Qur'anic individuals and emphasize direct engagement with the Qur'an.
• Status of Code 19: The mathematical code associated with Khalifa occupies a central role in Submitter theology and is presented as evidence of the Qur'an's divine authorship. Other Quranist writers have questioned or rejected the theological significance of Code 19, treating it as a form of numerological interpretation rather than as an essential criterion of Qur'anic authority.
• Ritual practice: Submitters follow standardized ritual practices based on Khalifa's interpretations of the Qur'an. Other Quranist writers differ in their interpretations of prayer and other religious obligations, reflecting the decentralized character of Quranist thought.

Consequently, United Submitters International is commonly treated in the literature as a distinct modern religious movement within the broader spectrum of Qur'an-centric Islam, rather than as representative of all Quranist currents.

Quranist movement in Turkey and Europe

In Turkey, Quranist ideas have been making themselves felt since the mid-1970s. One of the first and most important thinkers in this line is the Islamic theologian Hüseyin Atay. Among other things, he wrote his own translation of the Qur'an and was of the opinion that Islam at the time of the Prophet consisted only of the Qur'an and reason. It was only after the death of the Prophet that people began to refer to Hadiths, statements by companions of the Prophet and scholarly opinions, which in the long term led to alienation from the Qur'an and imitation of scholars. All extra-Quranic sources and tradition belonged only to the realm of religious culture and should be critically examined. Similar ideas were held by his student Yaşar Nuri Öztürk (d. 2016), who also wrote his own translation of the Qur'an.

Kerem Adıgüzel, a Swiss-Turkish author, founded the German-language website Alrahman.de in 2007 and the Al-Rahman – mit Vernunft und Hingabe (Al-Rahman – With Reason and Dedication) association in 2017. In addition to a return to the Qur'an, Adıgüzel is solely committed to a "de-Arabisation" of Islam, tries to make the Qur'an more accessible to German-speaking readers in particular and to enable independent interpretation. His arguments regarding the rejection of the traditional Sunnah views and Hadiths as well as his conviction of a mathematical code in the Qur'an are largely in line with the ideas of Edip Yüksel. In his book Key to Understanding the Qur'an, Adıgüzel describes his attitude to the Hadiths as follows:

"Aḥādīṯ, in German sayings, do not explain the reading, but rather dilute it with new words and new questions, new (often meaningless) laws, superstitions and sometimes even blasphemies. They elevate themselves as another authority alongside God's Word by selling themselves as "Islamic." They unconsciously demand that we associate them with God's word and thus make ourselves guilty of the capital sin in faith par excellence, namely the shirk, the association of other deities and authorities besides God. These sayings do not represent prophetic words. The prophet himself was always against the writing of his personal sayings [...], which is why in the first century no book was written that records the personal words of the prophet." — Adıgüzel: Key to Understanding the Koran. 2015, p. 197.

Doctrine

Foundational tenets

Quranism is not a single organized sect with a central hierarchy; rather, it is a scriptural methodology. Despite this lack of central authority, Quranist writers and adherents worldwide broadly converge on a set of foundational tenets:

• The Qur'an is the sole, self-sufficient source of Islamic doctrine and law, requiring no external source for divine legislation.
• Hadith literature cannot serve as a binding source of religious law or doctrine, whatever historical value it may hold.
• The Qur'an is clear and complete, and is properly interpreted through itself rather than through external traditions.
• Religious authority rests with the individual believer rather than with clergy, scholarly consensus, or centralised institutions.
• Each individual bears absolute accountability before God, and outsourcing religious interpretation to a third party does not excuse error.
• Earlier revealed scriptures, such as the Bible, have been altered from their original form, leaving the Qur'an as the only textually reliable book of God.

In practice, this self-sufficiency principle leads Quranists to interpret the Qur'an using the Qur'an itself:

[A] literal and holistic analysis of the text from a contemporary perspective and applying the exegetical principle of tafsir al-qur'an bi al-qur'an (explaining the Qur'an with the Qur'an) and the jurisprudential principle al-asl fi al-kalam al-haqiqah (the fundamental rule of speech is literalness), without refracting that Qur'anic usage through the lens of history and tradition.

This methodology differs from Tafsir bi'r-Riwāyah, which is the method of commenting on the Qur'an using traditional sources, and Tafsir al-Qur'an bi-l-Kitab, which refers to interpreting the Qur'an with/through the Bible, generally referred to in Quranic studies as the Tawrat and the ʾInjīl.

This self-referential methodology has historically led individual Quranists to reject specific doctrines they judged unsupported by the Qur'an itself. In the centuries following Muhammad's death, Quranists did not believe in naskh. The Kufan scholar Dirar ibn Amr's Quranist belief led him to deny the Dajjal, Punishment of the Grave, and Shafa'a in the 8th century. The Egyptian scholar Mohammed Abu Zaid al-Damanhury's Quranist commentaries led him to reject the belief in the ’Isrā’ and Miʿrāj in the early 20th century. In his rationalist Qur'an commentary published in 1930, which uses the Qur'an itself to interpret the Qur'an, he claimed that verse 17:1 was an allusion to the Hijrah and not ’Isrā’ and Miʿrāj.

Syed Ahmad Khan similarly argued that, while the Qur'an remained socially relevant, reliance on Hadith limits the vast potential of the Qur'an to a particular cultural and historical situation. The extent to which Quranists reject the authority of Hadith varies, but the more established groups have thoroughly criticised the authority of Hadiths and reject it for many reasons. The most common of these is the Quranist claim that Hadith is not mentioned in the Qur'an as a source of Islamic theology and practice, was not systematically recorded in written form until roughly a century after Muhammad's death, and not formally compiled into the canonical collections used today until nearly two centuries after that, and contain internal errors and contradictions as well as contradictions with the Quran. For Sunni Muslims, the Sunnah, i.e. the way of the Prophet, is one of the two primary sources of Islamic law, and while the Qur'an has verses enjoining Muslims to obey the Messenger, the Qur'an never talks about Sunnah in connection with Muhammad or other prophets. The term Sunnah appears several times, including in the phrase sunnah Allah (way of God), but not sunnah an-Nabi (way of the Prophet), a phrase customarily used by proponents of Hadiths.

The concept of taḥrīf has also been advocated within the broader Quran-centric movement by Rashad Khalifa, founder of the Submitters, who believed that previous revelations of God, such as the Bible, contained contradictions due to human interference. Instead, he believed that the beliefs and practices of Islam should be based on the Qur'an alone. Among Quranists proper, Edip Yüksel similarly holds that the Bible contains contradictions.

Differences with mainstream Islam

Quranists believe that the Qur'an is the sole source of religious law and guidance in Islam, rejecting the authority of external sources such as the Hadiths. They argue that the vast majority of Hadith literature is forged and maintain that the Qur'an itself criticises such narrations in both a technical and general sense. They point to 39:23, which describes the Qur'an itself as "the best hadith"; to 4:87 and 45:6, which ask rhetorically what other "hadith" beyond God's own words could be trusted; to 77:50, which poses a similar challenge in the context of disbelief; and to 31:6, which warns against those who "buy idle hadith" to mislead others from God's way — a set of verses Quranists read collectively as the Qur'an using the word hadith to refer to itself, and warning against treating any other "hadith" as equally authoritative.

Furthermore, Quranists contend that Sunni and Shia theologians have distorted the meaning of key scriptural passages to support sectarian agendas, particularly regarding verses on women's rights and warfare. They argue that both major sects have altered the central authority of scripture by promoting external dual sources of guidance—such as the Sunni reliance on the Quran and Sunnah, and the Shia reliance on the Quran and Ahl al-Bayt (the People of the House) as codified in traditional narrations like Hadith al-Thaqalayn. As a result of these foundational theological divergences, distinct differences exist between traditional Islamic and Quranist religious practices.

For instance, several extra-Quranic traditions upheld in traditional Sunni practice—such as venerating the Black Stone, the ritual Stoning of the Devil, and reciting the Tashahhud during Ṣalāh—are regarded by Quranists as forms of idolatry (shirk) or potential corruption of pure monotheism.

Concept of the Sunnah

In Quranist discourse and modern academic Islamic studies, a fundamental distinction is drawn between the concepts of Hadith (individual textual narrations attributed to Muhammad) and Sunnah (the established normative practice, model, or "way" of the Prophet). While classical and mainstream Sunni and Shia jurisprudence (Usul al-Fiqh) routinely uses the terms synonymously—positing that the Sunnah is primarily recorded within and accessed through canonical Hadith collections, a significant consensus among Quranist thinkers rejects Hadith compilations while maintaining a reinterpreted, non-textual understanding of the Sunnah.

Epistemological distinction between Hadith and Sunnah

Quranist theologians and modern reformists emphasise the epistemological gap between oral/textual reports and lived historical practices. Hadith collections, canonised over two centuries after the Prophet's death, are categorised in Islamic legal theory as āḥād (isolated, non-mass-transmitted narrations). Because these reports are subject to human error, sectarian bias, political manipulation during the Umayyad and Abbasid eras, and contextual linguistic shifts, Quranists view the entire Hadith corpus as epistemologically uncertain (ẓannī). Consequently, they argue that Hadith cannot serve as an authoritative, divine source of Islamic law (sharia) alongside the Qur'an.

Conversely, Quranists contend that the original Sunnah was never intended to be an anecdotal, legalistic catalog of spoken dictations or administrative rulings. Instead, it is understood as an overarching, lived ethical paradigm and a set of practical monotheistic rituals inherited and institutionalized by Muhammad. In this view, obedience to the Prophet (āṭīʿū ar-Rasūl) means adhering to the divine message he delivered—the Qur'an—and following the overarching monotheistic model he practiced, rather than subscribing to second-hand historical compilations.

Al-Sunnah al-ʿAmaliyyah (practical tradition)

A major intellectual stream within Quranism distinguishes between written Hadith literature and al-Sunnah al-ʿAmaliyyah (the practical or continuous Sunnah). Proponents of this methodology hold that essential Islamic practices were transmitted not through written chains of narrators (isnad), but through perpetual, generational mass practice (tawātur ʿamalī) passed down through entire communities.

Under this framework, core devotional and communal practices—such as the structural units and physical forms of daily prayers (ṣalāh), the procedural steps of pilgrimage (ḥajj), the public calls to prayer (aḏān and iqāmah), funeral rites (janāzah), are preserved as inherited practical traditions (Sunnah 'Amaliyya) passed down through continuous mass transmission (tawātur) rather than Hadith-derived mandates. By contrast, ritual purification (wuḍūʾ) is derived directly from the explicit text of the Quran (Surah al-Māʾidah, 5:6). Quranist scholars cite several core arguments to support this position:

• Absence of systematic manuals in Hadith literature: Canonical Hadith collections contain fragmented, highly specific, and occasionally conflicting reports regarding minor ritual details (such as hand placement or minor supplications), but lack comprehensive, end-to-end instructions for executing a complete ṣalāh or ḥajj. Quranists argue that this demonstrates that early Muslims relied on living, mass-transmitted community practice rather than written texts to perform their daily worship.
• Pre-existing Abrahamic practices: The Qur'an addresses rituals such as ṣalāh (prayers), zakāh (Compulsory giving), and ḥajj (pilgrimage) as established practices already recognised by Arab society through the historical legacy of the religion of Abraham (Millat Ibrāhīm). Quranists maintain that Muhammad purified and standardized these existing rites, which were subsequently preserved through universal, continuous adoption rather than new textual revelation.

View of Prophethood and "Obey the Messenger"

A central difference between Quranists and mainstream Sunni and Shia thought concerns the meaning of the Quranic command to "obey Allah and obey the Messenger". Traditional scholars understand this as establishing two sources of authority: the Quran and the recorded sayings and actions of Muhammad found in the Hadith literature. Quranists reject this dual-source interpretation.

Quranist writers argue that the Quran itself limits the Messenger's role to the clear delivery of the divine message. They point to several verses:

"Whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed Allah."

—4:80

"The Messenger's duty is only to deliver the message."

—5:99

"Say: 'Obey Allah and the Messenger.' But if they turn away, then Allah does not love the disbelievers."

—3:32

Quranists argue that, since the Messenger's sole duty is the clear delivery of the message (The Quran), obedience to the Messenger (and thus belief in the message he delivered) is equivalent to obedience to God.

One of the most discussed linguistic arguments appears in Quran 53:3–4:

"Nor does he speak (yanṭiqu) from [his own] desire. It is only a revelation revealed."

—53:3–4

The Syrian thinker Muhammad Shahrur argued that the verb yanṭiqu (from the root naṭaqa) refers specifically to the act of uttering or articulating the revealed text, not to ordinary human speech (takallama). In his reading, the verse confirms that when the Messenger recited the Quran he was not speaking from personal desire. It does not mean that every word he spoke in daily life was divine revelation. Traditional interpretation, by contrast, has often treated the verse as proof that the Prophet's speech in general was divinely guided and therefore authoritative beyond the Quran itself.

According to this view, the Messenger's religious role was to receive, deliver, and live according to the Quran. Once the revelation was complete, the binding source of guidance remained the Book itself. Later claims of religious authority based on Hadith are therefore seen as an expansion of the Messenger's role beyond what the Quran itself authorises.

This leads Quranists to reject the classical equation of the "Sunnah of the Prophet" with the content of the Hadith collections. They note that the Quran never uses the term sunnah in connection with Muhammad in the technical sense later developed by jurists, and that the only sunnah explicitly attributed in the Quran is the sunnah of Allah.

Mainstream Sunni and Shia scholars reply that the command to obey the Messenger necessarily includes his detailed teachings and practice, which were preserved through the Hadith. Without these reports, they argue, many Quranic injunctions would remain incomplete. Quranists respond that this underestimates the self-sufficiency and clarity of the Quran, which the text itself repeatedly affirms.

Muhammad the Prophet and Muhammad the Messenger

Within Quranist discourse, a distinction is frequently drawn between Muhammad's role as prophet (nabi) and his role as messenger (rasul). According to this view, the Quran uses the two titles with different emphases. The title "messenger" is understood as referring specifically to Muhammad's function of receiving and delivering the divine revelation (the Quran). Obedience to "the Messenger," as commanded in verses such as 4:80 and 5:99, is therefore interpreted as obedience to the message he was charged to deliver, rather than to his personal words, actions, or decisions outside the scope of revelation.

In contrast, references to Muhammad as "prophet" are often read as relating to his historical and personal circumstances. Quranist writers, including Muhammad Shahrur, maintain that commands and statements addressed to “the Prophet” frequently concern matters limited to his own lifetime or community and do not automatically constitute universal, timeless legislation for later generations. This distinction underpins the broader Quranist position that the binding religious authority of Muhammad is confined to the Quran he transmitted, and does not extend to extra-Quranic reports attributed to him.

Seal of the Prophets and the end of human revelation

A closely related point in Quranist doctrine concerns the finality of Muhammad's role. Quranists point to 33:40, which describes Muhammad as the Seal of the Prophets, as establishing that no human being will receive divine revelation (Waḥy) after him.

"Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but he is the Messenger of God and the Seal of the Prophets."

—33:40

Quranist writers note that the Quran also uses the term "messenger" (rasūl) for angels, not only for humans, citing 35:1:

"Praise be to God, Creator of the heavens and the earth, who made the angels messengers, having wings, two or three or four."

—35:1

They further point to 17:15, which states that God does not punish a people without first sending a messenger to warn them:

"And We were never to punish [a people] until We had sent a messenger [to warn them]." —17:15

From this, Quranist writers argue that "messenger" in the Quran is a broader functional category — one that includes angels and, historically, many human warners sent to earlier nations (40:78) — rather than a title exclusive to bearers of new scripture. On this reading, God did not stop sending "messengers" in the general Quranic sense of warners and signs, but Muhammad's status as Seal of the Prophets means no further human being will be given new divine revelation or scripture after the Quran.

Consequently, when a preacher, a book, a translation of the Quran, or even an angelic sign reaches a modern nation and warns them about God, that fulfills the functional role of a "messenger" being sent to them. Therefore, that nation becomes spiritually accountable because the warning was delivered, even though no new prophet was born.

Quranists and the Five Pillars of Islam

The classical Five Pillars of Islam (profession of faith, ritual prayer, Compulsory giving, fasting during Ramadan, and pilgrimage) are primarily derived from a Hadith known as the Hadith of Gabriel, recorded in the collections of Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim. Quranists generally do not accept this formulation as a definitive or exclusive definition of Islam.

Quranist writers have argued that the traditional Five Pillars cannot function as the universal foundations of the religion because not all of them are obligatory for every person. In particular, they note that Zakat (Compulsory giving) is not required of those without sufficient wealth, as per Quran 2:219 and 65:7. and that Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) is obligatory only for those who are physically and financially able to perform it, as per Quran 3:97. From this perspective, a foundational requirement of a religion described in the Quran as universal should be capable of being fulfilled by any human being, regardless of economic or physical circumstances.

In place of the five-pillar formulation, Quranists commonly emphasize a set of principles that the Quran presents as applicable to all people. These include:

• Belief in the one God
• Belief in His messengers
• The performance of righteous deeds.

They point to verses such as 2:177, 2:285, 4:136, and 5:69, which describe righteousness and true religion in terms of faith in God, the Last Day, the angels, the scriptures, the prophets, and ethical conduct. Quranist authors maintain that the Quran presents Islam as a universal religion of submission to God rather than as a set of practices limited to a particular cultural or historical context. They argue that defining the religion primarily through five specific ritual obligations derived from later Hadith literature risks reducing a broader Quranic message to a narrower set of practices that not all people can perform.

Most Quranists continue to observe forms of prayer, fasting, charity, and pilgrimage. However, they generally derive the details of these practices from the Quranic text itself or from continuous communal practice, rather than from the specific Hadith that enumerates the Five Pillars. They regard the traditional five-pillar list as a later systematization that, while historically influential within Sunni and Shia tradition, does not exhaust the definition of Islam as presented in the Quran.

Predestination and free will

Quranists generally reject the classical formulations of qadar that developed in later Islamic theology and were heavily influenced by Hadith literature. Instead, they derive their understanding solely from the Quran, placing strong emphasis on human free will and moral responsibility.

Emphasis on human choice

Quranist writers frequently cite verses that present belief and disbelief as genuine human choices. Key passages include:

Quranist writers point to 90:10 and 76:3, which describe God as having shown each person "the two paths" and left them free to be grateful or ungrateful, and to 18:29, which states plainly that "whoever wills may believe and whoever wills may disbelieve" — verses understood as affirming that individuals possess real agency and are fully accountable for their decisions. Central to this position is the Quranic concept of absolute divine justice (ʿAdl) and the total negation of systemic divine injustice or oppression (ẓulm). Scholars and commentators within this tradition emphasize that if God coercively predetermined moral choices and subsequently punished individuals for those enforced choices, the internal coherence of Quranic justice would collapse. Quranic passages explicitly disavow divine injustice toward humans, attributing moral failure strictly to human self-wronging:

"Indeed, God does not wrong people in the least, but it is people who wrong themselves."

—10:44

"Whoever does good, it is for their own soul; and whoever does evil, it is against it. Your Lord is never unjust to His servants."

—41:46

Under this framework, human agency (ikhtiyār) and the capacity to choose (mashīʾah) must be real operational factors for divine judgment and personal accountability to remain ethically consistent and fair.

Divine knowledge and human agency

Quranists distinguish between God's perfect foreknowledge and coercive predetermination. They accept that everything is recorded in a divine record:

"No misfortune can happen on earth, or in yourselves, except it is decreed in a record before We bring it about. This is easy for God."

—57:22

This is interpreted as God's complete knowledge of future free choices rather than a forced decree. Quranist exegesis resolves the apparent tension between divine sovereignty and human freedom by differentiating between omniscience (ʿilm) and forced execution (jabr). From a theological standpoint, God operates outside the linear constraints of temporal sequence; thus, the heavenly record (al-Kitāb) reflects an exhaustive, timeless awareness of actions that human beings freely choose to execute in time, rather than a causal force compelling those actions. Rashad Khalifa, founder of the Submitters, expressed a similar view, stating that predestination is a fact from God's perspective, while from the human perspective individuals remain completely free to choose belief or disbelief.

Furthermore, Quranist commentators address verses stating that God "guides whom He wills and misguides whom He wills" (e.g., 14:4) by analyzing them within the broader textual context of the Quran. They argue that divine guidance (hudā) and misguidance (iḍlāl) are not arbitrary pre-allocations, but rather conditional divine responses to prior human moral choices. Verses such as 2:26 and 5:51 indicate that divine misguidance is reserved for those who initiate wrongdoing or arrogant disobedience, whereas divine guidance is extended conditionally to those who actively turn toward God:

"God guides to Himself whoever turns to Him."

—13:27

"He misguides none thereby except the defiantly disobedient."

—2:26

Rejection of deterministic interpretations

Consequently, Quranists reject interpretations that portray human beings as passive instruments of an unchangeable divine will. They argue that such views undermine the Quran's consistent stress on individual accountability, repentance, and the justice of divine judgment on the Day of Resurrection. This approach aligns them more closely with the early emphasis on free will found among the Qadariyah and Muʿtazila, while remaining grounded exclusively in Quranic language.

Quranist perspectives on Predestination (Qadar)

In contrast to mainstream Sunni orthodoxy, which includes belief in divine predestination (al-qaḍāʾ wa-l-qadar) among the six articles of faith, many Quranist writers reject fatalistic determinism. Quranist writers such as Edip Yüksel argue that qadar in the Quran refers to concepts such as "measure," "proportion," and divinely established laws rather than to a predetermined human fate.

Quranist writers emphasize human free agency and moral responsibility, drawing on verses such as Surah 18:29 and Surah 13:11, which states that God "will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves." They maintain that extra-Quranic Hadith collections introduced doctrines depicting pre-recorded fate, which they view as contradictory to the Quranic principle of divine justice.

Application of the Quran in changing times

Quranists regard the Quran as complete, self-sufficient, and valid for all times (6:38, 16:89, 6:114). Because they reject both the Hadith and classical tools of jurisprudence such as Qiyas, the question arises of how a text revealed in the seventh century can respond to new circumstances that appear in later periods and in the modern world.

Principles of application

In practice, Quranists tend to follow three main methods:

• They interpret the Quran primarily through the Quran itself, explaining one verse by means of others rather than turning to external sources.
• They pay close attention to the Arabic wording of the text and treat it as complete and fully detailed, rather than relying on later historical or traditional explanations.
• Some Quranist thinkers, most notably Muhammad Shahrur, distinguish between fixed moral and legal boundaries set by the Quran and areas in which human societies retain flexibility to adapt according to their own conditions.

Muhammad Shahrur’s theory of limits

One approach developed within Quranist thought is the Theory of limits formulated by the Syrian engineer and writer Muhammad Shahrur (1938–2019). According to this theory, many legal verses in the Quran do not prescribe a single fixed ruling. Instead, they establish lower and upper boundaries within which human societies may exercise Ijtihad according to their historical and social conditions.

Shahrur described six mathematical-geometrical models that show different ways these limits can interact. In some cases only a minimum limit is given, in others only a maximum limit, and in still others both limits operate together. Within these boundaries, he argued, believers retain the freedom to adapt rulings to new situations, provided they do not go beyond the limits set by the text.

Overall stance

Quranists do not claim that the Quran contains a ready-made answer for every modern problem. Rather, they generally regard it as providing a stable and complete framework of principles, values, and limits within which each generation is expected to exercise reasoned judgment (Ijtihad), address new circumstances, and develop appropriate solutions while remaining faithful to the text.

Views on human origins and biological evolution

Individual Quranist writers have addressed the relationship between the Qur'an and evolutionary biology. Edip Yüksel has argued for theistic evolution over creationism, citing 29:20 — which instructs believers to "travel through the land and observe how He originated creation" — as scriptural grounds for treating the empirical study of biological origins as consistent with, rather than opposed to, Quranic teaching. He has also been critical of creationist positions within other Islamic movements, including that of the Turkish creationist Adnan Oktar, authoring a Turkish-language book criticising him.

Practice and jurisprudence

Academic scholarship notes that the degree to which extra-Quranic traditions and practical continuity are accepted varies across the Quranist spectrum:

• Practical Traditionalists and Reformists: Accept generational, mass-transmitted practices (Sunnah ʿAmaliyyah) provided they explicitly align with Quranic principles, while maintaining total skepticism toward individual Hadith narrations.
• Strict Scripturalists (Purists): Reject all extra-Quranic sources, historical continuity, and traditional practical rites entirely. They argue that worship practices, including prayer structure and ritual mechanics, must be derived strictly and exclusively from the explicit text of the Qur'an, viewing any non-textual mass practice as susceptible to cultural drift and unauthorized corruption over time.

Despite internal differences regarding historical practices, all Quranists maintain that Hadith collections hold no binding legal authority and cannot serve as a valid basis for establishing religious law (Sharia).

Shahada (creed)

Many Quranists accept a shortened form of the Shahada: lā ʾilāha ʾillā llāh ("There is no deity except God"). They generally omit the second part of the traditional Sunni and Shia testimony ("Muhammad is the messenger of God"), arguing that the Quran itself does not prescribe the longer formula as a required declaration of faith and that adding the name of any prophet to the testimony of God's oneness risks elevating the prophet to a status approaching partnership with God (shirk).

This position is not uniform across all Quranist groups. Some accept the traditional two-part Shahada while still rejecting the authority of Hadith, while others insist strictly on the monotheistic formula alone.

Ṣalāh (prayer)

The practice of prayer (ṣalāh) among Quranists varies based on hermeneutical approaches to the Quranic text and the degree of acceptance of inherited mass practical tradition (tawātur ʿamalī). Quranists observe five daily prayers (Fajr, Dhuhr, ʿAṣr, Maghrib, and ʿIshāʾ), maintaining the total count of five prescribed prayers as an inherited practical tradition rather than a Hadith-derived mandate. However, while the majority perform these five prayers across five distinct times throughout the day, a minority stream within Quranism interprets specific Quranic passages addressing prayer times (such as Surah 17:78 and Surah 11:114) as specifying three distinct prayer periods (Dawn, Sunset, and Night). Consequently, this minority group fulfills all five mandatory prayers scheduled within three daily time windows rather than five separate sessions.

Ritual and Legal Differences

While traditional Sunni and Shia jurisprudence incorporates greetings and supplications upon Prophet Muhammad and Prophet Abraham during the sitting posture (Tashahhud), some Quranists omit these extra-Quranic phrases during the call to prayer (Adhan) and the prayer itself. Quranist theologians base this exclusion on Quranic verses instructing that places of worship and remembrance belong strictly to God alone (e.g., Surah 72:18 and Surah 20:14) and that believers must not make religious distinctions among God's messengers (Surah 2:285).

Additional divergent positions documented among Quranist legal theorists include:

• Menstruation and Devotion: A significant proportion of Quranist scholars maintain that menstruation does not disqualify women from performing ṣalāh or fasting, asserting that the Quranic description of menstruation as a physical discomfort (aḏan) in Surah 2:222 pertains solely to sexual intercourse and physical hygiene, rather than ritual impurity that halts worship.

• Missed Prayers: The mainstream Sunni and Shia concept of making up missed prayers (qaḍāʾ) is generally rejected by Quranist jurists, who view prayer as a time-bound obligation (Surah 4:103) that cannot be retroactively accumulated or transferred once its ordained period has elapsed.
• Congregational Worship: Because the Quran does not explicitly mandate spatial segregation or physical barriers between male and female worshippers, proponents of Quranism generally reject traditional jurisprudence enforcing separate facilities or partitions. In practice, due to the movement's decentralised structure and sparse physical institutions, mixed-gender worship largely occurs within private study circles or progressive reformist congregations, ranging from shared-room arrangements with separated rows to side-by-side prayer.

Women as prayer leaders

Because Quranists derive religious authority from direct textual interpretation rather than juristic consensus, several Quranist organisations have taken the position that women may lead mixed-gender congregational prayer, a practice most Sunni and Shia jurists prohibit. In India, the Quran Sunnat Society, a Kerala-based Quranist organisation founded by Chekannur Maulavi, has been a demonstrative supporter of women's ability to act as imams (prayer leaders) and has campaigned against socially enforced veiling; commentators have noted that Quranist and Islamic feminist organisations in India have at points found their advocacy converging on these issues.

In 2018, Jamida Beevi, General Secretary of the Quran Sunnat Society, became the first woman in India to lead Friday prayers for a mixed-gender congregation, an event that drew condemnation and death threats from some Muslim organisations in Kerala.

Wuḍūʼ (ablution)

Quranist ablution (wuḍūʾ) before prayer is generally limited to the four actions explicitly mentioned in the Quran (5:6): washing the face, washing the hands up to the elbows, wiping the head, and wiping (or washing) the feet up to the ankles. Quranists typically reject additional steps found in traditional Sunni and Shia practice (such as rinsing the mouth and nose, washing each limb three times, or wiping the ears), regarding these as later elaborations derived from the Hadith rather than from the Quranic text itself.

Zakāh (Compulsory giving)

In mainstream Islam, giving Zakāh is a religious duty and amounts to 2.5 percent of annual wealth above a minimum threshold (Nisab), calculated once a year. Quranists derive their practice of Zakāh exclusively from the Quran. The Quran repeatedly commands the payment of Zakāh (for example in 2:43, 2:110, 22:41, and 24:56), yet it never states a fixed percentage such as 2.5 percent.

Because no rate appears in the text, Quranist views on the amount diverge. Some accept the traditional 2.5 percent as a reasonable or historically continuous figure, even while rejecting the Hadith literature that formally established it. Others reject any fixed percentage not found in the Quran and instead point to verses such as 2:219

"They ask you what they should spend. Say: what is surplus"

—2:219

Leaving the exact amount to individual judgment according to means and circumstances.

On the question of timing, many Quranists differ from the mainstream practice of calculating Zakāh once a year on accumulated wealth. They rely particularly on 6:141, which states:

"Eat from its fruit when it yields and give its due on the day of its harvest."

—6:141

Quranist writers interpret the phrase "the day of its harvest" as referring to the moment when income or produce is received. In the case of agricultural produce, this is understood literally as the day the harvest is gathered. For other forms of income, such as salaries or business earnings, the same principle is often extended by analogy, so that Zakāh is paid whenever income is obtained rather than once annually.

Many of these writers further argue that Zakāh is to be paid from the surplus remaining after necessary expenses, rather than from the total gross amount, linking this idea to 2:219. This reading is commonly connected with 70:24–25, which speaks of a recognized right in one’s wealth for the beggar and the deprived.

Nasī' and the lunar calendar

Quranist and reform-minded writers have also revisited the Qur'anic condemnation of nasī' ("postponement"), the pre-Islamic practice tied to the origins of the purely lunar Hijri calendar. The Qur'an states:

"Indeed, postponing [the sacred months] is an increase in disbelief, by which those who disbelieve are led further astray. They allow it one year and forbid it another year, to correspond to the number that God has made sacred, thereby permitting what God has forbidden. Their evil deeds are made to seem fair to them, and God does not guide the disbelieving people."

—9:37

Traditional scholarship reads this verse, together with 9:36 on the twelve months and four sacred months, as a general ban on nasī'. On this view, nasī' meant periodically inserting an extra month into the lunar calendar to keep it aligned with the solar seasons.

This reading is usually linked to two events. First, the Prophet declared during the Farewell Pilgrimage of 10 AH that the calendar had returned to its "natural order." Second, caliph Umar formally adopted, in 17 AH, a purely lunar, non-intercalated calendar dated from the Hijrah. Under the conventional account, this closed off any future insertion of a leap month.

Some recent scholarship proposes a narrower reading of 9:37, following the Quranist principle of interpreting the Qur'an through the Qur'an rather than through later reports. Zein and El-Wakil argue that the verse condemns a specific tribal custom, not intercalation itself. In this custom, a tribe would declare a normally sacred, fight-free month ordinary for that year, and declare an ordinary month sacred in its place. This kept the total count of prohibited months at four while letting the tribe fight whenever it wished.

On this reading, the wrongdoing named by the verse is manipulating which months counted as sacred, not the separate practice of adding a leap month to reconcile the lunar and solar years. Zein and El-Wakil note that the Qur'an does not explicitly prohibit intercalation as such. They cite a tradition preserved in Twelver Shi'a exegetical literature in which a man of the Kinanah tribe proclaims during the pilgrimage season that bloodshed is permitted in Muharram that year, with its sanctity "postponed" to Safar, and the reverse the following year.

This narrower reading converges with the broader Quranist position that binding rulings cannot rest on inference beyond the Qur'an's explicit text. Mainstream Sunni and Shia scholarship, by contrast, continues to treat 9:37 as the scriptural basis for the purely lunar character of the Hijri calendar. On the mainstream view, it also forms the basis for prohibiting intercalation in Islamic religious practice.

Ṣawm (fasting)

Quranists observe the fast of Ramadan in accordance with the Quranic command in 2:183–2:185. They generally do not regard the last day of Ramadan or Eid al-Fitr as a specially mandated holy day, since neither is named or prescribed as such in the Quran.

Although many Quranists reject the traditional purely lunar Islamic calendar and argue that the Qur'an does not prohibit calendar intercalation (Nasi'), the majority continue to observe Ramadan according to the same calendar used by mainstream Sunni and Shia Muslims.

A minority of Quranists, however, go further by insisting that Ramadan should be determined according to a lunisolar calendar rather than the current purely lunar system. They argue that Ramadan was originally tied to a specific solar season, pointing to the historical meaning of the word "Ramadan" as "scorching heat." According to this view, Ramadan begins with the sighting of the new moon in September and remains around September–October, which they consider to be the correct Qur'anic method of determining the month.

Ḥajj (pilgrimage)

Extra-Quranic rituals associated with the Hajj, such as kissing or touching the Black Stone and the symbolic Stoning of the Devil (ramy al-jamarāt), are rejected by many Quranists. They regard these practices as lacking any basis in the Quran and view them as forms of shirk (associating partners with God) or as innovations derived solely from the Hadith literature.

Quranists generally affirm the obligation of the pilgrimage itself when mentioned in the Quran (for example 3:97 and 22:27–22:29), but limit the required rites to those explicitly described in the text, such as circumambulation of the Kaaba (ṭawāf) and the overall pilgrimage to the Sacred House.

Quranist writers further argue that the Quran defines Hajj as occurring across a span of months rather than a fixed narrow window, citing 2:197, which states that "Hajj is [during] well-known months." They note that mainstream practice has restricted the main rites of the pilgrimage to a fixed five-day period (the 8th–13th of Dhu al-Hijjah), whereas the Quran describes the period in the plural as “well-known months.” They further point to the wording of 2:197:

"Whoever obligates [Hajj] upon himself therein..."

—2:197

as indicating that the believer personally chooses when, within these months, to undertake the pilgrimage, rather than being bound to dates fixed by external authority.

Quranist writers identify the "well-known months" of 2:197 with the four sacred months named in 9:36:

"Indeed, the number of months with God is twelve months in the Book of God, [from] the day He created the heavens and the earth; of these, four are sacred..."

—9:36

Some Quranist writers distinguish between Hajj and the Greater Hajj, holding that Hajj (the pilgrimage) may be performed at any time during the four sacred months. By contrast, the “day of the greater pilgrimage” mentioned in the Quran is understood as a single specific day:

"...and a proclamation from God and His Messenger to the people on the day of the greater pilgrimage..."

—9:3

Mainstream Sunni and Shia scholarship identifies that day with the Day of Sacrifice (10 Dhu al-Hijjah), citing a hadith in which Muhammad is reported to have named it as such.

Ridda (apostasy)

Quranists generally reject the classical death penalty for apostasy (ridda), arguing that it has no basis in the Quran. They point to verses such as 2:256:

"There shall be no compulsion in religion"

—2:256

Other passages also affirm freedom of belief and warn against forcing faith upon others (for example 10:99, 18:29, and 109:6).

In their view, the traditional ruling that an apostate must be executed derives exclusively from the Hadith literature and later juristic consensus, both of which they regard as non-binding. Quranist writers maintain that the Quran consistently treats matters of faith as a personal responsibility between the individual and God, with accountability deferred to the afterlife rather than enforced by human authorities in this world.

Riba (usury) and banking

While mainstream Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) relies on Hadith literature to define Riba as any form of predetermined interest—forming the basis of modern Islamic banking—Quranist scholars restrict the definition of Riba strictly to what is delineated in the text of the Quran. Drawing upon Surah (3:130), which forbids consuming Riba "doubled and multiplied," many Quranist and reformist scholars contend that the Quranic prohibition applies specifically to predatory, exorbitant, or compounding usury, and that a modest interest rate charged by modern banks can function as compensation for currency depreciation and administrative cost rather than the exploitative increase the Quran condemns. Proponents of this view point to the difference between commodity-money economies, in which classical rulings on Riba were formulated and long-term inflation was comparatively low, and modern fiat-currency economies, in which purchasing power has eroded more persistently.

Other scholars, including within Islamic finance more broadly, dispute this reasoning on several grounds. They argue that the Quranic condemnation of Riba is not limited to the "doubled and multiplied" case named in 3:130, since other verses (2:275–2:279) prohibit Riba in general terms without a compounding qualifier, and that classical jurists reached the broader definition through exactly the kind of cross-referencing and legal reasoning that Quranists apply elsewhere. Critics of the inflation-compensation argument also note that it is an economic justification rather than a textual one, and that the Quran does not itself distinguish fixed bank interest from other forms of predetermined return.

Some Quranists, conversely, criticize mainstream Islamic banking products as a re-labeling of interest under the guise of trade markups. They argue that cost-plus financing models such as Murabaha replicate the economic function of conventional loans while substituting terminology to achieve Sharia compliance, and that pricing these markups relative to benchmark rates such as SOFR or LIBOR makes the return functionally equivalent to interest. Defenders of conventional Islamic banking respond that the legal form of a transaction — an actual sale and resale of an asset, with attendant risk — is not merely nominal under classical fiqh, and that treating economic equivalence as decisive would collapse a distinction fiqh has long treated as substantive.

Polygamy

Views on polygyny among Quranists diverge significantly from classical Sunni and Shia jurisprudence. Traditional legal schools interpret Surah 4:3 as a general permission for a man to marry up to four wives, provided he treats them equally. In contrast, Quranist scholars argue that the text establishes strict, non-negotiable prerequisites tied exclusively to the care of orphans.

Central to the Quranist argument is a linguistic analysis of the word used in Surah 4:3, yatāma (يَتَامَى, the plural of yatīm, يَتِيم). In classical Arabic lexicography, such as Ibn Manzur's Lisan al-Arab and Edward William Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon, a child is defined as a yatīm specifically upon the death of their father (a fatherless child). Classical Arabic distinguishes this from a child who has lost both parents, designated by the term latīm (لَطِيم, a double-parent orphan), or a child who has lost only their mother, called an ʿajiyy (عَجِيّ, a motherless child).

Because the Qur'an deliberately employs yatāma (fatherless children) rather than latīm (double-parent orphans), Quranist scholars argue that the verse specifically addresses widowed mothers left with fatherless children after events of mass casualty, such as the Battle of Uhud. Under this interpretation, polygyny is not a general sexual or marital privilege, but a socio-economic relief mechanism limited to marrying the widowed mothers of fatherless children to integrate them into established households and protect their inheritance.

Furthermore, Quranists synthesize Surah 4:3—which mandates marrying only one wife if a man fears he cannot treat them with justice—with Surah 4:129, which explicitly states, "You will never be able to be equal between wives, even if you should strive [to do so]." Based on this cross-textual link, reformist theologians such as Edip Yüksel argue that the Qur'an establishes a self-limiting rule that effectively restricts systemic polygyny, establishing monogamy as the sole achievable moral baseline under modern conditions.

Military jihad

In Quranist theology and jurisprudence, a fundamental distinction is drawn between the general concept of jihād (literally "striving" or "exerting effort", which Quranists primarily interpret as intellectual and moral striving using the Qur'an) and Qital (armed warfare). Rejecting the classical legal doctrine of offensive expansionist warfare (jihād al-ṭalab) developed during early medieval empires, Quranists maintain that armed combat is strictly restricted to defensive, reactive, and anti-oppressive operations.

Textual foundations and conditions for warfare

Quranist scholars ground the prohibition of offensive aggression in explicit Quranic injunctions that define the non-negotiable legal boundary for legitimate combat:

• Prohibition of Aggression: Surah 2:190 explicitly mandates:

"Fight in the way of God those who fight you, but do not transgress. Indeed, God does not like transgressors."

—2:190

Quranist exegetes interpret "transgression" (iʿtadū) as initiating unprovoked hostilities, invading foreign lands, or targeting non-combatants.

• Defensive Requirement: Surah 22:39 establishes that military authorisation is granted strictly to:

"those who are being fought, because they were wronged..."

—22:39

Emphasizing that warfare is authorized solely to repel active aggression and physical persecution.

• Mandatory Ceasefire and Neutrality: Under Surah 4:90 and Surah 8:61, if hostile forces incline toward peace or cease fighting, Muslims are explicitly ordered to stop military action immediately. Furthermore, Surah 60:8 commands Muslims to maintain peaceful, equitable, and kindly relations with all non-Muslim communities that have not initiated warfare or expelled believers from their homes.

"Allah does not forbid you from dealing kindly and fairly with those who have neither fought nor driven you out of your homes. Surely Allah loves those who are fair."

—60:8

"If the enemy is inclined towards peace, make peace with them. And put your trust in Allah. Indeed, He ˹alone˺ is the All-Hearing, All-Knowing."

—8:61

Rejection of abrogation (naskh)

A core point of departure between classical jurisprudence and Quranism concerns the hermeneutical doctrine of abrogation (naskh). Classical Sunni jurists historically relied on naskh to argue that the "Sword Verse" (Surah 9:5) abrogated over one hundred earlier peaceful and defensive Quranic verses, thereby legally justifying imperial conquest.

Conversely, Quranist theologians reject the doctrine of textual abrogation entirely, maintaining that the Qur'an is an internally consistent, self-contained text (citing Surah 15:9 and Surah 4:82). Quranists argue that Surah 9:5 was a specific historical ordinance directed exclusively against pagan tribes who had repeatedly breached peace treaties during the Tabuk campaign, rather than an open-ended command against non-Muslims. Consequently, Quranist thinkers contend that utilizing extra-Quranic traditions to justify offensive aggression violates the foundational Quranic principles of bodily sovereignty and freedom of conscience, codified in Surah 2:256 ("There is no compulsion in religion").

Food and dietary laws

Dietary jurisprudence among Quranists is derived exclusively from the explicit text of the Qur'an. Rejecting extra-Quranic dietary prohibitions established in Hadith literature, Quranists maintain that Islamic law specifies only four strictly prohibited categories of food, as codified in Surah 2:173, Surah 5:3, Surah 6:145, and Surah 16:115:

1. Carrion: Animals that die of natural causes, illness, injury, or strangulation before being properly slaughtered (maytah).
2. Running blood: Flowing or poured-forth blood (damm masfūḥ).
3. Swine: The flesh of swine or pork products (laḥm khinzīr).
4. Sacrifices to idols: Food or animals dedicated, sacrificed, or slaughtered in the name of any entity other than God (uhilla li-ghayr Allāh).

Rejection of extra-Quranic taboos

Unlike classical Sunni and Shia legal schools—which prohibit predatory animals with fangs, birds of prey, shellfish, or equine meat based on Hadith narrations—Quranists regard all animals outside the four explicit categories as lawful (halal). Quranist scholars cite Surah 6:145, in which Muhammad is commanded to state:

"Say, ˹O Prophet,˺ I do not find in what has been revealed to me anything forbidden to eat except carrion, running blood, swine—which is impure—or a sinful offering in the name of any other than Allah. But if someone is compelled by necessity—neither driven by desire nor exceeding immediate need—then surely your Lord is All-Forgiving, Most Merciful."

—6:145

Food of the People of the Book and slaughter methods

Quranists accept the ruling of Surah 5:5, which permits eating food prepared by Christians and Jews (the People of the Book). However, Quranist exegetes cross-reference this with Surah 6:118 and Surah 6:121, which command believers to eat only that over which God's name has been pronounced. Consequently, many Quranists pronounce the blessing Bismillah directly over Christian and Jewish meals prior to consumption if the meat was processed commercially without an initial invocation. Modern industrial slaughter techniques used in Western countries are not inherently rejected by Quranists on ritual mechanics alone, provided the animal was not already dead prior to slaughter and was not dedicated to an idol.

Behavioral etiquette

Classical Sunni and Shia jurisprudence incorporates behavioral etiquette derived from Hadith narrations, such as the prohibition against eating or drinking with the left hand. Because Quranists do not consider Hadith collections to be a source of divine law or binding guidance, they reject these behavioral taboos as non-binding cultural customs, permitting the consumption of food with either hand.

Dress code

In Quranist jurisprudence, dress codes and standards of modesty are derived strictly from the text of the Qur'an, rejecting extra-Quranic regulations codified in Hadith literature. Traditional Sunni and Shia legal requirements—such as mandatory female head-covering (hijab), face-veiling (niqab), or compulsory male facial hair (beards)—are considered by Quranist scholars to be cultural or extra-scriptural additions rather than divine mandates.

Quranic verses on modesty

Quranists base their understanding of dress on specific passages, analysing the literal semantic meaning of classical Arabic terms:

• General Modesty: Surah 24:30–31 mandates that both men and women lower their gaze and guard their private parts (furūj). For women, the passage commands drawing their covers or garments (khumur, plural of khimār) over their bosoms or chests (juyūb). Quranist exegetes emphasise that the root word khimār generically means "cover" or "veil" (any fabric covering an area) and that the verse explicitly instructs covering the chest (juyūb), rather than specifying a hair or head covering.
• Outer Garments in Public: Surah 33:59 instructs believing women to lengthen or bring down their outer garments (jalābīb, plural of jilbāb) when abroad, establishing the purpose as recognition and protection against harassment. Quranist reformists argue that the jilbāb serves as a context-dependent cloak or over-garment for public dignity rather than a standardized uniform or facial mask.
• Principle of Righteousness: Surah 7:26 states that God sent down clothing to cover modesty and serve as an adornment, but concludes that "the garment of righteousness" (libās al-taqwā) is paramount.

Punishment for theft

The Quranic verses concerning theft are:

"As for the thief, the male and the female, cut off (fa-iqṭaʿū) their hands (aydiyahumā) as a recompense for what they have earned, as an exemplary punishment from God. God is Mighty, Wise. But whoever repents after their wrongdoing and mends their ways, Allah will surely turn to them in forgiveness. Indeed, Allah is All-Forgiving, Most Merciful."

—5:38–39

Mainstream Sunni and Shia jurisprudence (fiqh) traditionally interprets the verb qaṭaʿa (to cut) in this verse as literal amputation of the hand, subject to strict conditions regarding the value of the stolen property, the manner of theft, and the absence of mitigating circumstances.

Quranist interpreters, relying solely on the Quranic text and Arabic linguistic usage, generally reject the amputation reading. They note that the root q-ṭ-ʿ frequently appears in the Quran with non-literal meanings such as "to sever ties," "to interrupt," or "to mark/cut into." They also observe that the word aydī (hands) is used metaphorically elsewhere in the Quran to mean power, means, or capability (for example 38:45 and 48:10).

Consequently, many Quranists render the verse as a command to "mark, cut, or cut off their hands/means." This is understood as restricting the thief's ability to steal again, imposing a visible mark, or applying a proportionate and reversible deterrent measure rather than permanent physical amputation. They further emphasize the immediately following verse (5:39), which stresses repentance and reform, arguing that irreversible mutilation would contradict the Quran's repeated emphasis on mercy and the possibility of rehabilitation.

This approach differs sharply from classical fiqh, which derives detailed procedural rules — such as minimum value thresholds and rules of evidence — primarily from the Hadith literature, sources that Quranists do not regard as authoritative for religious law.

Male grooming and beards

In classical Sunni and Shia jurisprudence, growing a beard and trimming the mustache are considered obligatory Sunnah based on Hadith commands (e.g., Sahih al-Bukhari). Because Quranists do not view Hadith as binding law, they maintain that facial hair is a matter of personal choice and aesthetic preference rather than a religious requirement.

Hadith

Quranists believe that Hadiths – while not being reliable sources of religion – can be used as a reference to get an idea on historical events. They argue that there is no harm in using Hadiths to get a common idea on the history as long as they are not taken as historical facts. According to them, a Hadith narration about history can be true or can be false, but a Hadith narration adding rulings to religion is always false.

This position is rooted in the view that the Quran is complete and fully detailed (6:114, 16:89), and that any additional religious legislation derived from post-Quranic narrations constitutes an unauthorised addition to divine law. Academic studies of the movement note that while Quranists vary in their degree of rejection, the majority treat the entire Hadith corpus as historically secondary and religiously non-binding.

Wasiyyah (the will) and inheritance

Quranists distinguish between two layers of Quranic legislation on the disposal of an estate: a general command to write a personal will (waṣiyyah), and a set of fixed numerical shares for specific relatives. They read the Qur'an as giving the personal will explicit priority over the fixed shares.

"It is decreed for you, when death approaches any of you, if he leaves wealth, that he makes a bequest (waṣiyyah) for parents and near relatives, according to what is fair — a duty upon the righteous."

—2:180

Quranist writers note that the verses which set out the numerical shares for children, parents and spouses each state that these shares are calculated only after the bequest has been paid out: in Surah An-Nisa's inheritance verses (4:11–4:12), each time a share is named — for the parents, the spouse, or the siblings — the Qur'an repeats the qualifying phrase "...after any bequest which was made, or debt," making the payment of debts and the honouring of the deceased's bequest a repeated precondition rather than an afterthought.

On this basis, Quranists argue that the fixed fractions of Surah An-Nisa function as a default distribution supplied by God for cases of intestacy, rather than a mandatory formula that overrides an individual's own testamentary wishes. Under this reading, a person may lawfully leave a larger share to a family member in greater need — for example a daughter in financial difficulty; Quranists criticised Sharia court rulings that invalidated such wills in favour of the standard fractions as contrary to the Qur'an.

Classical and mainstream Sunni and Shia jurisprudence takes the opposite position. Most jurists hold that 2:180 was restricted or abrogated by the later, more detailed verses of inheritance, citing a hadith in which Muhammad is reported to have said that "God has given everyone their due right, so there is no bequest for an heir"; on this basis a will is void if it benefits an heir who already receives a fixed Quranic share, and is capped at one-third of the estate even for non-heirs.

Quranists reject this hadith as an unauthorised addition to divine legislation, consistent with their broader rejection of the doctrine that a hadith can abrogate the Qur'an. They argue that no verse of the Qur'an restricts the proportion of an estate a person may bequeath, and that inventing such a restriction amounts to legislating "what God did not authorise" — a matter the Qur'an itself links to shirk (42:21). Quranist writers argue that the "no bequest for an heir" hadith cannot be reliably traced to Muhammad, and that applying it produces results that conflict with the Qur'an's own wording on inheritance, which repeatedly makes the fixed shares conditional on a bequest first being honoured.

Tafsīr

Although some Quranist scholars have produced works of exegesis, most Quranists view formal external commentary as non-binding. Quranist hermeneutics relies primarily on intra-textual cross-referencing (analysing verses through other verses) alongside individual reason (aql).

Quranists generally reject traditional interpretive hierarchies and clergy, maintaining that any reader can engage the text directly through rational inquiry and linguistic analysis. Consequently, no exegesis—including works by prominent Quranist figures—is considered authoritative or obligatory.

Other

Beyond these core areas of law and ritual, Quranists hold a range of further positions—some rejecting practices as unsupported innovations, others affirming rulings they consider explicit in the text—that they derive independently from the Quran rather than from Hadith or later tradition.

• Circumcision is generally viewed as irrelevant or non-religious, since it is not mentioned in the Quran.
• Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha are often treated as cultural rather than religiously mandated festivals, as neither is named or prescribed as such in the Quran.
• The headscarf (hijab) is not considered obligatory for women; Quranist interpretations of Q 24:31 and 33:59 emphasize covering the chest and outer garments rather than the hair or face.
• Cremation is regarded by some Quranists as permissible because the Quran contains no prohibition against it and does not exclusively require burial.
• Torture beyond the specific corporal punishments stated in the Quran is rejected.
• Stoning (rajm) for adultery or other offences is rejected on the ground that it does not appear in the Quran; the Quranic penalty for zina is flogging (Q 24:2).
• Prohibitions on music, figurative drawing, and the making of statues (including images of prophets) are rejected as extra-Quranic.
• Restrictions on men wearing gold or silk, or on shaving the beard, are rejected as lacking Quranic foundation.
• Dogs are not regarded as unclean or to be avoided; the Quran mentions dogs in neutral or positive contexts (e.g., Q 18:18) and permits their use in hunting (Q 5:4).
• Quranists generally regard homosexual acts as prohibited on the basis of the Quranic narrative of the people of Lot (Lut), in which the primary sin highlighted is men approaching men with desire instead of women (7:80–81, 26:165–166, 27:54–55, and 29:28–29).
• Quranists also consider intentional gender transition (transgenderism) to be forbidden (Sin), interpreting it as a form of "changing the creation of God," which the Quran attributes to the command of Satan in 4:119, they view this as a violation of the natural order established by God.
• Belief in the Mahdi or the Dajjal is rejected because neither figure is mentioned in the Quran; both appear only in later Hadith literature.

Anti-institutionalism and free thought

A central tenet of modern Quranist philosophy is the rejection of institutionalized religious authority and clerical hierarchies, emphasizing individual accountability and personal engagement with scripture. Quranists argue that traditional Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and the establishment of authoritative clerical bodies (such as the ulama) have created an artificial intermediary between the individual and God, which they view as unscriptural.

Quranist discourse heavily relies on textual anti-conformism, grounding their anti-establishment stance in Quranic verses that explicitly warn against following consensus or majority opinion in matters of faith, doctrine, or religious law purely out of tradition. A foundational scriptural reference frequently cited by Quranists is Surah Al-An'am (6:116):

"And if you obey most of those upon the earth, they will mislead you from the way of Allah. They follow not except assumption, and they are not but falsifying."

—6:116

Proponents assert that reliance on historical consensus (ijma) or institutionalized sectarian traditions leads to intellectual stagnancy and spiritual corruption. Consequently, Quranism promotes individual critical thinking (ijtihad) and personal reasoning (aql) as divine imperatives, asserting that each believer must independently read, analyse, and apply the Quranic text ideally with sufficient knowledge of its Arabic, without blindly adhering to clerical decrees. They point to 47:24, which asks rhetorically whether people fail to examine the Qur'an because "there are locks upon their hearts," framing a lack of independent reflection as a spiritual failing rather than a neutral choice, and to 4:82, which challenges readers to search the text for contradiction, which Quranists interpret as encouraging readers to examine the Qur'an itself rather than treating inherited interpretations as beyond scrutiny, a reading extended to 38:29, which describes the Qur'an as revealed specifically so that people "may carefully examine its verses."

Individual interpretation vs. centralised authority

Because Quranism fundamentally rejects centralised religious institutions, the movement lacks a universal governing body, formal clergy, or standardised creed. Critics argue that this decentralization leads to extreme interpretative subjectivism, resulting in wildly divergent understandings of fundamental practices such as prayer, almsgiving, and ritual purity.

Conversely, Quranist thinkers generally view interpretative differences as a natural consequence of allowing individuals to engage directly with the Quran rather than treating a particular group of scholars or an established tradition as the final religious authority. From this perspective, keeping interpretation open allows the Quran to be understood and applied in different circumstances and in light of new knowledge, while avoiding the establishment of a fixed religious orthodoxy, provided that such interpretations remain grounded in the Quran itself and do not contradict its clear and foundational verses, which the Quran describes as the "Mother of the Book" in Surah 3:7. They therefore characterize this approach as preserving what they regard as the original, decentralized spirit of early Islamic thought.

Quranists draw a distinction between religious authority and collective decision-making. They argue that the Quran itself is complete and sufficient for matters of faith, doctrine, and religious law, rendering any centralised religious authority or binding scholarly consensus (ijma) unnecessary and, in their view, unsupported by the Quran. At the same time, they regard consultation (shura) as a principle governing collective affairs. They frequently cite 42:38, which praises those “whose affair is consultation among themselves.” While Quranist thinkers commonly interpret this principle as applying to collective decision-making in political, social, and practical matters, some Quranist thinkers also regard consultation as relevant to communal deliberation more broadly. The verse itself does not explicitly restrict shura to worldly affairs or exclude religious questions; rather, the distinction between religious interpretation and collective decision-making reflects their broader view that the Quran provides the ultimate basis for religious rulings, while matters requiring collective action may be addressed through consultation.

Institutionalization and critique of clerical authority

In academic analyses of modern Islamic reform, Quranist literature is characterized by its systemic critique of traditional institutionalization and scholarly authority. Writers within the movement argue that the historical rise of formal legal schools (madhhabs) and clerical bodies (the ulama) gradually introduced systemic vulnerabilities into religious practice, citing three main concerns: that formal hierarchies position scholars as intermediaries between God and believers, making clerical positions susceptible to political patronage and personal ambition; that established institutions tend to prioritize defending consensus (ijma) over open inquiry once they hold social and political power; and that reliance on established hierarchies encourages passive compliance among lay believers rather than direct engagement with scripture.

Defenders of institutionalized religious scholarship, and critics of Quranism's anti-institutional stance, argue that formal scholarly structures serve functions that individual interpretation does not readily replace. They contend that peer review among trained scholars historically functioned as an error-correction mechanism, subjecting interpretive claims to scrutiny before they gained authority, and that this differs from Quranism's more decentralized model in which, critics argue, an individual reader's interpretation faces no equivalent structural check. Critics also point to the wide range of interpretive outcomes across the Quranist movement itself — visible, for example, in its internal disagreements over prayer times, Zakāh calculation, and the Islamic calendar — as evidence that removing institutional checks does not eliminate interpretive disagreement but instead disperses it to the individual level, with no established mechanism for resolving it.

Quranist writers respond that this criticism understates the risks of institutionalization itself: that historical consensus (ijma) has at times entrenched positions with weak textual grounding, and that individual engagement with the text, guided by reason (aql) and cross-referencing within the Qur'an, is preferable to deference to an authority structure they regard as historically contingent rather than divinely mandated.

Individual accountability and rejection of scholarly excuses

Under Quranist theology, individual accountability is absolute, meaning that shifting moral or spiritual responsibility to religious teachers, jurists, or ancestral scholars is rejected as a valid defensive argument before God. Writers in the movement assert that because God provided each human with independent reasoning faculties (aql) alongside a clear scriptural guide, outsourcing moral discernment to a third party constitutes an evasion of individual duty. Quranists maintain that mainstream traditions permitting religious blind following (taqlid) violate foundational principles of the text, noting that the Quran explicitly denies the transfer of spiritual guilt:

"And no bearer of burdens will bear the burden of another. And if a heavily laden soul calls [another] to carry some of its load, nothing of it will be carried, even if he should be a close relative."

—35:18

Furthermore, Quranist literature emphasises that the text describes explicit scenes from the Day of Judgment where subordinates unsuccessfully attempt to excuse their errors by blaming their scholarly or political leaders. Movement thinkers frequently cite Surah Al-Ahzab (33:67) as a direct scriptural warning that following religious dignitaries will not insulate an individual from divine judgment:

citing 33:67, in which followers are depicted admitting on Judgment Day that they "obeyed our masters and our dignitaries, and they led us astray from the way." Quranist texts argue that treating human rulings (fatwas) as divinely binding amounts to a form of shirk (associating partners with God), drawing parallels to Quranic criticisms of past religious groups who elevated their clergy to the status of lawmakers. By arguing that leadership will ultimately disown its followers at the judgment, Quranists frame independent textual reflection not just as an intellectual right, but as an unavoidable individual obligation for salvation.

"[And they should consider] when those who have been followed disown those who followed them, and they [all] see the punishment, and cut off from them are the ties [of relationship]."

—2:166

Around the world

Demographics

No comprehensive census or survey of the global Quranist population exists. Major demographic studies of the worldwide Muslim population, such as the Pew Research Center's Mapping the Global Muslim Population, report sectarian affiliation only as a Sunni–Shia breakdown and do not track Quranism as a distinct category.

Fanack attributes the absence of reliable figures in part to concealment: in several Arab countries, most Quranists reportedly hide their beliefs for fear of harassment or prosecution. Reflecting this, both Fanack and the Minority Rights Group describe Quranists generally as "a small group" of Muslims.

Country-level estimates exist only in a small number of cases. In India, the Quranist population was estimated at approximately one million as of 2024. No comparable estimates have been published for Egypt, where Quranism is likewise described as a minority current, or for other countries where Quranist activity has been documented.

In the 21st century, Qur'anist rejection of the Hadith has gained traction among modernist Muslims who want to throw out any Hadith that they believe contradicts the Qur'an. Both modernist Muslims and Qur'anists believe that the problems in the Islamic world come partly from the traditional elements of the Hadith and seek to reject those teachings. Rejecting the Hadith has become a growing trend in the Middle East and North Africa, such as in Egypt and Morocco.

Quranists in Egypt and elsewhere have stirred heated discussions in the Muslim world. Quranism has been criticised by Sunnis and Shias. The Sunni belief is that "...the Quran needs the Sunnah more than the Sunnah needs the Quran." Sunnis and Shias argue that Islam cannot be practised without Hadith. Sunnis have often described Quranists as Khawarij.

Egypt

In Egypt, Quranists are a religious minority. The Quranist trend began in 1977, when Quranists took the initiative to debunk Sahih al-Bukhari and its assumed sanctification inside Al-Azhar Mosque. Quranists who have been vocal in their criticism of Hadiths include Ahmed Subhy Mansour, Ibrahim Eissa, Islaam Behery, Khaled Muntaser, and Ahmed Abdo Maher.

India

Quranism gained a significant following in India in the 19th century. The movement introduced by Syed Ahmad Khan was the most influential and coordinated effort in the formation of Quranism. Another ground for the creation of Quranism was opposition to Ahl-i Hadith. Another influential Quranist during this period was Chiragh Ali. Two movements started in the Indian subcontinent after the publication of Syed Ahmad Khan's and Chiragh Ali's beliefs. The center of the first movement was in Lahore, led by Abdullah Chakralawi. Chakralawi founded the Ahl-i Quran movement, which has been described by Aziz Ahmad and Dietrich Reetz as a "fundamentalist splinter group of Ahl-i-Hadith" while Francis Robinson has described it as puritanical. Alongside his criticism of Hadiths, Chakralawi opposed Sufism and vehemently condemned the shrine-based practices and Piri-Muridi traditions of the time.

Chakralawi established a Quranist mosque with the financial assistance of his disciple Shaykh Muhammad Chittu (d. 1911) in Lahore. Mohammad Ramadan was a student of Chakralawi who established the Quranist sect "Omaht Moslem" and the Quranist institution "Ahl al-Zekr va al-Quran". Another Quranist sect in Amritsar was founded by Khawaja Ahmad al-Din Amritsari, who later founded the "Omeh Moslemeh Association" in Lahore.

In 2024, the Quranist population in India was estimated to be one million.

Iran

Like some of their counterparts in Egypt such as Muhammad Tawfiq Sidqi and Mohammed Abu Zaid al-Damanhury, some reformist scholars in Iran who adopted Quranist beliefs came from institutions of higher learning. Shaykh Hadi Najmabadi, Mirza Rida Quli Shari'at-Sanglaji, Mohammad Sadeqi Tehrani, and Sayyid Abu al-Fadl Burqaʻi were educated in traditional Shia universities in Najaf and Qom. However, they believed that some beliefs and practices that were taught in these universities, such as the veneration of Imamzadeh and a belief in Raj'a, were irrational and superstitious and had no basis in the Qur'an. And rather than interpreting the Qur'an through the lens of Hadith, they interpreted the Qur'an with the Qur'an (Tafsīr al-Qur’an bil-Qur’an). These reformist beliefs provoked criticism from traditional Shia scholars like Ayatollah Khomeini, who attempted to refute the criticisms made by Sanglaji and other reformists in his book Kashf al-Asrar. Qur'an-centered beliefs have also spread among Muslims like Ali Behzadnia, who became Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare and Acting Minister of Education shortly after the Iranian Revolution. He has criticised the government in Iran for being undemocratic and totally alien to the "Islam of the Quran".

Niger and Nigeria

Kala Kato is a Quranist movement based in Niger and northern Nigeria. Kala Kato leaders established a mosque in Kaduna. In 2009, they engaged in skirmishes with Nigerian police at Zango on the outskirts of Bauchi, resulting in the deaths of 38 people. Similar cases occurred in Maiduguri in 2004. In Niger, Sunni Imams have urged the government to suppress Kala Kato, who have been described as militant.

Previously in Nigeria, Quranism took on a militant dimension, with the Yan Tatsine movement, founded by Mohammed Marwa, better known by his nickname Maitatsine, which publicly adopted the slogan "Only Qur'an" as the foundation of the religion.

Russia

In the Russian Federation, intellectual discussions around Quran-centric reformism—often referred to in regional academic literature as "Qur'anic humanism" or "Euro-Islam"—gained visibility through debates within official Islamic institutions, particularly in Tatarstan and Moscow. Prominent Muslim intellectuals, including philosopher Tawfik Ibragim and former Tatarstan Deputy Mufti Rustam Batyr (Batrov), advocated for revisiting classical legal methodology (fiqh) by prioritizing the ethical framework of the Qur'an over medieval Hadith-based legal interpretations.

In 2018, the Council of Ulema under the Russian Council of Muftis (DUM RF) issued a controversial theological stance that generated significant debate regarding the authority of Hadith literature versus the primacy of the Qur'an. Although officially intended to articulate a moderate, reform-oriented methodology of ijtihad (independent legal reasoning), critics and commentators argued that the text implicitly favored a Quran-centric perspective. The document asserted that uncritical reliance on late historical reports (*rivayat*) and medieval commentaries had led to stagnation in Islamic thought, suggesting that an ideal, ethical society should draw its core guidance directly from the Qur'an.

The document sparked widespread debate among Russian Muslim theologians, academics, and public intellectuals. While proponents of Islamic reform and "Qur'anic humanism" praised the initiative for promoting intellectual dynamism and challenging rigid traditionalism, traditionalist scholars and Hadith-centrists expressed strong concerns over what they perceived as an erosion of the Sunnah and classical jurisprudence.

Saudi Arabia

In 2023, in a major departure from Wahhabism, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud ordered the establishment of an authority in Medina to scrutinise uses of the Hadith that are used by preachers and jurists to support teachings and edicts on all aspects of life. According to Khmer Times, the reforms of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have been influenced by the Ahl-e Quran group.

Previously, in 2018, Saudi Quranist scholar Hassan al-Maliki was arrested and charged with capital crimes for his political views, opposition to the more strict Saudi Wahhabism, and for promoting ideas that have been described as "Quranist", "moderate", "tolerant". Other Saudi intellectuals, like Abd al-Rahman al-Ahdal, continue to advocate for the abandonment of Hadith and a return to the Qur'an.

Syria

There is a Quranist community within Syria, who began forming in the 19th century and followed the teachings set forth by the Indian theologian Syed Ahmad Khan and then spread to Syria soon afterwards via intermediary pilgrims. However, Quranist adherents precede these 19th century developments in the form of Mu'tazilites such as Ibrāhīm an-Naẓẓām, who lived for some period in these environs. Contemporary adherents of Quranism in Syria have included Muhammad Shahrur.

Turkey

In Turkey, Quranist ideas became particularly noticeable, with portions of the youth either leaving Sunni Islam or converting to Quranism. There has been significant Quranist scholarship in Turkey, with there being even Quranist theology professors in significant universities, including scholars like Yaşar Nuri Öztürk and Caner Taslaman.

The "Ankara School" was characterised by historical criticism and a revivification of Mu'tazilite rationality. The origin of its approach is traced to the 1980s, when Edip Yüksel, invoking critical Hadith studies to question the reliability of the Sunnah's transmission, proposed a Quran-only formula.

Quranists have responded to the criticisms of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) with arguments and challenged them to a debate.

Tunisia

In Tunisia, Quranist ideas have been associated with the historian and Islamologist Mohamed Talbi (1921–2017). Talbi advocated reliance on the Quran as the primary source of religious guidance and was critical of traditional interpretations based on Hadith and classical jurisprudence. In 2013, he founded the International Association of Quranic Muslims.

Quranist voices in Tunisia have participated in public debates about the role of religion in society, particularly after the Tunisian revolution in 2011, though they remain a minority current.

Other places

In Morocco, rejecting the Hadith has become a growing trend. Quranists who have been vocal in their criticism of Hadiths include Ahmed Assid, Mohamed Lamsiah, and Rachid Aylal.

In 2015, Quranists in Sudan were imprisoned and sentenced to death for recognising the Qur'an and rejecting the Hadith. After being arrested for more than five weeks, the men were released on bail. Quranists are present in Pakistan. In 1920, the Lahore High Court gave legitimacy to the Ahl-e Quran group as a Muslim sect.

Legal status

The legal treatment of Quranists varies considerably by country, ranging from unrestricted practice to state-sanctioned harassment and criminal prosecution.

In Egypt, adherents have periodically faced state action over their religious beliefs. In August 2020, Egyptian security forces detained Reda Abdel Rahman, a teacher and Qur'anist blogger, along with several relatives; his relatives were released after a few days, but Abdel Rahman was held incommunicado for more than forty days before being brought before state prosecutors and charged with joining a terrorist organisation and spreading false news. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) called for his release, stating that Egypt's blasphemy laws and pre-trial detention practices had been used against him because of his religious interpretation. Abdel Rahman was released in February 2022 after roughly a year and a half in pre-trial detention.

In Saudi Arabia, authorities arrested the Quranist writer Hassan al-Maliki in September 2017 and brought charges against him in October 2018; Human Rights Watch reported that Saudi prosecutors sought the death penalty, with two of the fourteen charges relating specifically to his questioning of the authenticity of certain hadith and his criticism of early Islamic religious figures, alongside separate charges concerning political statements.

In Sudan, twenty-five men were charged with apostasy and threatened with the death penalty in 2015 after being accused of following Quranist teachings; they were released on bail after more than five weeks in detention.

By contrast, Quranist groups and publications operate openly and without legal restriction in some countries. In Pakistan, the Lahore High Court ruled in 1920 that a waqf (religious endowment) established in favour of the Ahl al-Quran movement was valid under Muhammadan law, effectively recognising the group's standing as a Muslim religious body. In Turkey, Quranist theologians have held academic posts at public universities.

Criticism

Quranism has been subject to significant criticism from Sunni and Shia scholars, as well as from some academic observers.

Mainstream Muslim scholars argue that the Quran itself repeatedly commands believers to obey the Messenger and to take him as a model (for example Quran 3:31, 4:59, 33:21, and 59:7). They maintain that detailed knowledge of the Prophet's practice (Sunnah) is indispensable for understanding and implementing many Quranic injunctions, particularly those concerning ritual prayer, zakat, pilgrimage, and legal rulings, and that this knowledge is preserved primarily in the Hadith literature.

Critics further contend that complete rejection of the Hadith corpus leaves core religious practices without clear guidance, since the Quran does not specify the exact form of the five daily prayers, the precise rates of zakat, or many procedural details of the pilgrimage. They also argue that the historical transmission of Hadith was subject to rigorous authentication methods developed by classical scholars, and that dismissing the entire corpus on the basis of late compilation or the existence of fabricated reports is methodologically excessive.

In several Muslim-majority countries, Quranist views have been described by religious authorities as a form of innovation (bidʿah) or even apostasy. Scholars associated with Al-Azhar University in Egypt have publicly labelled Quranists as a threat to Islam. Similar condemnations have been issued by mainstream Muslim scholars in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and elsewhere, sometimes resulting in legal or social pressure against individuals associated with the movement.

Quranist writers have responded to these criticisms by arguing that the Quran presents itself as clear and complete (for example Quran 6:114, 16:89, and 41:3), and that obedience to the Messenger means obedience to the message he delivered—the Quran—rather than to later reports attributed to him. They also contend that many details of ritual practice were preserved through continuous communal practice rather than through written Hadith collections.

Some academic observers note that while Quranism shares certain reformist impulses with 19th- and 20th-century Islamic modernism, its more radical rejection of all extra-Quranic tradition has remained a minority position and has not gained broad institutional acceptance within the wider Muslim community.

Epistemic and historical objections

A frequent objection raised by mainstream Sunni and Shia scholars against Quranism is the charge of inconsistency. They argue that the same early Muslim community — the Companions and those who followed them — transmitted both the Quran and the reports about the Prophet's words and actions. Therefore, accepting the reliability of the Quran’s transmission while rejecting the Hadith is, in their view, methodologically inconsistent.

Traditional scholars maintain that the Quran was memorized, written down, and standardized by the same generation that also transmitted descriptions of how the Prophet performed prayer, collected zakat, and explained Quranic rulings. They contend that confidence in the integrity of that early community cannot be applied selectively only to the Quranic text.

A second related argument focuses on the practical necessity of the Prophet's example. Scholars point to Quranic verses that command believers to obey the Messenger and take him as a model (3:31, 4:59, 33:21, 59:7). They argue that many of these commands would remain incomplete without knowledge of the Prophet's concrete practice, knowledge preserved primarily in the Hadith literature. Without this material, they claim, core rituals such as the exact form of the daily prayers or the detailed rites of pilgrimage cannot be derived from the Quranic text alone.

An early example of this line of reasoning is found in a report attributed to the Companion Imran ibn Husain. When a man asked that only the Quran be taught and the Hadith left aside, Imran replied that reliance on the Quran alone would leave believers unable to know the number of units in the daily prayers, the rites of pilgrimage, or the details of other religious practices.

Quranist writers respond by distinguishing the nature of the two transmissions. They argue that the Quran was preserved through mass transmission (Tawatur) on a scale that makes systematic alteration virtually impossible, and that God explicitly guaranteed its protection (15:9). In contrast, they maintain that the majority of Hadith reports are solitary (āḥād) narrations compiled more than a century after the Prophet’s death and therefore do not enjoy the same degree of certainty.

Traditional scholars generally regard this distinction as insufficient. They maintain that the early Muslim community did not treat the Quran and the Prophet's explanatory practice as two unrelated bodies of material, and that the historical process of preservation applied to both.

Beyond the transmission-consistency argument, mainstream scholars also argue that several of the specific doctrinal reinterpretations advanced within Quranism — including alternative readings of Riba, the calendar verse 9:37, and the punishment for theft — rely on lexical or contextual arguments that are themselves contested within specialist scholarship, and that presenting a minority philological reading as textually decisive, without equal treatment of the majority position's own textual and historical basis, risks overstating the case for reinterpretation. Quranist writers respond that mainstream objections of this kind often assume the correctness of later juristic consensus as the standard against which a reading is judged, which they regard as circular given their broader rejection of the authority of that consensus.

Selective reliance on Hadith as historical evidence

Critics have pointed to a tension between the Quranist rejection of Hadith as a source of religious law and the practice, common among Quranist writers, of citing specific Hadith reports as historical evidence for their own positions — for instance, narrations describing Umar's alleged prohibition on writing Hadith, Abu Bakr's reported burning of an early collection of traditions, or other reports drawn from canonical collections such as Sahih Muslim. Because these narrations are themselves Hadith, critics argue that invoking them as reliable historical testimony while denying that the Hadith corpus as a whole carries any binding authority risks applying an inconsistent standard: a report is treated as usable when it supports the Quranist position and dismissed when it does not.

Quranist writers respond that this criticism conflates two distinct questions: the historical reliability of a report and its status as a source of religious law. They maintain that a Hadith narration, like any other historical document — a classical Arabic dictionary, a chronicle, or a biography — can be weighed on ordinary historical grounds and cited for context or corroboration without thereby being treated as divinely binding legislation. On this view, a report about history can be judged true or false like any other historical claim, but no Hadith — regardless of how plausible its content — can add a binding rule to religion; it is the claim to religious authority, not the use of historical material as such, that Quranists reject. They note that this is the same standard by which they consult external, non-scriptural sources generally — classical Arabic lexicons, works of history, and philology — for linguistic or contextual background, without regarding any of them as sources of divine law.

Critics reply that this distinction is easier to state than to apply consistently in practice, since deciding which Hadith reports count as reliable history and which do not is itself an interpretive judgment made by the individual reader, with no agreed method for adjudicating disputed cases.

Notable figures and organizations

Notable organisations

• Association Internationale des Musulmans Coraniques, Quranist organisation founded in Tunisia promoting Quranism and countering Salafism
• Izgi Amal, Kazakh Quranist organisation
• Kala Kato, mostly Nigerian Quranist movement
• Quran Sunnat Society, Indian Quranist movement, with its headquarters in Kerala
• Tolu-e-Islam (organization), non-denominational Quranist organisation founded by Ghulam Ahmed Perwez
• United Submitters International, Quranist organization founded in Tucson, Arizona

Notable individuals

Individuals with full or partial Quranistic ideas include:

• Muhammad Shahrur (1938–2019), Syrian civil engineer, philosopher and author. He developed a contemporary reading (qirāʾa muʿāṣira) of the Quran that rejected traditional medieval tafsīr and Hadith-based authority. Central to his methodology is the principle of anti-synonymy (no tarāduf): he argued that no two words in the Quran are true synonyms and that each term carries a distinct meaning. This led him to differentiate key terms such as al-Kitāb, al-Qurʾān, al-Dhikr and others that classical scholarship often treated as interchangeable. He also formulated the Theory of limits (ḥudūd Allāh), according to which the Quran sets fixed upper and lower boundaries for legislation while allowing human societies flexibility within those boundaries, and he largely rejected classical abrogation (naskh). His works, especially Al-Kitāb wa-l-Qurʾān: Qirāʾa Muʿāṣira (1990), provoked strong opposition from traditional Sunni scholars while influencing later Quran-centric and reformist thought.

• Mohammad Sadeqi Tehrani (1926–2011), Iranian Shia thinker who followed a Quranist approach in his legal ways. He studied in seminaries of Qum, Iran under Ruhollah Khomeini and Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i.

• Kassim Ahmad (1933–2017), Malaysian intellectual, writer, poet and an educator known for his rejection of the authority of Hadiths. He was the founder of the Quranic Society of Malaysia. At the time of his death, he was working on a Malay translation of the Quran.

• Muammar Gaddafi (1942–2011), Libyan revolutionary, politician and political theorist. He governed Libya as the "Brotherly Leader" of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya until 2011. He ruled according to his own Third International Theory.

• Gamal al-Banna (1920–2013), Egyptian author and trade unionist.

• Mustafa İslamoğlu (born 1960), Turkish theologian, poet and writer. He was criticised in Turkey and received threats for his ideas that promoted logic above tradition and denying the authority of Hadith, who he saw to be fabricated.

• Rashad Khalifa (1935–1990), Egyptian-American biochemist, professor, theologian, computer expert and Islamic reformer. In his book Quran, Hadith and Islam and his English translation of the Qur'an, Khalifa argued that the Qur'an alone is the sole source of Islamic belief and practice. He claimed that the Qur'an had a code-system based on the number 19 which proved its divinity.

• Hassan al-Maliki (born 1970), a Saudi Arabian writer, historian and scholar.

• Ahmed Subhy Mansour (born 1949), Egyptian-American Islamic scholar.

• Chekannur Maulavi (born 1936), Islamic cleric who lived in Edappal in Malappuram district of Kerala, India. He was noted for his controversial and unconventional interpretation of Islam based on the Qur'an alone.

• Yaşar Nuri Öztürk (1951–2016), Turkish university professor of Islamic theology, lawyer, columnist and a former member of Turkish parliament. Öztürk died in 2016, due to stomach cancer.

• Muhammad Tawfiq Sidqi (1881–1920), Egyptian scholar and physician who focused on criticising Hadith as a whole from the Qur'an as well as based on Hadithic pseudo-scientific claims on medicine.

• Mohamed Talbi (1921–2017), Tunisian historian and professor. He was the founder of the Association Internationale des Musulmans Coraniques (AIMC), or International Association of Quranic Muslims.

• Caner Taslaman (born 1968), Turkish academician and writer known for his works on the Big Bang theory and the scientific structure of the Qur'an.

• Edip Yüksel (born 1957), Turkish philosopher, lawyer, Quranist advocate, author of Nineteen: God's Signature in Nature and Scripture, Manifesto for Islamic Reform and a co-author of Quran: A Reformist Translation. He taught philosophy and logic at Pima Community College and medical ethics and criminal law courses at Brown Mackie College.

• In addition to these names, Quranists assert that naturally Muhammad and his true companions were also Qur’an-centric.